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ABSTRACT 
The issue of economic sanctions has become a popular foreign policy tool that is usually resorted 
to in dealing with states whose policies are deemed to be repugnant to acceptable foreign 
international norms. The dominant rationale behind the imposition of economic sanctions against 
the target state is based on the presumption that such punitive measures will inevitably bring about 
behaviour modification in the target state. Related to this belief is that the citizens of the target 
state will embark on a popular revolt against their government as a result of the national hardships 
caused by the imposed economic sanctions. Regardless of the fact that there is no empirical 
evidence on the efficacy of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool for policy modification, 
economic sanctions have remained the most popular foreign policy tool when dealing with errant 
or rogue states. 
The thesis is premised on the consensus of many scholars that economic sanctions do not lead to 
behaviour modification in the target state, instead, they actually create a situation whereby those 
who are supposed to be helped by economic sanctions end up suffering the most as a result of the 
negative consequences of those sanctions. The rationale behind the support of economic sanctions 
is predominantly derived from economics and does not take into account the negative humanitarian 
consequences of economic sanctions. The rationale behind economic sanctions does not 
accommodate any humanitarian impulse. It was partly for this reason that the study advanced the 
thesis that the reason behind the imposition of economic sanctions by the sender state(s) against 
the target state is related to the pursuit of national interests of the sender state(s). 
From a historical perspective, the Western world has used economic sanctions as an expression of 
power. Economic sanctions were used as a way of subduing poor states into doing what the 
powerful countries wanted these poor countries to do. In this regard there was not any humanitarian 
consideration in the imposition of sanctions. Many scholars have argued that economic sanctions 
are designed to inflict economic harm on the target state indiscriminately. It is for this reason that 
critics of economic sanctions have argued that they are an inhumane system. While the UN Charter 
does not specifically mention the term ‘economic sanctions’, the concept is implied in terms such 
as ‘other measures necessary for the maintenance of peace and security in the world’ such as ‘trade 
embargoes’, which can be taken multilaterally under the authorisation of the UNSC, and 
unilaterally. The spirit of the UN Charter premised the imposition of sanctions on the 
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understanding that apart from warfare, they are a harmless foreign policy tool for the promotion 
of peace and security in the world. Through case studies of countries such as Cuba, Iraq and 
Zimbabwe, where economic sanctions have been imposed, the study questioned the efficacy of 
economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool for the promotion of peace and security in the world. 
It was thus deduced from these case studies that economic sanctions have contributed to 
indiscriminate suffering of the majority of the innocent citizens in these target states instead of 
bringing about behaviour modification of the perceived errant State. 
It was argued that economic sanctions cannot be justified from the Western and African ethical 
traditions. The basis of my ethical critique was on the assumption that they are a foreign policy 
tool that is designed to inflict indiscriminate suffering on the majority of the innocent citizens of 
the target state. From the utilitarian ethical perspective, economic sanctions violate the utilitarian 
ethical principle of acting in a way that promotes the greatest good for the greatest number of 
people. The inherent element of indiscrimination in economic sanctions arises from the fact that 
they are a foreign policy tool that is designed to use persons as means and not as ends in themselves 
as required by the Kantian deontological ethics. From a Judeo-Christian perspective, it is also 
argued that economic sanctions are a manifestation of structural evil in the generality of human 
existence by virtue of their inherent capability to inflict indiscriminate harm on the innocent. 
Another ethical critique that was proffered in this study was based on the African ethical tradition 
which puts emphasis on our human relationality and common belongingness. In the light of this 
ethical tradition, it was thus deduced that economic sanctions, by inflicting indiscriminate harm, 
fail to affirm our shared humanity.  
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Research Problem 
The practice of imposing sanctions against States that are considered to be errant to international 
norms remains ethically problematic in the sense that in most cases whenever sanctions are 
imposed against a particular state, it is the majority of the innocent citizens such as children and 
the economically vulnerable of the population of the target state who usually become casualties of 
those economic sanctions. The unintended consequences of economic sanctions have in most cases 
resulted in the rapid degeneration of the healthcare system and a general deterioration in the 
standards of living among the population of the target country. Many scholars, as it will be shown 
later on, have argued that there is no empirical evidence that demonstrates that sanctions have ever 
brought about the desired results in the target state. It has always been the case that the evils that 
are created by economic sanctions against the target state have always outweighed the good effects 
of those economic sanctions. For this reason, there is also overwhelming scholarly consensus that 
sanctions have never been a good solution to resolving international conflicts and effecting positive 
foreign policy change in the internal socio-economic and political affairs of the target country 
(Drezner 2011; McGee 2003).  
 Since the end of the Cold War, sanctions have become the common response of the United Nations 
(UN) against countries that are deemed rogue, pariah, or against international norms. In the 
approximately forty-seven years of its existence, from 1945 to 1992, the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) approved economic sanctions only against colonial Rhodesia (1966) and 
apartheid South Africa (1977). Despite the continuation of trade with these racist States, many 
lives of the innocent were lost in the struggle for freedom as the majority of the oppressed people 
in these two target countries suffered inhumane treatment from the minority illegitimate regimes 
of both countries. As a result, some scholars have maintained that the imposition of sanctions 
against these colonial States was therefore ineffectual because many companies from America and 
Europe continued to trade with these two target States. After that period, according to the Jersey 
Financial Services Commission (2015), several countries were sanctioned by the UNSC including 
Libya (1993; 2003), Haiti (1994; 2000), Somalia, Liberia and Rwanda (1996; 1997), Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda (1997), Iraq (2000; 2003; 2004), Somalia (2002), the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(2003), Liberia (2004), Sudan (2005), Lebanon and Syria (2006), and Rwanda (2008). In total, 
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over 29 countries have been under sanctions of some sort from the UN, the EU, the USA, and other 
countries or international organisations. There are 628 individuals and 369 entities and other 
groups under sanctions on the Consolidated UNSC Sanctions List (2016), which shows their 
prevalence, thereby justifying a deeper inquiry. In all these examples there is nothing that has been 
significantly achieved by the UNSC in terms of influencing domestic and foreign policies of these 
target States. Besides the UNSC imposed sanctions, the United States of America (USA) and its 
allies have imposed sanctions on 35 countries between 1993 and 1996 (Gordon 1999). Since such 
sanctions were not approved by the UNSC as the multilateral body, one can only say they were 
illegal, because the UN Charter, Chapter VII states that it is the UNSC which has the authority to 
apply sanctions when it has been collectively determined by the UNSC that the target country 
poses a threat to world peace and security. Thus sanctions that are imposed by particular countries 
on a target country without the mandate of the UNSC or the UN can be critiqued on the grounds 
that such sanctions are aimed only at promoting the national interests of those countries that impose 
such sanctions on a target state.  
Apart from the above examples, in the light of the main examples that were selected in this study, 
the imposition of sanctions against Cuba, Iraq and Zimbabwe actually resulted in a catastrophic 
humanitarian situation whereby the majority of the ordinary citizens lost their lives owing to 
hunger, disease and political instability. In the case of Cuba and Zimbabwe, some countries such 
as the USA and Britain have imposed sanctions without the mandate of the UNSC and the UN. 
The UN General Assembly in 2015 voted for the 25th straight year against US embargoes on Cuba 
as undermining the UN Charter (General Assembly 26 October 2016). It was a near unanimous 
vote with 191 countries opposed to the sanctions, a move that was followed by the release of a 
document which condemned the use of sanctions in general. Two countries, the USA and Israel, 
abstained from voting for the eradication of sanctions. Since economic sanctions have contributed 
to many humanitarian crises in the world, their imposition against target States remains unethical 
because it is unintelligible that a member state may inflict a great deal of suffering on the majority 
of a population that is in most cases innocent. Related to this ethical problem is the fact that the 
imposition of sanctions against a target country does not necessarily lead to the promotion of peace 
and security in the world as stated in the UN Charter, Chapter VII. On the contrary, the harm that 
is inflicted on the target country as a result of sanctions greatly outweighs the good that is 
anticipated from the imposition of sanctions. The central problem that is investigated in this study 
 
 
3 
 
is, if economic sanctions bring about untold human suffering, thus implying a foreign policy tool 
that is unethical, to what extent can economic sanctions be considered to be an ethical instrument 
for promoting peace and security in the world? 
1.1.1 Key Research Question 
In light of the fact that economic sanctions do cause catastrophic humanitarian crisis in the target 
state, can they be ethically justified from a humanitarian perspective as a tool for the promotion of 
peace and security in the world? 
1.1.2 Research Sub-Questions 
a) Why is the rationale behind the imposition of economic sanctions controversial? 
b) What are the factors that led to the historical development of economic sanctions? 
c) How were economic sanctions deployed by the United Nations during the Cold War era? 
d) What was the reason for the imposition of economic sanctions after the Cold War? 
e) What role was played by national interests by imposing economic sanctions on target 
States such as Cuba, Iraq and Zimbabwe as case studies?  
f) Can economic sanctions be ethically justifiable as an instrument of foreign policy for the 
promotion of peace and security in the world? 
g) What are the store comforters that lead to the development of economic sanctions by the 
United Nations?  
h) What are the ethical challenges posed by economic sanctions on target States? 
i) What are the effects of economic sanctions on target states? 
1.2 Research Objectives 
a) To analyse the rationale behind economic sanctions. 
b) To investigate the factors that led to the historical development of economic sanctions. 
c) To discuss how economic sanctions were deployed by the United Nations during the 
Cold War era. 
d) To discuss the reason for imposing economic sanctions after the Cold War era. 
e) To critically discuss the role of national interests on the imposition of economic sanctions 
on target States such as Cuba, Iraq and Zimbabwe as case studies. 
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f) To discuss whether economic sanctions are ethically justifiable as an instrument of 
foreign policy for behaviour modification of the target States. 
g) To describe the store comforters that lead to the development of economic sanctions by 
the United Nations? 
h) To understand the ethical challenges posed by economic sanctions on target States. 
i) To discover the effects of economic sanctions on target States. 
 
1.3 Literature Review 
The three dominant schools of thought on economic sanctions are: comprehensive economic 
sanctions, political impact, and smart sanctions (Kaempfer & Lowenberg 1988; Radrick & 
Duchatelet 2008; Cortright, Lopez & Gerber-Stellingwerf 2010; Drezner 2011). However, it needs 
to be stated from the outset that these schools of thought do supervene on each other in such a way 
that when one discusses one of them, sometimes one finds oneself being led to discuss the other 
school of thought in the same breath. From an economics school of thought, it is maintained that 
sanctions are imposed with the intention of undermining the economic capability of the target state. 
The popular view of economic sanctions from a traditional economic perspective “is premised on 
an ‘instrumental’ theory” whereby it is argued that “the real intent of sanctions is to bring about 
policy change in the target nation through imposing the severest possible economic harm” 
(Kaempfer & Lowenberg 1988:786).  
1.3.1 The Instrumental Theory of Economic Sanctions 
The instrumental theory is based on the idea that something can be used in order to bring about a 
desired socio-economic and political order. According to this theory, when economic sanctions 
are imposed by the sender on a target state, they bring about the desired order without which that 
desired order would not have been attained. William Kaempfer and Anton Lowenberg argued that 
“sanctions might have an altogether different goal – namely, to serve the interests of pressure 
groups within the sanctioning country … others obtain utility directly from taking a moral stance 
against some other nation’s objectionable behaviour”. The above authors further opined that the 
effects of sanctions can also affect the sender of those economic sanctions because “trade 
interruptions which have high costs to the target country are also likely to carry heavy costs for 
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the sanctioning country”, hence “it is not surprising that the sanctions actually adopted often appear 
ineffectual” (Kaempfer & Lowenberg 1988:786; see also Radrick & Duchatelet 2008:49).  
Thus, from an economic analytical perspective, economic sanctions are analogous to a double 
sword that negatively affects the sender of those sanctions and the target state in terms of cost and 
benefits analysis. When they analysed the motive for the imposition of sanctions from the sender, 
Kaempfer and Lowenberg deduced that, “[t]he level of economic sanctions, as an international 
public policy tool, is determined by pressures brought to bear in the political system by interest 
groups of differing motives. These pressures are the outcome of private utility maximisation on 
the part of individual members of the interest groups concerned. While the groups are defined by 
commonality of interests, the political participation of any group member is tempered by a desire 
to free ride” (Kaempfer & Lowenberg 1988:787). The reality of a plurality of motivations among 
those who campaign for the imposition of sanctions against the target state is a fact that complicates 
the ethical justifiability of sanctions. The population of pressure groups may be numerically 
negligible while exerting a lot of pressure on the government in terms of international public policy 
statecraft. These pressure groups are usually the beneficiaries of the imposition of sanctions against 
the target state. 
In the same school of thought, Charles Radrick and Martine Duchatelet (2008:49) observes that: 
“Economic sanctions imposed for a special interest, even with good intentions, can be questioned 
on the basis of their ethical legitimacy.” These authors went on to say that, “[w]hen we look at the 
consequences of sanctions, in most cases the outcome has been to lower economic, educational 
and healthcare systems of the sanctioned countries”. In other words, when economic sanctions are 
imposed with the intention of appeasing the interests of a special interest group, they cannot be 
considered to be ethically legitimate. The other argument against economic sanctions which is 
proffered by these authors is that they erode the living standards of the target country.  The US 
sanctions against Cuba were based on the desire of the USA as the sender of those sanctions to 
undermine the socialist economic policies of Fidel Castro. It has been documented by the UNICEF 
that “economic sanctions against Iraq resulted in a doubling of the death rate for children less than 
five years of age” as well as “the deaths of 500 000 children under the age of five between 1991 
and 1998” (Radrick & Duchatelet 2008:50). In this regard, economic sanctions carry with them a 
huge propensity for indiscriminate destruction of life and livelihoods whenever they are imposed 
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on the target state. Another contentious issue that arises from the imposition of economic sanctions 
against the target state is that these sanctions are in most cases imposed on weak or economically 
poor States whereby in the final analysis these weak or poor States end up worse off than they 
were before the imposition of sanctions. The practice whereby economically powerful countries 
are always swift to impose economic sanctions on weak States also raises the issue of ethical 
legitimacy of sanctions. While it is maintained from a capitalistic perspective that States should 
not interfere with the running of the free market, economic sanctions are an expression of the 
state’s interference in the market (Hahn 2001:222). However, the purpose of economic sanctions 
against a target state remains problematic to the extent that the economic reasons that are given by 
the senders of sanctions remain ethically indefensible. 
1.3.2  The Political View of Economic Sanctions 
The second school of thought arises from the politics of international relations. Within the UN and 
the UNSC, sanctions are usually supported on the basis of respective national interests among the 
UN and UNSC member States. In this regard, sanctions are used for reasons that are contrary to 
what is usually stated by the UNSC resolutions. When the UN imposed sanctions against Iraq, the 
rationale was that Iraq should disarm and allow the UN Monitoring, Verification and Inspection 
Commission to dismantle Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction. However, this UN Resolution (687) 
on sanctions against Iraq was later abused by the USA when the then US President George H. W. 
Bush said that “[m]y view is we don’t want to lift these sanctions as long as Saddam Hussein is in 
power”. President Bill Clinton maintained the same policy when he said, “[s]anctions will be there 
until the end of time, or as long as he [Saddam Hussein] lasts” (Cortright, Lopez & Gerber-
Stellingwerf 2010:2008). In the light of the above statements from the USA Presidents on Iraq 
sanctions, it can be deduced that these sanctions were seen in terms of advancing US interests 
within Iraq. The national interest of the USA on the imposition of economic sanctions was to 
overthrow Saddam Hussein who had attempted to annex Kuwait, thus posing a threat to the USA’s 
hegemony over the control of oil production in the Gulf region.  
The USA and its NATO allies used UN sanctions to degrade Iraq’s military capability as a result 
of the arms embargo. Here the political motive behind their support of sanctions on Iraq unfolded 
later, when the USA and the United Kingdom went on to wage a war against Iraq with the intention 
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of overthrowing Saddam Hussein and his Baath party from political power. Daniel Drezner 
observes that: 
As the main backer of the United Nations sanctions initiative, and the country most adamant in trying 
to force out its leader, responsibility fell on the United States. The United States and United Kingdom 
stoutly resisted pressures to alter the sanctions regime from the other permanent members of the 
UNSC during the 1990s. Madeleine Albright, the US ambassador to the United Nations at the time, 
provided the defining sound bite for this culpability in May 1996. In a 60 Minutes interview, she said 
that even if the sanctions had killed half a million Iraqi children, ‘the price is worth it’ (Drezner 
2011:98).  
As an instrument of foreign policy, the sanctions on Iraqi have been a political and humanitarian 
disaster. The very idea that Albright could justify the death of half a million of Iraqi children as ‘a 
worth[y] prize to pay’ implies that the sender of sanctions does not have the promotion of the 
wellbeing of the citizens of the target country at least, but the national interests of the sender. From 
a political perspective, sanctions are usually an externally engineered disaster for the target country 
and the surrounding neighbouring countries. Drezner maintained: “Sanctions do not just weaken 
the rule of law in the target country – they weaken the rule of law in the bordering countries and 
monitoring organisations as well. The corruption has a path-dependent quality, persisting long 
after sanctions have been lifted. The humanitarian and political costs that emanated from the Iraq 
sanctions caused a great deal of consternation in political circles at the same time that concerns 
about ‘human security’ were emerging” (Drezner 2011:98). It is for this reason that the post-cold 
war political scholarship questioned the moral credibility of sanctions as a coercive tool for foreign 
policy. Another politically contentious issue about economic sanctions is that they are usually 
applied selectively. Those countries that are deemed to be allies by America and the West are 
usually protected against economic sanctions. For example, when the UN imposed sanctions 
against the then apartheid South African government “Germany and Great Britain in part merely 
made recommendations and imposed no binding sanctions” (Hefti & Staehelin-Witt 2002).  
Meanwhile, Hefti and Staehelin-Witt (2002) observes: 
In general, sanctions imposed against South Africa were very limited and indicate numerous 
loopholes and exception clauses. One reason for the limitation surely lay in the fact that the heads of 
government in Britain, the USA, and Germany did not regard sanctions as the correct means of 
prompting political change in South Africa. The argument that was usually put across by the USA, 
Britain and Germany, who were the major trading partners with the apartheid government, was that 
sanctions will hurt the majority of the African population that was suffering under the gruesome 
policies of the then apartheid government. 
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Hefti and Staehelin went on to say that the stance of USA, Britain and Germany found support 
from the public-choice theory from economists. As they put it, “[t]he economists’ public-choice 
theory argued for this reason that economic sanctions often have so minimal an impact because 
they are selected primarily to suit the economic interests of the sanctioning countries and only 
secondarily consider the costs on the country sanctioned” 
(http://www.snf.ch/sitecollectiondocuments/nfp42p/nfp42p/_staehelin-e.pdf).  
Those countries that were hesitant in imposing sanctions against apartheid South Africa mainly 
did so with the aim of protecting their national interests because it was economically lucrative to 
do business with South Africa. In the final analysis, this implies that sanctioning countries do not 
have any concern for the wellbeing of the ordinary people of the target country. For example, 
Switzerland never imposed sanctions against apartheid South Africa because it was benefiting 
from low prices of coal from those countries which had imposed trade embargoes against South 
Africa. Switzerland’s position was that it rejected sanctions as a way of achieving political goals 
((http://www.snf.ch/sitecollectiondocuments/nfp42p/nfp42p/_staehelin-e.pdf).In the case of the 
then Rhodesia sanctions, there has been an overwhelming discontent among African leaders 
because despite the UN economic sanctions against Rhodesia, this racist regime continued to 
prosper economically. George Shepard observes: “The temper of the debate at the United Nations 
showed rising African frustration with the ineffectual measures supported by the UK. Suspicions 
of the real British intent were strong. Racial feelings were introduced. It was suspected that the 
British were secretly trying to protect their ‘kith and kin’ in Rhodesia and were not serious about 
international sanctions. … Most serious of all, the feeling spread through African capitals that the 
UN had become a device for diverting African revolutionary challenges to the Western system of 
domination” (Shepard 1968:9). From a political perspective, sanctions are thus not an effective 
tool because of the dominance of national interests of the sender countries. 
1.3.3 The Smart Sanctions Approach 
The third school of thought which gained currency in our contemporary times advocates what are 
called ‘smart sanctions’ or ‘targeted sanctions’. This school of thought is a revisionist approach to 
comprehensive sanctions in the sense that it argues that the consequences of comprehensive 
sanctions, which are sometimes called externalities, were greatly defeating the purpose or 
outweighing the good that is promoted by sanctions when compared to the positive outcomes that 
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arise from comprehensive economic sanctions. It is thus argued by the proponents of smart 
sanctions that sanctions can be more effective or bring about the desired policy change from the 
target state when individuals, companies and organisations that are supportive of the target state 
are made the focal point for sanctions instead of the whole country. Smart sanctions are considered 
to be a disincentive tool against authoritarian leaders and their supporters. It is also argued that 
comprehensive sanctions do not have a strong effect on authoritarian targets as compared to smart 
sanctions. As Drezner put it: 
Smart sanctions could raise the target regime’s costs of noncompliance while avoiding the collateral 
damage that comes with comprehensive trade embargoes. The most prominent country-wide 
examples included financial sanctions, asset freezes, travel bans, restrictions on luxury foods, and 
arms embargoes. Furthermore, instead of sanctioning the entire country, smart sanctions advocates 
for targeting individuals, restrictions corporations, or holding companies associated with the target 
government’s leadership” (Drezner 2011:100).  
The belief behind smart sanctions is that they do not cause humanitarian disasters; hence smart 
sanctions are deemed to be more humane. An instructive example of this smart sanctions regime 
is the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) which explicitly shows that 
the US Government will implement travel and economic sanctions against those individuals and 
their associates and families.  Likewise Mbanje and Mahuku (2011:2) point out that the EU and 
American smart sanctions “were targeted on the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front 
(ZANU PF) leadership and all those business people, intellectuals, journalists and many others 
who sympathized with the ZANU-PF leadership” (.However, the argument that can be raised 
against the idea of smart sanctions is that they still operate under the rationale of comprehensive 
sanctions where the sender wants the target to change their behaviour or policy (Lacy & Niou 
2004:28). The problem with this school of thought is that it deals with the same problems that are 
faced with regard to comprehensive sanctions. For example, when sanctions are aimed at leaders 
and companies of the target country, obviously such sanctions will affect the majority of the 
population of the target country. While smart sanctions are usually considered to be radically 
different from comprehensive sanctions, their negative impact on the target country remains 
similar to that of comprehensive sanctions. Sanctions do promote a negative image of the country 
as a whole and not only on the image of targeted individuals, organisations and companies. Such 
a scenario affects the inflow of direct foreign investment in the country as well as cause capital 
flight from the country. The argument that there is no difference between comprehensive sanctions 
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and smart sanctions was observes by Mbanje and Mahuku when they argued in the case of 
Zimbabwe: “The EU’s targeted sanctions have also greatly affected the standard of living of the 
general population. The deteriorating economic conditions have led to large emigration, especially 
of skilled members of most families to countries like South Africa, Botswana, Namibia and Britain. 
This in itself has further strained the economy of its skilled manpower” (Mbanje & Mahuku 
2011:3). The effects of smart sanctions on Zimbabwe seem to have been economically catastrophic 
to Zimbabwe in a way that is similar to a situation of war and comprehensive sanctions. 
1.3.4 Gaps in Literature 
This study argues that most of the literature on sanctions has given scant attention to the role of 
national interests in the imposition of sanctions by sender States on target countries and that the 
pursuit of national interests ultimately renders economic sanctions, whether comprehensive or 
smart, ethically indefensible as a tool for foreign policy. This observation reinforces the theory of 
sceptical realism which maintains that nations do not take moral considerations into account in 
their relations with other States, but the pursuit of their national interests. This provides the 
plausible rationale on the imposition of sanctions from sender States and not for humanitarian 
purposes on the target state.  While all the above schools of thoughts have been critiqued by 
scholars on the grounds that economic sanctions remain unethical by virtue of inflicting 
catastrophic humanitarian crisis on the target country, what has been given attention to in this study 
is the role that is played by national interests in the motives of the sender countries when they 
impose sanctions on the target country. It is mainly on these grounds that while, from a theoretical 
perspective, sanctions are critiqued as unethical, the study will argue that the pursuit of national 
interests by sender countries precludes any ethical considerations in the imposition of sanctions on 
the target state. 
1.4 Theoretical Framework upon which the Study is Based 
There are five theoretical frameworks that are employed in this study. These are ethical theories 
of utilitarianism; deontology; the human rights approach; African ethics; and sceptical realism. 
From a utilitarian perspective the goodness of an action is judged on the basis of its consequences 
towards the realisation of the greatest good for the greatest number of people. John Stuart Mill, the 
proponent of utilitarianism who defined the theory, had this to say about utilitarianism: 
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The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, 
holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to 
produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain; by 
unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up 
by the theory, much more requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the ideas of pain 
and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open question. But these supplementary explanations 
do not affect the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded – namely, that pleasure, 
and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are 
as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in 
themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the 
promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain (Mill 1960:6). 
 
From the quote above, it can be argued that the ethical theory of utilitarianism is based on the idea 
that actions can be condoned as ethical only when they promote the Greatest Happiness Principle 
and unethical when they cause pain. For Mill, happiness implies pleasure and the absence of pain. 
Here the utilitarian principle is one which appeals to all human beings in the sense that the goal of 
life is mostly seen in terms of maximising happiness and avoiding doing that which inflicts pain 
on ourselves and other people. Thus utilitarianism maintains that the goodness of an action should 
be evaluated in terms of its consequences that the action was done. Since the consequences of 
economic sanctions erode the greatest good in the target state more effectively, there is no way 
they can be defended with logical impunity when subjected to the ethical theory of utilitarianism. 
This deduction is usually known as the utilitarian calculus. Joy Gordon argued that:  
When we work out the utilitarian calculus of sanctions, we see on one side that there is not a high 
likelihood that sanctions will succeed in stopping military aggression or human rights violations. On 
the other side of the calculus, we see the high probability, if not inevitability, that sanctions will harm 
the most vulnerable population. Sanctions are a device specifically tailored to harm nations with 
dependent or weak economies. The economic effectiveness depends heavily on how dependent the 
target nation is on imports (Gordon 1999:135). 
Since most of the target States are usually those countries whose economies depend heavily on 
imports, from a utilitarian ethical theoretical perspective, sanctions have the capacity to do more 
harm on poor target States than they would do on target States that are economically relatively 
autonomous and sometimes dependent on donations from rich countries and multilateral 
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. It is common 
knowledge that these two multilateral institutions are controlled by the most powerful countries, 
who are the main shareholders. The imposition of sanctions on poor countries is not done according 
to the utilitarian calculus. Consequently, whenever they are imposed on the target state, they harm 
the weakest members of society. 
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1.4.1 Deontology  
Another ethical paradigm to be employed in this study is based on Immanuel Kant’s deontological 
ethics which says that people should not be used as means to ends; rather they should be treated 
as ends in themselves. According to Kant, morality is a duty. We have a duty to ourselves as 
rational beings, and we have a duty to others. Morality is thus a matter of universal conformity to 
universal law based on the principle that one should do to others what we would like them to do 
to us. This principle is stated as follows: 
I am never to act otherwise than so that I could also will that my maxim should become a universal 
law. Here, now, it is the simple conformity to law in general, without assuming any particular law 
applicable to certain actions, which serves the will as its principle, and must so serve it if duty is not 
to be a vain delusion and a chimerical notion. The common reason of men in its practical judgements 
perfectly coincides with this, and always has in view the principle here suggested (Immanuel Kant, 
2012: 18).  
The popular reasoning that is applied by the advocates of sanctions is that economic sanctions 
against a particular state will help the population of the targeted state to revolt against their 
government. From the perspective of deontological ethics, economic sanctions dehumanise people 
because they are being treated as a means and not an end in themselves. In the imposition of 
economic sanctions against a target state, people are used as instruments towards the attainment 
of goals and purposes that are not necessarily their own. From the Kantian deontological ethical 
perspective, we become ethical when we see our humanity in the humanity of others. Sanctions 
are inhumane in the sense that the senders do not see their humanity in the humanity of the 
population of the target state. It is thus argued that economic sanctions violate morality by virtue 
of using people as means.  
1.4.2 The Human Rights Approach  
The third theoretical framework is the human rights approach, whereby it is shown that economic 
sanctions violate human rights (Rawls 1971). According to Brink (2014): 
A human rights-based ethic takes the position that an action is bad if someone’s rights are violated, 
regardless of whether the good outweighs the bad.  What is wrong prima facie does not become right 
just because some majority ultimately benefits. A major advantage of a rights-based ethic is that there 
is no need to calculate total gains and compare them with total losses. It is impossible to precisely 
measure gains and losses anyway. A rights-based ethic removes this problem (Institute of Economic 
Affairs 2003; McGee 2002). The only thing that needs to be determined is whether someone’s rights 
would be violated. The matter is further complicated, however, because there are two different kinds 
of rights, negative rights and positive rights (Haass 1997). Negative rights include the right not to 
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have your property taken from you without your consent and the right not to be killed. One attribute 
of negative rights is that they do not conflict. My right to property does not conflict with your right 
to property. My right to life does not conflict with your right to life. Positive rights have different 
attributes from negative rights. Examples of positive rights include the right to free or low-cost 
medical care and the right to subsidised housing.  
According to Brink (2014), one attribute of positive rights is that they always involve the violation 
of someone’s negative rights. The kind of rights we need to look at when we are trying to determine 
whether a particular sanction is justified is negative rights. That being the case, one can easily 
conclude that the vast majority of sanctions cannot be justified on ethical grounds because 
someone’s rights are almost certainly violated. The sanctions against Iraq killed perhaps as many 
as 2 million Iraqis between the early 1990s, when they were first imposed, and April 2003, when 
they more or less ended. Many of the deaths were of children under the age of five (Brink 2014; 
Haass 1999; Institute of Economic Affairs 2003; McGee 2002). The main cause of death was the 
lack of adequate medical supplies and malnutrition and the diseases that emanate therefrom. From 
a rights perspective, the cost is not justified, because the sanctions violated the rights to life, 
property, and contract, among others. From a rights perspective, someone’s rights are almost 
always violated as a result of the imposition of economic sanctions. In most cases, some of the 
basic services such as health, food and education, which are supposed to be accessed by all citizens, 
are interrupted by economic sanctions. From such a theoretical framework, sanctions undermine 
the basic liberties of the sanctioned country. 
1.4.3 African Ethics Tradition  
The fourth theoretical framework is derived from the African ethical tradition. From this ethical 
tradition we can deduce two ethical principles, namely relationality and the primacy of life. There 
is an Nguni adage which says “Umuntu ngomuntu ngabantu – a person is a person because of other 
persons. This adage implies that our humanity is inseparable from the humanity of others”. For 
example, Marie Samkange and Stanlake Samkange said that Ubuntu means “the attention one 
human being gives to another: the kindness, courtesy, consideration and friendliness in the 
relationship between people; a code of behaviour, an attitude to other people and to life, is 
embodied in hunhu or Ubuntu” (Samkange & Samkange 1980:39). In the light of the above 
quotation, Ubuntu implies being considerate towards the needs of others. Such an attitude is 
possible only when one realises that one’s wellbeing is inseparable from the wellbeing of others. 
Munyaradzi Murove observes that, “[a person] with Ubuntu will always behave virtuously in her 
 
 
14 
 
or his relationships with other people. A virtuous person is someone who has Ubuntu” (Murove 
2016:173). Someone with Ubuntu will therefore have a sense of care and concern for the wellbeing 
of others. The presumption behind the concept of Ubuntu relatedness is the reality that is pervasive 
in all the realms of human existence. Nhlanhla Mkhize observes that the concept of Ubuntu implies 
the relational nature of being human whereby “personhood is defined in relation to the 
community … A sense of community exists if people are mutually responsive to one another’s 
needs” (Mkhize 2008:39). Here it can hardly be said that economic sanctions express a sense of 
concern and being responsive to the needs of others. In African ethics, life is valued very much 
and cherished and celebrated as an expression of being alive. 
1.4.4 Sceptical Realism  
Finally, another theoretical framework which is central to the main argument of this study comes 
in the form of sceptical realism. An argument that has been advanced by proponents of sceptical 
realism in international relations is that States relate to each other in a way that is amoral. The 
theory of sceptical realism in international relations is derived from Thomas Hobbes’s book, 
Leviathan. In this book Hobbes argued that nations cannot have agreeable values because their 
national values within their particular territories are irreconcilable with each other. He writes, 
“[t]he notions of Right and Wrong, Justice and Injustice, have no place. Where there is no common 
Power, there is no Law, no Injustice. Force and Fraud are in War the two Cardinal Virtues” 
(Hobbes 1967:139). Hobbes’s reasoning was that the international political scene was not 
governed by a common authority that dictates rules that are supposed to be followed by all nations. 
Since there was no common authority on the international political scene, it also followed that 
nations can survive on this international scene only when they solely pursue their national self-
interests. The absence of shared ethical norms among nations presupposes that the relations that 
exist among States are anarchical. Morality can thus exist among nations when there is a common 
power and compliance with shared norms (Maxwell 1990:11–12). But the fact that the 
international political scene does not have shared moral norms implies that the relations that exist 
among nations are based not on altruism but on the pursuit of national interests by whatever means 
in such a way that the ends justify the means. The implication of sceptical realism with regard to 
economic sanctions is that both are applied on the target state by the senders with the aim of 
pursuing selfish national interests. It is for this reason that senders are not constrained by any moral 
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considerations with regard to humanitarian crises that are inflicted on target States by the 
imposition of economic sanctions. The instrumental value of sanctions is to effect the realisation 
of national interests of those States that are economically and militarily powerful. Economic 
sanctions are therefore designed as one of the strategies that enable the survival of the powerful 
States in an anarchic international world setting (Maersheimer 2010:349–350). Within the theory 
of sceptical ethical realism, the most popular arguments that economic sanctions are unethical and 
that they are a violation of international law are critiqued for failing to realise that senders of 
sanctions are motivated not by ethical or legal considerations when they apply sanctions to the 
target state, but mainly by their own national selfish interests.   
1.5 Research Methodology 
From what has been said so far, this study is theoretical and speculative in the sense that it attempts 
to find out why the UN and the UNSC approves the use of economic sanctions as a deterrent 
against perceived errant States despite of the fact that a lot of scholarly research has demonstrated 
that they do not necessarily achieve the desired results. The study is partly historical in the sense 
that it will focus on the origins of sanctions in the UN. As a theoretical study, it relies mainly on 
the plausibility and implausibility of the arguments that have been advanced by proponents as well 
as critics of economic sanctions as a deterrent measure against perceived errant States. In this 
regard, the study will start by presenting the arguments of the proponents of sanctions and 
thereafter go on to present the arguments of the critics of sanctions from an ethical perspective. 
The study will select countries such as Iraq, Cuba and Zimbabwe where economic sanctions have 
been imposed with and without a UN mandate. Through these case studies, the study’s argument 
is reinforced to the effect that economic sanctions inflict devastating consequences on the 
population of the sanctioned country. Such case studies are used as supporting evidence for the 
argument that sanctions are unethical. These selected countries are not the only ones to be 
employed as examples in this study because other countries that have experienced economic 
sanctions will be used with the intention of reinforcing the main argument of this thesis. For this 
reason, this study is a work of advocacy in the sense that I am wholly convinced that while 
sanctions are unethical and, in most cases, illegal, their instrumental value is to promote the 
national interests of the senders who in this study are those countries that are economically and 
militarily powerful. My intention is to provide arguments to the effect that sanctions are not 
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imposed on target countries for moral and legal purposes, but for the pursuit of the selfish interests 
of the senders. Since this study is theoretical, the research that is done is based on books, journals, 
and Internet sources, depending on their relevance to the issue under discussion. 
1.6 Limitations 
This study of economic sanctions is a wide area that cannot be given just treatment within the 
scope of a single PhD study. As a theoretical study, some claims that are made will not be given 
empirical validation through interviews or fieldwork research as a way of testing the validity of 
these claims. Under those circumstances, the study from extensive array of literature. The study 
does not intend to investigate all countries that have experienced the effects of economic sanctions. 
In this study I am limiting myself to an ethical analysis of economic sanctions with reference to 
countries and not to individuals and organisations on which sanctions have been imposed by the 
UN and other countries without the mandate from the UN and the Security Council. 
1.7 Layout of the Study 
The study consists of eight chapters that are outlined below:  
Chapter 1: Scope of the study 
This part consists of background to the study which traces the evolution of the concept and idea of 
economic sanctions. The chapter also contains the statement of the problem which captures the 
problem that makes this study worth pursuing. Furthermore, the study consists of the broad key 
research question as well as some sub-research questions which should be answered by the 
researcher after conducting the entire research process. The study is also punctuated by the 
research objectives that show the aims and purpose for conducting this research. There is also a 
preliminary review of the literature, and the theoretical framework whereby the study focuses on 
the utilitarianism, deontology and human rights approaches to economic sanctions. This chapter 
wraps up by giving an outline of the entire study, which in this case consists of eight chapters. 
Chapter 2: A conceptual analysis of the rationale behind economic sanctions 
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section traces the genesis of sanctions and the 
issues that are embedded in this section such as unilateral imposition of sanctions, the theory of 
the Game of interest groups. In essence, this section focuses on how the idea of sanctions came 
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about. The second section examines global economic issues such as democracy, political, 
technological, communicative and social linkages during and after the Cold War, and the 
implication of changes in global economics in relation to sanctions. The third section makes an 
introspection into the rationale behind the imposition of UN sanctions on two countries during the 
Cold War that is Rhodesia and South Africa. The fourth section briefly analyses the legal and 
ethical implications surrounding the imposition of sanctions. The issue that will be analysed in this 
section includes the legality of imposition of sanctions resting on the provision of Chapter VII of 
the UN Charter.  
Chapter 3: A historical overview of economic sanctions in the United Nations 
This chapter is comprised of three sections. The first section briefly discusses the evolution of the 
UN economic sanctions in the modern political arena. In the second section my focus will be on 
the instrumental value of economic sanctions in the UN. The third section will demonstrate that 
economic sanctions have been used by the UN as a foreign policy tool that was often resorted to 
in order to resolve international conflicts. 
Chapter 4: The United Nations’ application of economic sanctions during the Cold War era 
The chapter presents an exploration of the United Nations application of economic sanctions 
during the Cold War where it highlights issues such as the UN maintaining an uneasy peace, the 
analogue of the Cold War ideologies, and the dynamics surrounding the application of economic 
sanctions. In highlighting the dynamics surrounding the imposition and usage of sanctions, the 
chapter categorically presents economic sanctions that were increasingly applied during the 
beginning of the 20th century as some of these economic sanctions were enshrined in the United 
Nations Charter system. The chapter also presents an evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
application of the United Nations sanctions in the Cold War environment where it noted that 
sanctions have failed as an instrument to change behaviour and are not free of ethical costs as they 
impact on innocent civilians. Lastly, the chapter outlines the post-Cold War trends and the use of 
economic sanctions where it traces the nature and severity of sanctions that were imposed by the 
UN.  
Chapter 5: A critical analysis of economic sanctions after the Cold War 
The chapter gives a run-down of the issues underlying the dimensions and the rationale of 
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economic sanctions in the post-Cold War era. The chapter looks at the concepts of smart and 
comprehensive sanctions and analyses their attributes and facets. It moves on to analyse the usage 
of the smart sanctions by the United Nations across the world where it unpacked the modalities 
that are associated with the UN sanction imposition system, successes and failures by the UN to 
realise their intended objectives: the supporting clauses of the UN Charter that paved the way for 
sanctions to be imposed. The problems militating against the implementation of the smart 
sanctions are also delved into. In addition, the reasons behind the adoption and imposition of smart 
sanctions are also captured. In this case, factors such as deterrence, compulsion, and coercion as 
well as the symbolic facets of economic sanctions are highlighted. Lastly, the chapter captures the 
scenarios of the usage of economic sanctions in the new dispensation where sanctions are used as 
a measure for facilitating the adoption of international humanitarian law. Economic sanctions can 
also serve as a measure for combating terrorism as well as serving as an ethical measure for conflict 
prevention. 
Chapter 6: Economic sanctions against Cuba, Iraq and Zimbabwe 
The chapter focuses on the deployment of economic sanctions on Iraq, Cuba and Zimbabwe. In 
the process it traces the origins or factors that contributed or led to the imposition or adoption of 
economic sanctions in these three respective countries. The Iraqi scenario saw the economic 
sanctions being imposed as a result of Iraqi’s invasion of Kuwait. The Cuban case witnessed the 
US government imposing an embargo on Cuba in 1959 as a strategy to oust the Castro led 
Communist revolutionary government. The economic sanctions evolved into a comprehensive 
blockade in the early 1960s. The Zimbabwean case is punctuated by the imposition of sanctions 
that came as a result of Zimbabwe’s policy to grab its land back from its erstwhile colonial masters. 
The chapter highlights the rationale behind the imposition of these economic sanctions on these 
respective countries as well as the nature of these sanctions in these countries. Lastly, the far-
reaching effects of these sanctions on Cuba, Iraq and Zimbabwe are also captured.  
Chapter 7: An ethical critique of economic sanctions 
The chapter focuses on providing an ethical critique of sanctions as a deterrent tool for sovereignty.  
The chapter captures the alternative goals of economic sanctions in which economic sanctions 
were viewed as a form of statecraft that nations use in satisfying the goals of their foreign policies. 
In addition, the legitimacy of sanctions in the context of Just War doctrine are examined. The Just 
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War theorists aimed at stopping the selfishness that emanates from people by advocating for 
proportional reason, legitimate authority, and right intention in the imposition of economic 
sanctions, which are correspondingly highlighted. Humanitarian suffering as a mechanism of 
persuasion using Kantian analysis was also captured in line with the Just War doctrine. The 
utilitarian justification of sanction as well as the ethical problems of indirect economic sanctions 
in which sanctions are purportedly imposed on those nations which do not conform in particular 
to usually ethically perceived standards are also presented.  
The chapter delves into the ethical problems of indirect economic sanctions where the dual notion 
of sanctions (that is, positive and negative sanctions) and how sanctions are meant to alter the 
behaviour or action of the target nation are noted. Furthermore, the nexus between economic 
sanctions and human security is also delved into, where the chapter discusses the following 
dimensions: economic sanctions and the principle of discrimination, the impact of economic 
sanctions on human rights, the impact of economic sanctions on basic freedoms, as well the impact 
of economic sanctions on the reformative efforts of nations. Consequently, the chapter presents an 
unexpurgated version of the immorality of economic sanctions where the inhumanity and the 
decadence of economic sanctions are extrapolated. This in addition to the global dynamics 
surrounding the deployment of economic sanctions marks the final segment of the chapter. 
Chapter 8: General conclusion and recommendations 
This chapter focuses on giving a summary of the key issues undergirding the ethical efficacy of 
economic sanctions as a deterrent tool for sovereignty. The chapter provides a synopsis of the first 
seven chapters as well as a synthesis as to how economic sanctions can be ethically applied to 
promote peace and stability across the globe. The chapter discusses the key dimensions and 
rationale behind the imposition of economic sanctions as well as the nature and effects thereof on 
Cuba, Iraq and Zimbabwe. The study therefore concludes that economic sanctions are not ethical 
in their application as they fall short by causing harm to the very people whom they intend to 
protect. The ordinary citizens, who in this case are the general civilians, are exposed to socio-
economic evils as there is the visible economic strangulation and deprival of goods and services. 
The study established that the use of economic sanctions is an implausible tool for sovereignty.   
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CHAPTER 2: AN ANALYSIS OF THE RATIONALE BEHIND ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
2.1 Introduction 
It is an indisputable fact that the imposition of economic sanctions on another country does have 
disastrous consequences on the target state. In most of those countries that have been targeted with 
economic sanctions it is known that those economic sanctions have destroyed the healthcare 
system and infrastructure of the target state. Those who impose economic sanctions justify their 
acts by claiming that their aim is to punish the regime of the target country regardless of the fact 
that in most cases it is the majority of the innocent citizens of the target state who end up suffering 
from the negative consequences of those sanctions compared to those who are the rulers of the 
target state. It is mainly for this reason that many scholars have argued that economic sanctions 
are unethical (McGee 2003; Allen & Lektzian 2012). 
Despite the ethical problems that always emanate from the imposition of sanctions on the target 
state, the United Nations Security Council has continued to call for sanctions against those 
countries that are considered to be rogue States. The United Nations Charter stipulates that 
economic sanctions can be used as one of its arsenals for the maintenance of peace and security in 
the world. The aim is to force the target state to modify its behaviour according to internationally 
accepted norms. In this regard one can say that economic sanctions are aimed at enforcing a 
situation of behaviour modification on the target state. However, even after behaviour modification 
in terms of foreign policy from the target state, sometimes economic sanctions have remained in 
place. For example, the case of Iraq shows the reverse of these objectives, because economic 
sanctions were maintained even though Iraq had pulled out of Kuwait, the reason that was initially 
given by the senders as the sole objective of sanctions against Iraq. Economic sanctions are usually 
imposed by the senders under a potpourri of motives that are not usually stated by the senders. 
If sanctions bring about loss of human life, the question that arises is: why have the UNSC and the 
UN continued to implement them? This question has been central to all scholars who have 
researched and written on the impact of economic sanctions on the target state such as Gordon 
(1999). Some scholars have characterised them as a “blunt instrument” which is used by the 
international community, but “without full consideration of the impact that these measures will 
have on the population of the targeted countries, particularly the weakest elements of society” 
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(Allen& Lektzian 2012:121). Other scholars have argued that the imposition of economic 
sanctions on the target state have given rise to unintended consequences with regard to the target 
state that are radically different from the intended aims of the sender States (McGee 2003). 
Because of the collateral damage inflicted on the target state, it has been suggested by supporters 
of sanctions that to avoid collateral damage, economic sanctions should be smart or targeted 
instead of being imposed indiscriminately on the target state (Drezner 2011). However, the 
problem with so-called smart sanctions is that the effects of such sanctions on the target state 
remain the same when compared with comprehensive sanctions. It is mainly on the basis of the 
inherently indiscriminate nature of their consequences on the target state that some scholars have 
referred to economic sanctions as a “deadly remedy” (Gordon 1999). 
While the UNSC is mandated by the UN Charter with the responsibility of employing all means 
necessary as a means towards the promotion of peace and security in the world, some countries 
(notably United States, United Kingdom, EU members states and Australia) have ignored this spirit 
of the UN Charter and have proceeded to impose sanctions unilaterally against States that are 
considered to be hostile to their interests. Such a practice is undoubtedly a violation of international 
law and the spirit of the UN Charter. While the professed motive of the senders of economic 
sanctions is closely related to the principles of criminal justice – rehabilitation of the offending 
state– as will be shown in the following chapters –there is no empirical evidence that economic 
sanctions have achieved the objective of such rehabilitation.  The aim of this chapter is therefore 
to provide an analysis on the rationale behind the imposition of sanctions and whether such a 
practice is ethically defensible. Apart from this introduction, the chapter is divided into four 
sections. The first section discusses the main rationale behind the imposition of sanctions on the 
target state. In the second section, my focus will be on sanctions as a tool for international foreign 
policy. The third section focuses on how national interests of the economically and militarily 
powerful countries have played a significant role in the imposition of sanctions in many instances. 
The fourth section discusses the motive of the senders behind the imposition of economic sanctions 
against the target state. 
2.2 The Economic Rationale Behind the Imposition of Sanctions 
The traditional understanding of economic sanctions has been predominantly based on the idea 
that the intention of senders is to bring about policy change in the target state by imposing 
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economically harmful economic sanctions. William Kaempferand Anton Lowenberg described 
this view as “the instrumental theory” of economic sanctions (Kaempfer & Lowenberg 2007:786). 
This instrumental view of economic sanctions has been the dominant one among many scholars 
who have discussed economic sanctions from different disciplines. Thus, the political presumption 
behind the imposition of economic sanctions is that they effect policy change on the target state 
which is on the long run desirable to the senders. 
The United States of America has been on record for imposing economic sanctions unilaterally in 
many countries. Most of the reasons that are stated by the US for imposing economic sanctions 
over the years are as follows: “Boycott activity, Communism, Transition to democracy, 
Environmental activity, Expropriation, Harbouring war criminals, Human rights, Market reform, 
Military aggression, Narcotics activity, Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, Terrorism 
and Workers’ rights” (McGee 2003:41). The United Nations has multilaterally imposed economic 
sanctions on the basis of some of these reasons (McGee 2003:41). Some scholars such as Dean 
Lacy and Emerson Niou analysed economic sanctions from a theoretical “game” perspective in 
which they postulated about a game of economic sanction operating under the following rationale: 
Cases of economic sanctions involve a coercer who wants a target to comply with the coercer’s 
demands on some issue, X. To gain concessions on the disputed issue, the coercer threatens sanctions, 
S. For simplicity, we assume that the issue under dispute has a binary outcome, such that X= (x, –x). 
We will use the convention that x=coercer’s demand met on original issue, –x=the coercer’s demand 
not met. Sanctions also involve a binary outcome, S = (s, –s), where s =sanctions, –s= no sanctions. 
The strategic moves in the game begin with a choice by the coercer of whether to threaten sanctions.  
After the coercer threatens sanctions, the target either complies with the coercer’s demand in respect 
of X, or does not comply. The coercer then chooses whether to impose sanctions. After the coercer’s 
decision to impose sanctions, the target decides whether or not to capitulate to the coercer’s demands 
(Lacy& Niou 2004:28). 
In this game of economic sanctions, it is usually the coercer who wants the target state to comply 
with its own demands. But the problem is that since each state is a sovereign entity, it is only 
logical that no state which takes its sovereignty seriously will take seriously the act of being bullied 
through sanctions. Lacy and Niou went on to say that, “We specify two types of targets: resilient 
targets (TR) and compliant targets (TC). Resilient targets would prefer to suffer sanctions without 
complying with or capitulating to the coercer’s demands. A compliant target would rather concede 
to issue X than suffer economic sanctions. In short, for the compliant target, 05 > 01 > 02 > 04 > 
03; for the resilient target, 05 > 01 > 03 > 02 > 04” (Lacy &Niou2004:30). In other words, these 
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two authors are saying that there are more benefits to be accrued from complying as compared to 
those accrued from resisting the threat of sanctions. Here, the presumption is that the coercer will 
not impose sanctions if the target state complies with the demands of the coercer (Lacy & Niou 
2004:30). In other words, what is implied is that conceding to the demands of the coercer is usually 
done on the basis of economic costs versus being resilient to the threat of sanctions. But Lacy and 
Niou concedeto the fact that sometimes “the resilient target’s preferences could be rooted in 
noneconomic considerations, such as the domestic or international political cost of backing down” 
(Lacy &Niou 2004:32). This observation somehow undermines the binary model which these 
authors had given us above as the dominant rationale behind the game of economic sanctions, as 
we shall see in the examples that will be given in respect of economic sanctions that were imposed 
on other member States of the international community such as Cuba, Iraq and Zimbabwe. In the 
light of the case studies chosen in this study in chapter six, economic sanctions were resisted not 
on the basis of the economic rationale of making decisions after calculating costs and benefits, but 
mainly on the basis of national pride and ideological convictions. Lacy and Niou proffered a game 
theory of economic sanctions with a nicely put binary model intended to support their presumption 
that economic sanctions are based on predictable favourable outcomes. This analysis also fails to 
capture the effects of economic sanctions in neighbouring countries of the target state – thereby 
implying that economic sanctions will negatively affect only the target state to the exclusion of the 
neighbouring countries which, as we shall see later, bear the consequences of those sanctions. 
Another weakness in the above game theory of economic sanctions is that it presumes that 
economic sanctions are imposed on the target state by all citizens of the coercing State(s). In this 
regard, an argument that will demonstrate that economic sanctions are usually a game of interest 
groups will undermine the above presumption. 
Another rationale behind economic sanctions is based on the theory of the Game of Interest 
Groups. As Mėlanie Golliard puts it,  
According to the interest group theory, policies in international relations and their implications are 
perceived as outcomes of the set-ups of domestic interest group politics within sender and target 
countries. In other words, it expresses how national policy choices mirror the interests of 
constituency groups within the polity … National governments have no independent policy 
preferences or agendas” (Golliard 2013:44). 
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For Golliard, it is interest groups that are listened to by national governments on the understanding 
that in a given country, they are critical in determining competing “domestic interest groups, acting 
in a more less impartial manner”. Golliard maintained that while some might derive some utility 
from the imposition of sanctions, other interest groups derive some moral satisfaction fromthe fact 
that the target country has been punished for its deviant policy stance (Golliard 2013). Thus she 
writes: “The public choice approach is based on the fact that policy markets exist, where the policy 
constitutes the good. Both sender and target States own such markets.” She went on to say that the 
pressures that are put on both sender and target States “are the results of private utility 
maximisation from individual members of interest groups involved” (Golliard 2013:45). In the 
light of the above analysis of economic sanctions, it is evident that the rationale of economic 
sanctions from a game theoretical analysis based on free market economic methodological 
assumption where each person and their motivation for action is aimed at the maximisation of 
utility. This utility maximisation is a common element among both sender and target of economic 
sanctions.  
Nonetheless, the problem that arises from the above brief description of Golliard’s analysis of 
economic sanctions on the basis of the game theory of interest groups is that it makes an economic 
fallacy which has haunted economics as a discipline – that all human actions are about utility 
maximisation among individuals, and that all human actions are undertaken after calculating costs 
and benefits. The underlying presumption in this mode of thought is that all human beings are 
egoists. As Munyaradzi Murove observes, “Since it is argued by neo-liberal economists that human 
beings will always act in a way that maximises their own utilities, the only admissible type of 
reasoning is instrumental reason or ends-orientated rationality” (Murove 2005:109). In this utility 
maximisation rationality embedded on the game theory of interest groups, reasons behind the 
imposition by the sender to the target state are based on one single motivation, which is utility 
maximisation. On the final analysis, utility maximisation excludes the existence of other forms of 
motivation which have nothing to do with utility maximisation on the imposition of sanctions by 
sender and target state. For example, the sender of economic sanctions can do so for humanitarian 
reasons such as protecting the citizens of the target state against the abusive use of power against 
its citizens.  
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Likewise, Golliard, who analysed economic sanctions from the game theory of interest groups 
William Kaempfer and Anton Lowenberg argued that apart from the traditional instrumental view 
of economic sanctions as basically aimed at bringing about policy change in the target nation, 
“sanctions might have an altogether different goal – namely to serve the interests of pressure 
groups within the sanctioning country”. These authors went on to say that “even sanctions which 
have little economic impact in the target country can induce desired political responses if they are 
designed to selectively affect the appropriate interest groups” (Kaempfer and Lowenberg 
2017:786). It is not clearly stated in the above quotation with regard to what is meant that sanctions 
that have little economic impact in the target country end up producing desired political desires.  
However, one can deduce that these two authors are dogmatic believers in the efficacy of sanctions 
as a tool for policy change in the target state. For these authors, economic sanctions are desired by 
interest groups in both the sanctioning country and the target country. Thus they claim that “[w]e 
use an equilibrium model of interest group competition within the sanctioning country and the 
target country, in which public policy outcomes are explained as a function of the relative 
effectiveness of interest groups in generating political pressure. One purpose of the model is to 
predict the content and level of sanctions imposed by the sanctioning country and the target 
country” (Kaempfer & Lowenberg 2015:786–787). In this way of reasoning, sanctions are based 
on the principle of reciprocity between interest groups in the sanctioning country and the target 
country. On the basis of the above claim, the authors assert that “this approach might be used to 
explain why sanctions typically restrict imports from the target country rather than exports to that 
country, or to explain the types of imports singled out for embargo” (Kaempfer & Lowenberg 
2015:786–787).  
In this type of reasoning, it is eminently clear that the sanctioning country encourages exports to 
the target state while restricting imports from the target country, a practice that shows that the 
imposition of economic sanctions is done for self-serving purposes by the sanctioning countries 
instead of the national economic interests of the target state. For example, as we shall see in chapter 
five, individuals who belong to interest groups in the sender state made huge profits by trading 
with the target state, a practice that is popularly known as sanction busting. The implication here 
is that sanctions are important only when they help the interest groups from the sanctioning country 
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to reap as much profit as possible. Such a practice from an economic point of view ultimately 
implies impoverishing the target country through a process of looting. 
Meanwhile, another rationale that has been crafted by some political scholars of IR and economists 
is that economic sanctions can cause untold suffering in a way that outweighs the original goal that 
the senders professed to want to achieve. Despite the elegance of mathematical equations and 
sophistry in philosophical arguments, a fact that has remained very crucial to promoting peace and 
security in the world. The arguments that have been applied by ethicists and non-ethicists alike are 
that economic sanctions have caused indiscriminate suffering of people in the target country in a 
way that has surpassed a situation of actual war in the target country. For this reason, some scholars 
in international relations and policy makers have argued that instead of applying comprehensive 
economic sanctions on the target country as a whole, this senseless cruelty and indiscriminate mass 
killings of innocent people that has always dovetailed the imposition of economic sanctions on the 
target country can be avoided when economic sanctions are imposed selectively against 
individuals, companies, institutions and organisations that supported the government of the target 
state. This selective application of economic sanctions is usually referred to as ‘smart sanctions’ 
by the reformists of economic sanctions scholarly discourses. 
Within the current literature on economic sanctions, the evolution of the idea of smart sanctions 
should be traced to the end of the Cold War era. After the end of the Cold War, as Daniel Drezner 
puts it, “The most high-profile cases were comprehensive United Nations sanctions imposed on 
Iraq, Haiti, and former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s”. Drezner went on to say that, “The Iraq 
sanctions created three significant and overlapping political problems for the proponents of 
economic statecraft as a foreign policy tool. First, they did not seem to work. When they were 
initially imposed, most policymakers believed that Saddam Hussein would be the victim of a coup 
in short order. Instead he was defiant in his refusal to acquiesce to Security Council demands on 
weapons inspections” (Drezner 2011:98). Unsurprisingly, the Iraq sanctions resulted in a 
disastrous humanitarian crisis. On the other hand, “The final policy problem was the link between 
sanctions and the spread of corruption, as the UN’s Oil for Food scandal made clear. By punishing 
ordinary market activity, sanctions give entrepreneurs a strong incentive to take the criminal route 
– and very usually earn higher-than-usual profits in the bargain. Sanctions and black-market 
activity therefore go together. … Sanctions do not just weaken the rule of law in the target country 
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– they weaken the rule of law in bordering countries and monitoring organisations as well. The 
corruption has a path-dependent quality, persisting along after sanctions have been lifted” (Drezner 
2011:98).  
In the light of the above argument, Drezner maintained that the failure of sanctions in Iraq led 
some scholars to find new ways. There was doubt on whether sanctions were really working as a 
foreign policy tool because those who were hurt were those who were politically weak and 
ironically, those who benefited were those who were supporters of the regime of the target state. 
Some scholars went as far as arguing that those who suffered the consequences of comprehensive 
economic sanctions were women and children of the target country. As it will be discussed in 
chapter six, the Iraq sanctions are said to have triggered worldwide protests from NGOs on the 
issue of human security and ethical issues related to the imposition of comprehensive sanctions. It 
is on record that “UN Secretary-Generals Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan both labelled 
sanctions as a ‘blunt instrument’ and asked whether the suffering inflicted on vulnerable groups 
was a legitimate means of exerting pressure on political leaders” (Drezner 2011:99). The critique 
against multilateral sanctions was mainly based on the idea that the practice itself was based on 
the principle of indiscriminate punishment which in the final analysis was not effective in bringing 
about policy change to the target state. Thus the paradigm shift to smart sanctions was partly 
premised on the belief that  
[s]mart sanctions could raise the target regime’s costs of noncompliance while avoiding the 
collateral damage that comes with comprehensive trade embargoes. The most prominent 
countrywide examples included financial sanctions, asset freezes, travel bans, restrictions on 
luxury goods, and arms embargoes. Furthermore, instead of sanctioning an entire country, smart 
sanctions advocates advocated the targeting of individuals, restrictions corporations or holding 
companies associated with the target government’s leadership. Targeted sanctions would hamper 
the ability of leaders to offer crucial supporters rent-seeking opportunities (Drezner 2011:100). 
 
However, the question that arises against the efficacy of smart sanctions as compared to 
comprehensive sanctions is that smart sanctions can easily cause the same effects to the target 
countries in a way that is similar to the effects that are caused by comprehensive sanctions. The 
belief in the efficacy of smart sanctions was succinctly captured by Maria Bengtsson when she 
said smart sanctions are based on “selecting methods aiming to target the elites responsible for the 
offensive policy and thus aim[s] to minimise hardship on the general population, especially the 
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most vulnerable” (Bengtsson 2002:19). Instead of implementing comprehensive sanctions that 
were primarily aimed at trade embargoes, smart sanctions put emphasis on financial restrictions of 
embargoes which “include measures such as freezing foreign assets of a targeted country, 
government or individuals” (Bengtsson 2002:19). Bengtsson went on to say:  
Because more focus is on the powerful and wealth, financial sanctions put pressure on those 
responsible for the wrongdoing instead of on vulnerable populations. Furthermore, they minimise 
the short-term humanitarian and the long-term social costs for the people in a targeted country. … For 
a targeted country’s vulnerable population these sanctions are likely to be less severe than with 
traditional trade sanctions” (Bengtsson 2002:19–20). 
In the light of the above observation, the main presumption is that smart sanctions are designed to 
punish only a few of the targeted country’s elite or those who are in political power and their 
associates nationally and internationally. The question that arises is whether smart sanctions do 
not have the same negative effects similar to those that are experienced by the target country under 
comprehensive economic sanctions. If we take it that political leaders are there to promote the 
national interest of their countries, it should also follow on logical grounds that sanctions that are 
imposed on those politicians as individuals will have adverse effects on the target country because 
those politicians who have been put on sanctions can no longer represent their countries in the 
international arena. Without international representation, the majority of the citizens whose 
politicians have been put on smart sanctions will end up suffering the economic consequences in 
a way that resembles those target States that are under comprehensive economic sanctions. Apart 
from the above dominant assumptions about economic sanctions, the other rationale behind 
economic sanctions is based on the belief that economic sanctions are a tool for the promotion of 
international foreign policy by sanctioning a country or countries that behave in a way or promote 
policies that violate(s) international law. 
2.3 Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool for the Enforcement of International Law 
Thomas Hobbes was one of the philosophers who stated explicitly in his book, Leviathan, that the 
problem with the international political scene is that it lacks a common authority or government 
and consequently it is dominated by the pursuit of national interests. In an international political 
context where there is no common government, the very idea of enforcing international peace and 
international law remains the responsibility of sovereign States. Jackson Ralston maintained that 
International Law is derived from international conventions whereby  
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[n]ations agree among themselves on the formation of rules of navigation, treaties of naturalisation, 
recognition of trademarks and of copyrights … and an immense number of minor conventions which 
involve no abstract right as a rule, but are an arrangement of relations upon matters usually morally 
indifferent. In each instance there is created a modus vivendi from which no one nation has any 
sufficient reason to depart. The rule is universally observed just as a like rule is followed within the 
State, and may lead to no material international differences. Aside from convention, there also grows 
up what may be called the minor common law of nations regulating their intercourse of courtesy. All 
of these matters are treated under the head of International Law and have their importance as the 
usages of polite international society (Ralston 2012:12–13). 
 
2.3.1 The Challenges of Enforcing International Law 
In view of the observation made by Ralston in the previous section, it is evident that International 
Law is derived from rules and norms that nation States freely enter among themselves in an attempt 
to come up with a universally acceptable international order. Rules that are central to International 
Law are thus presumed to be binding on all nations. But the question that arises is: who enforces 
the rules of International Law?  As an answer to this question, most scholars have deduced that the 
international political scene is characterised by anarchy owing to the absence of morality on the 
international political scene. What is considered to be lawful by one country maybe unlawful and 
morally repugnant to another nation or nations. In this regard, it has been emphasised over and 
over again by scholars that the drive towards the promotion of international moral norms is based 
on the realisation that the international political scene is bereft of shared moral values among 
nations. Ali Mazrui observes: “The essential difference once again between the international 
domain and the domestic may hinge on the simple fact that the international dimension does not 
have law in the same sense as the domestic. There are no legal sanctions, as we know all too 
clearly, that can be applied against transgressors in the international system. There are no jails to 
which offending nations might be sent; and even economic sanctions and boycotts have been 
applied so half-heartedly that as often as not, they have strengthened the transgressor instead of 
weakening her” (Mazrui 1974:434). In this way of thinking, it is eminently clear that Mazrui is 
arguing that international law differs remarkably from domestic law because there are no stipulated 
sanctions that can be imposed against those who violate international law. Mazrui’s scepticism 
towards International Law is not shared by other scholars.  
Contrary to Mazrui’s scepticism towards International Law, Edmund Jan Osmanczyk has an 
optimistic view towards the international acceptance of the existence of International Law. As he 
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puts it:“The 20th century marked a hundred years of codification and development of international 
public law. An initiative to this end was taken by the League of Nations, which on 22 September 
1927 established a Committee of Experts for the Progressive Codification of International Law. In 
1927 the League of Nations convened Conferences for Codification of law in the areas of 
citizenship, shipping law, and certain fields of responsibilities of States” (Osmanczyk 1990:458). 
In the light of the above quotation, the argument that is being made is that there has been a gradual 
international commitment to the development of International Law and its codification. This 
gradual commitment to international law can be deduced from the fact that there are treaties which 
are agreed upon by all States as legally binding. As Osmanczyk phrased it: “The war crimes against 
humanity have played an important role in preparation and adoption of such significant treaties for 
international law as the Convention on Genocide of 1948, [the] Convention on the Prohibition of 
Racial Discrimination of 1965, the Covenants on Human Rights of 1966. The UN General 
Assembly also adopted conventions and treaties concerning the limitation of armaments, the 
Treaty on the Antarctic of 1959, the Treaties on the Prohibitition of Nuclear Tests in the Air, Outer 
Space and Under Water of 1963, the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Arms of 1968, and many others” 
(Osmanczyk 1990:458). This is clearly an expression of optimism on the existence of International 
Law.  
2.3.2 Natural Law 
Another source of optimism in the existence of International Law is derived from the philosophy 
of Natural Law. From the philosophy of Natural Law, one finds that it is usually asserted that as 
human beings we are one family which shares the same moral values. The shared moral values 
help us to have the same life outlook towards that which is morally permissible and impermissible. 
Mary Maxwell’s deduction of morality from Natural Law led her to the conclusion that “[e]ven in 
the absence of world government, and despite the problem of cultural pluralism, there is still a 
universal standard of right and wrong” (Maxwell 1990:32). However, Maxwell went on to say: 
The significance of natural law for our discussion of international morality stems from the fact that 
it is sometimes proposed either as a guide for international law or as a source of judgement of the 
behaviour of individual States. The most dramatic use of natural law in an international context 
occurred this century at the Nuremberg Tribunals. There, the prosecutors identified the category of 
‘crimes against humanity’. These included the ‘extermination, enslavement, deportation and other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population … whether or not in violation of domestic 
law” [her emphasis] (Maxwell 1990:33). 
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 In other words, the rulings against heinous crimes against humanity under the auspice of the 
international community criminal court set precedence on the existence of International Law. Here 
the implication is that International Law was something that was historically concrete. Thus she 
writes: 
The historical relationship between natural law and international law can be outlined as follows. The 
Romans first worked out a jus gentium (law of nations) in order to govern the many diverse tribes in 
the Empire. This jus gentium was said to contain those universal principles of law that were practised 
everywhere because of human nature rather than because of local convention. As such, the jus gentium 
was more or less interchangeable with the jus naturale. Later the Romans made use of the Stoic 
natural law idea in order to obtain a broader theoretical base for the jus gentium. …Roman jus gentium 
was, however, not international law, since all nations were part of the Empire. Indeed, even for over 
a thousand years after the fall of Rome there was no need in Europe for a true international law: the 
States of the Holy Roman Empire were unified in their deference to papal authority. Moreover, it was 
a central metaphysical belief of the Christian religion that God was the author of a universal order. 
Saint Augustine (354–430) proposed that the very existence of separate States was artificial, a result 
of punishment for sin. By the seventeenth century, however, following the Reformation and Counter 
Reformation, it was no longer possible to maintain the fiction of a united Christendom: the States of 
Europe were constantly warring (Maxwell 1990:34). 
2.3.3 Sources of International Law 
Within the history of the West, the idea of International Law evolved from the Greek philosophical 
concept of Natural Law and the Roman Empire. Apart from these two sources for International 
Law, the other source which is identified by Maxwell is the Christian religion with its idea of God 
as the author of the universal order. The idea of International Law was already being sought after 
in the antiquity of the Christian religion. But the Western world’s approach to International Law 
was resented in the Western world because of the hegemony of the papacy. The Reformation era 
did not make things easy for the emergence of International Law because the main spiritual thrust 
for the reformers was against universality in favour of the nation-state. However, after the Second 
World War, the need to avoid the situation that led to the Second World War led to the formation 
of the United Nations and the subsequent formation of the International Law Commission which 
was comprised of experts who were committed to the development of International Law and its 
codification. As Osmanczyk (1990:459) puts it: “The commission seeks to make international law 
a more effective means of implementing the purposes and principles set forth in the Charter of the 
United Nations. Most of its work consists of drafting articles on various aspects of international 
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law which could ultimately be included in international conventions or other legal instruments”. 
Thus the formation of the International Law Commission aimed at coming up with internationally 
binding legal norms for all States that comprise[d] the international community. 
2.3.4 Principles of International Law 
In 1944 American and Canadian internationalists came up with International Law principles and 
postulates that were all in all aimed at strengthening International Law in the aftermath of the 
Second World War. The spirit behind most of these principles was aimed at the promotion of peace 
and security as an international legal obligation to be adhered to by all States. For example, 
Principle 2 States: “Each state has a legal duty to see that conditions prevailing within its own 
territory do not menace international peace and order, and to this end it must treat its own 
population in a way which will not violate the dictates of humanity and justice or shock the 
conscience of mankind”. In the same spirit, Principle 2 states: “The law of the Community of 
States is international law. The development of an adequate system of international law depends 
upon continuous collaboration by States to promote the common welfare of all peoples and to 
maintain just and peaceful relations between States” (Osmanczyk 1990:459). Thus one finds that 
in many instances where comprehensive economic sanctions have been imposed on the target state, 
the reason that has been given by the sanctioning country or countries has been that the target 
country has violated International Law. The thrust of International Law was mainly aimed at 
averting the possibility of the recurrence of the European international political conditions that 
served as a stimulant to the rise of the Second World War. The imposition of sanctions on the 
target state has been done on the basis of protecting human rights which are seen as an articulation 
of the spirit of International Law in praxis. 
2.3.5 Functions and Human Rights 
Apart from the justification of the imposition of economic sanctions as a mechanism for the 
enforcement of International Law against the target state, the other rationale that is given for the 
deployment of economic sanctions against the target state is usually presented as a mechanism for 
the protection of human rights in the target state. As seen previously, both comprehensive and 
smart sanctions are rationalised on the basis that they are the only way of protecting human rights 
against the abuses of the citizens within the target state. Smart sanctions are deemed preferable by 
other scholars on the grounds that they do not violate human rights as compared to comprehensive 
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economic sanctions. However, most of the members of the UNSC have always talked of human 
rights violations and are swifter in imposing sanctions as punitive measures to those countries that 
are accused of violating human rights. In most cases those countries that are friends of some of the 
UNSC permanent members have wantonly violated human rights without facing any 
condemnation or the punitive measures of sanctions from these permanent members of the UNSC. 
For example, it is well known that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and Israel (on the Palestinian 
issue) have wantonly violated human rights without being threatened with economic sanctions by 
the USA and her UNSC allies. It is also common knowledge that before Saddam Hussein invaded 
Kuwait he was notoriously known for ruthlessly violating human rights with impunity without 
being threatened with economic sanctions from the USA and her UNSC allies. Another plausible 
reason behind the imposition of sanctions against the target state is usually related to the pursuit 
of the national interests of those countries that impose sanctions on the target state. 
2.4 Economic Sanctions and the Pursuit of National Interests 
In the preceding discussion it was shown that with regard to economic sanctions, whether 
comprehensive or smart, the end result is that they inflict human suffering indiscriminately. The 
concept of national interest is related to the classical liberal economic theory of homo economicus, 
which said that human beings were selfish or egoists by nature (Mandeville 1924; Smith 1976). 
Classical economists have maintained that the individual pursuit of self-interest in economic 
relations has nothing to do with ethical considerations. What is deemed as solely the motivating 
force in economic relations is self-interest. Equally, classical political philosophers have argued 
that political liberalism should be based on the presumption that the pursuit of self-interests should 
be understood as the main motivating force in political decision making (Hobbes 1967; Ernest C. 
Mossner, 1980). Thus, in its foreign policy, each state is presumed to relate to other nations purely 
on the basis of pursuing its own national interest. This pursuit of national interest is done in a way 
that is devoid of moral considerations. This is popularly known as the theory of political realism. 
Mary Maxwell summarised the thinking behind the national interest of the theory of political 
realism as follows: “In the real world, it [political realism] says international relations are 
characterised by aggression, deceit, and the play of power politics. The national leader must, 
perforce, follow the rules of the game: he must meet his opponents on their own terms. To wish 
instead that the world were a more moral or idealistic place is to engage in naïve fantasy” (Maxwell 
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1990:11–12). In this way of thinking, international relations and foreign policies are not based on 
moral considerations but on promoting national interests. Maxwell went on to say: “Realism 
believes that certain forces in the world, or perhaps ultimately in human nature, determine the 
outcome of international events. This belief naturally devalues any effort to make nations behave 
ethically” (Maxwell 1990:14). If one applies this theory of national interest to sanctions, one can 
say that sanctions are not imposed on the target state for humanitarian purposes, but for the national 
interests of the sanctioning countries. The connection between national interests and sanctions 
does away with the claim which is usually made by the sanctioning country or countries when they 
say that sanctions were for humanitarian purposes in the target state. As we shall see in chapter 
seven, the criticism that has often been levelled against the imposition of economic sanctions that 
they are unethical is based on the idea that the pursuit of national interests through economic 
sanctions undermines any ethical considerations. 
Economic sanctions do serve various interests of the imposers on the target state. Craig Knouse 
(1986)observes that the USA sanctions can be categorised into national interests such as “defense, 
economic, world order and ideological”. As he puts it, “[t]he multitude of sanctions cases can be 
subjectively simplified into six different groups: human rights, nuclear safe-guards, expropriation, 
destabilization, territorial and war” (Knouse 1986:100). All these categories are deemed to serve 
USA basic national interests. Knouse went on to explain these basic interests as follows: 
Human rights: This issue is most easily identified as an ideological interest. The US believes that its 
set of values expressed in the form of human rights are universally good and therefore should be 
followed by all nations. Nuclear safeguards: The protection of the international system relies on the 
protection of nuclear weapons and their proliferation. This issue fits into the world order interest 
category. Expropriation: This issue is most easily identified with the economic interest category. 
Most of the expropriation cases involve the seizure of US company assets and not US government 
properties. Destabilization: This issue is mainly involved with the protection of world order interests. 
Sometimes the ideological label could be applied to destabilizing a government. Territorial: This 
issue also is covered by the world order interest category. Occasionally the seizure of territory can 
be influenced by economic reasons, but on the whole, world order interests is a more accurate label. 
War: This issue is most certainly of the defense interest category. Only during this issue can physical 
violence be used towards the homeland of the country initiating the sanction (Knouse 1986:102). 
While Knouse identified the above national interests as the USA’s basic national interests, he also 
acknowledges that these national interests do have a spill over [effect] into other categories as well. 
If national interests have a spill over effect, it is problematic for one to put these national interests 
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into categories as Knouse has done. The USA has never been consistent in its adherence to the 
issue of human rights. As stated previously, it supported totalitarian regimes that ruthlessly 
oppressed its citizens such as Saudi Arabia, yet no economic sanctions have ever been imposed by 
the USA against Saudi Arabia. The USA has been on record for arming other countries with 
nuclear weapons as well as refusing to impose economic sanctions against oppressive regimes. In 
other words, the pursuit of national interest through sanctions is not done in a way that is consistent. 
When sanctions are imposed on the target country on the basis of national interest they serve the 
selfish purposes of the sender. The case of US sanctions on Cuba is an instructive example in this 
regard. 
2.4.1 The Example of Cuba 
As we shall see in chapter six, the USA sanctions against Cuba were mainly punitive against Fidel 
Castro, who was pro-socialist economic policies as opposed to the Batista regime, which was pro-
capitalist. In this case Golliard observes that, “As Cuba was getting closer to the Soviet Union, 
commercially and politically, United States reacted by initiating a series of policies acting as a 
near-total embargo. Unilateral economic sanctions implemented by the United States against Cuba 
are broad-reaching in scope and duration, during more than four decades” (Golliard 2013:94). To 
put it another way the USA’s imposition of sanctions against Cuba was based mainly on 
ideological grounds rather than humanitarian ones. When sanctions are imposed in pursuit of 
national interest, they violate the country’s sovereignty of the target state to pursue its own socio-
economic policies without external interference. Economic sanctions against Cuba were not 
imposed to help the Cuban people; rather, they were imposed in order to advance USA’s national 
interests. Sanctions against Cuba were imposed on the grounds that by nationalising most of the 
industries, Fidel Castro had undermined the USA’s national interests in Cuba. 
2.4.2 The Example of Iraq 
In the case of Iraq, some scholars have argued that sanctions against Iraq were based mainly on 
the pursuit of the USA and European national interests. While economic sanctions are stipulated 
in the UN Charter as one of the instruments to be used to promote peace and security in the world, 
in the case of Iraq, economic sanctions were used to politically destabilise and undermine the 
sovereignty of Iraq. Economic sanctions that were imposed on Iraq as a punishment for invading 
Kuwait were later used by the USA and her European allies as leverage for the overthrow of 
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Saddam Hussein’s government. Kenneth Vaux argued that the imposition of sanctions against Iraq 
was done to serve USA national interest, which in this case was cheap oil. When the imposition of 
sanctions failed to remove Saddam Hussein from power, the USA went on to claim falsely that 
Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction. When economic sanctions decimated over five 
hundred thousand Iraqis, the USA felt that its primary objective, which was that of removing 
Saddam Hussein from power, had not been achieved; hence, it decided to go to war against Iraq.  
Alexander Thompson observes that the USA went as far as making payments to those countries 
that supported the war effort against Iraq. He writes: “Payments were handed out by the United 
States to many countries, including at least Egypt, Poland, Syria, and Turkey, and Security Council 
Members Columbia, the Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Malaysia, the Soviet Union, and Zaire. Economic 
inducements included extending credit, forgiving loans, and making trade concessions” 
(Thompson 2009:61). Saddam Hussein had become a threat to USA national interests in the 
Middle East which was mainly about cheap oil. But it was not only about USA national interests 
which Hussein had threatened by invading Kuwait. As Kenneth Vaux put it, “Western vital 
interests were at stake: Stability in the region, continued affordable oil prices, protection of the 
American way of life” [his italics] (Vaux 1992:25). Even though Iraq withdrew from Kuwait, 
devastating economic sanctions remained. The interest of the USA and her Western allies was in 
the removal of Saddam Hussein from political office at the expense of “hundreds of thousands of 
Iraq lives” (Rai 2003:8–9). As can be seen, the pursuit of national interests does not take into 
account the consequences of economic sanctions to innocent lives. Furthermore, the Iraq case 
demonstrated the leverage the United States has on the operations of the UN since the former is 
the host state and the major contributor to UN budgetary needs. The old adage that he who pays 
the piper seems to hold sway in this context. 
2.4.3 The Example of Zimbabwe 
Sometimes economic sanctions have helped target countries to collaborate in order to protect their 
national interests. Mediel Hove and Heather Chingono (2013:14) observe that, “National interests 
have rendered economic sanctions ineffective as a coercive diplomatic tool because like 
globalisation they foster the phenomenon of interdependence which enables sanctioned countries 
to ‘survive’ through trade, cooperation and financial support from sympathiser countries opposed 
to the imposed sanctions”. These authors went on to say that, 
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In Zimbabwe the ten plus years old sanctions did not lead to the intended quick political resolution. 
…China is and has been instrumental in restraining the effects the sanction on Burma, North Korea, 
Iran and Zimbabwe. China therefore served as an economic and technological messiah. The 
imposition of sanctions was unlikely to cause positive behavioural changes to Burma, Zimbabwe and 
Iran. The sanctions surely led to the continued suffering of the civilians in the sanctioned countries 
(Hove & Chingono 2013:14). 
It is scarcely surprising that the pursuit of national interests has on several occasions rendered 
sanctions ineffectual to bring about government change of policy. What sanctions achieved in the 
case of Zimbabwe was to cause an unprecedented humanitarian crisis that had never before been 
experienced in that country’s history. The same can be said in the case of Cuba, Burma, North 
Korea and Iran. In this regard, as will be shown in this study, because of the pursuit of national 
interests, economic sanctions is a strong and indisputable example that shows that nations do not 
take moral or ethical considerations in their behaviour towards each other. The final rationale to 
be considered in this study for the imposition of economic sanctions against the target State(s) 
which is closely related to the theory of national interests is known as the theory of motivation 
behind the imposition of economic sanctions against the target state. 
2.5 The Utility Economic Sanctions as an Instrument of Foreign Policy 
When economic sanctions are imposed on the target state or States, the question that arises is: what 
are the motivating factors that drive the sender countries to send sanctions against the target 
State(s)? While I will not go into an in-depth discussion on this question, my main concern in this 
section is to give a synthetic discussion of the main motives for the imposition of economic 
sanctions on the target state. Since economic sanctions constitute an interference or violation of 
the sovereignty of a target state, it can be deduced that economic sanctions are intended to enforce 
the change of policy in the target state. Instead of using military force, sender countries use 
economic sanctions for specific purposes. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberly 
Ann Elliott identified three sources of motivation that drive the sender countries whenever they 
impose economic sanctions against the target state. The first source of motivation for senders 
which they identified is that economic sanctions serve as a Demonstration of resolve [my italics]. 
They write:  
This is particularly true for the United States, which frequently has deployed sanctions to try to assert 
its leadership in world affairs. US presidents seemingly feel compelled to dramatize their opposition 
to foreign misdeeds, even when the likelihood of changing behaviour in the target country seems 
remote. In these cases sanctions often are imposed because the cost of inaction – in lost confidence 
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at home and abroad in the ability or willingness of the US to act – is often expected by the 
international community – to demonstrate moral outrage and to reassure its allies that the United 
States will stand by its international commitments. The impact of such moral and psychological 
factors on the decision to impose sanctions should not be underestimated, even if it is hard to 
document (Hufbauer, Schott &Elliott 1990: 38). 
In the light of the above motivation, these authors are saying that economic sanctions are used by 
powerful countries, the US in particular as a way of demonstrating its global hegemony by treating 
other sovereign countries in a way that is similar to how a big brother treats a delinquent young 
brother.  
2.5.1 Demonstration of Resolve to Impose Economic Sanctions 
By resorting to economic sanctions, the US demonstrates its power within its own territory and in 
foreign territories about its invincibility. Regardless of the inefficacy of these economic sanctions 
on the sender state, the main idea is to show to the whole world that it is ultimately in charge of 
the international affairs. Through economic sanctions the US shows to the whole world that what 
is permissible and impermissible is determined by its ability to act. When the US imposes 
sanctions, it does so in a way that is intended to demonstrate to the whole world in practical terms 
that it is ultimately has the imperial power for the whole world. As the world imperial power, the 
US has demonstrated through its unilateral imposition of sanctions that it was the sovereign 
authority that rules the whole world.  
2.5.2 Sanctions as a Tool for Deterrence 
The second source of motivation for the sender(s) which is stated by these authors is that sanctions 
serve as a tool for Deterrence [my italics] which is the “frequently cited reason for sanctions: 
supposedly a sender country can discourage future objectionable policies by increasing the 
associated costs. Two recent cases (United States v. USSR over Afghanistan from 1980 forward 
and the United States v. Libya over terrorism from 1978 forward) suggest that it is difficult, if not 
impossible, to determine whether sanctions are an effective deterrent” (Hufbauer et 
al.1990:10).These authors doubt the efficacy of economic sanctions as a policy tool for deterrence 
against the wayward behaviour of the target State(s). Put another way, economic sanctions are 
regarded as having failed as a tool for deterrence with specific reference to examples of US and 
USSR over Afghanistan and the US’s sanctions against Libya. Other scholars have argued that 
economic sanctions have not been an effective tool for deterrence because their efficacy is 
 
 
39 
 
compromised when the target state is not economically dependent on foreign markets. This is the 
argument that was made by Margaret Doxey when she said: 
Vulnerability to economic sanctions is a function of dependence on external supplies of goods or 
capital and on external markets for domestic products, and to some extent a potential target of 
sanctions can act in advance to minimise their impact. Rhodesia was warned in October 1964 that 
UDI would mean British sanctions, and this gave all sectors of the economy a full year to plan and 
strengthen their defences … The Republic of South Africa has had more than thirty years to work 
towards self-sufficiency. Typical advance action to reduce the effect of trade embargoes includes 
stockpiling; the development of alternative sources of supply; the stimulation and diversification of 
domestic production; control of strategic resources; and the development of industrial substitutes. 
Conservation of foreign exchange is an obvious strategy; improved and diversified transportation 
systems may be developed to reduce dependence on one outlet. In the wider sphere of inter-state 
economic relations, new links can be forged through trade agreements and other marketing 
arrangements. … The effects of sanctions can be countered by adaptation, reduction of external 
dependence, and possibly the development of new links with non-sanctioning States (Doxey 
1987:110–111). 
An argument such as that of Doxey as stated above punches holes in the argument that economic 
sanctions serve as a deterrence tool against policies of those States that violate internationally 
accepted foreign policy norms. Two factors that militate against the deterrence effect of sanctions 
are: reduction or minimisation of economic dependency, and establishment of relations with those 
countries that are not part of the sanctioning States. The availability of alternatives renders the 
deterrent effect of economic sanctions ineffectual. While the deterrent argument is mostly believed 
by supporters of economic sanctions or senders, the failure of economic sanctions is more 
overwhelming, to such an extent that one questions whether there was any moral consideration 
among the senders of economic sanctions. The deterrence motive seems to dominate the rationale 
of senders as well as their supporters. As we shall see later on, the UN Charter implied that the 
rationale of economic sanctions was based mainly on the belief that they have a deterrent effect on 
the would-be transgressors of international norms. The deterrent effect of economic sanctions is 
rather dogmatically believed in, regardless of the abundance of empirical evidence of their failure 
throughout history.  
2.5.3 Sanctions as Surrogate for Other Measures 
The third motive that was observed by Hufbauer et al. (1990) is that economic sanctions are used 
as a surrogate for other measures [my italics] (Hufbauer et al.1990:10). To put it differently, 
economic sanctions are used on the place of other measures that are supposed to be used against 
 
 
40 
 
the target state or that they are a substitute in the place of another punitive measure which is at the 
disposal of the sender State(s). As the above authors put it:  
More extreme measures, such as covert action or military measures, may be excessive. Sanctions 
provide a popular middle road: they add ‘teeth’ to international diplomacy – even if the bark is worse 
than the bite. In a sense, the imposition of sanctions conveys a triple signal: to the target country it 
says the sender does not condone your actions; to allies, it says that words will be supported with 
deeds; to domestic audiences it says the sender’s government will act to safeguard the nation’s vital 
interests” (Hufbauer et al.1990:10–11). 
The idea of using economic sanctions as surrogate to military confrontation is usually motivated 
by the need to protect national interests of the sender State(s) – inflicting maximum harm on the 
target state without necessarily harming the sender(s)’ national interests such as preservation of 
the lives of the citizens of the sender State(s). For example, if the sender were to send its forces to 
attack the target state, the possibility of the sender state to incur some loss of lives in the process 
is real. The very idea that economic sanctions are used for surrogate purposes implies that they are 
used for self-serving purposes by the sender State(s). Understanding economic sanctions as another 
form of coercion against the target state is similar to the understanding of economic sanctions as a 
surrogate for other measures. Daniel Drezner made an observation that shows this similarity as 
follows: “States will use economic coercion when the costs of military intervention are too great” 
(Drezner 1999:14). 
In other words, economic sanctions are a substitute for war. Through economic sanctions, the 
sender is supposedly expected to achieve foreign policy enforcement on the target state. Hufbauer 
et al. (1990:11) went on to say that economic sanctions function in a way that is similar to the 
functioning of criminal law, whereby the purpose of criminal law is “to punish, to deter, and to 
rehabilitate” the offending state. As they put it: “Countries that impose sanctions, like States that 
incarcerate criminals, may find their hopes of rehabilitation unrealised, but they may be quite 
satisfied which whatever punishment and deterrence are accomplished” (Hufbauer et al.1990:11). 
In other words, the imposition of sanctions on the target State(s) is not an automatic guarantee for 
success or rehabilitation of the offending State(s). The issue of whether economic sanctions have 
succeeded as a tool for rehabilitation of offending State(s) is integral to the scope of this study, as 
will be shown in the following chapters. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have shown the prevalent or primary rationale behind the conceptualisation of 
economic sanctions. The first rationale behind economic sanctions that was discussed was that of 
the game theoretical approach. The traditional understanding of sanctions has been predominantly 
based on the idea that the intention of economic sanctions is to bring about policy change on the 
target state by imposing economically harmful sanctions on the target state. William Kaempfer 
and Anton Lowenberg described this view as “the instrumental theory” of economic sanctions 
(Kaempfer &Lowenberg 2017:786). Another rationale that was identified behind the imposition 
of economic sanctions comes from the belief that they help errant States to adhere to international 
law within their sovereign territories. The rationale that is given for the deployment of economic 
sanctions against the target state is usually presented as a mechanism for the protection of human 
rights in the target state. Both comprehensive and smart sanctions are rationalised on the basis that 
it is the only way of protecting human rights against the abuses of the citizens within the target 
state. The idea of human rights is presumed to be pivotal to international law. Regardless of cultural 
and historical differences, all countries of the world are presumed to support the idea of human 
rights.It was also argued that sometimes economic sanctions are imposed on the target state for 
self-interested motives. The pursuit of national interest through sanctions is not done in a way that 
is consistent. For example, some countries have violated human rights with impunity without 
having economic sanctions being imposed on them. Here, what comes to mind are Saudi Arabia 
and Israel, to mention only a few. When sanctions are imposed on the target country on the basis 
of national interest, they serve the selfish purposes of the sender. For example, the US sanctions 
against Cuba were mainly punitive against Fidel Castro, who was pro-socialist economic policies, 
as opposed to the Batista regime, which was pro-capitalist. I have also shown that some countries 
such as China have provided economic support to some of those countries that are on economic 
sanctions. 
Lastly, I identified three sources of motivation that drive the sender countries whenever they 
impose economic sanctions against the target state. These three sources of motivation are: (i) 
demonstration of resolve, (ii) deterrence and the idea that sanctions are (iii) surrogates of other 
measures. According to Hufbauer et al. (1990), these sources of motivation imply that economic 
sanctions should be seen as analogous to the criminal justice system in the sense that just like the 
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criminal justice system, the functioning of criminal law is to punish, to deter, and to rehabilitate 
the offending state. It was deduced from these sources of motivation that economic sanctions are 
an exercise in power relations in the realm of foreign policy. But what has remained as an open-
ended question is whether economic sanctions have succeeded as a tool for rehabilitation of the 
offending State(s). For us to answer this question I think it is imperative for me to give a brief 
historical discussion on the evolution of economic sanctions in chapter three.  
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CHAPTER 3: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN THE 
UNITED NATIONS 
3.1 Introduction 
The end of the Second World War gave rise to the formation of the United Nations as a multilateral 
organisation for all independent states. The main purpose behind the founding of the UN was to 
avert the political situation that had led to the rise of the Second World War and to ensure that it 
would not recur. Thus the formation of the UN had the promotion of peace and security for the 
whole world as its main goal or primary objective. After the formation of the UN, other organs 
were also formed with the intention that they would assist the UN to realise its mission of 
safeguarding peace and security in the world. Related to this primary motive was the belief that 
military force was not a good method of promoting peace and security globally because the major 
lesson that was learnt from the Second World War was that war will always lead to destruction of 
human lives and has the tendency of escalating itself in a way that surpasses the anticipated 
objectives for this global undertaking. Because of the Second Word War, millions of human lives 
that included those of soldiers and civilians were lost. It was not only the loss of human lives; 
many economies and livelihoods were ruined. The formation of a multilateral organisation such as 
the UN was also based on the belief that all the independent nations of the world needed to live 
under some shared political and economic values that would be regarded as binding to all member 
states.  
The United Nations was preceded by the League of Nations. The League of Nations was mainly 
composed of European countries with the specific goal of aiding each other militarily against any 
form of aggression from without their borders. Most of those countries from Asia, Africa and Latin 
America were not members of the League of Nations. The League of Nations was mainly 
Eurocentric in the sense that it was mainly concerned with European political and security issues. 
In this regard, the League of Nations was primarily preoccupied with the idea of countering the 
threat of war in Europe. The name “United Nations” was used in the Declaration by the United 
Nations in 1942 and was later on adopted unanimously at the San Francisco Conference on 
25 April 1945 (see Osmańczyk 1990:946). The UN Charter states succinctly that the UN is “based 
on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members” (Article 2.1). The implication of this 
principle is that all members of the UN are to treat each other as equals. The recognition of each 
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other as equally sovereign implies that member states of the UN are supposed to desist from 
segregating or looking down upon each other. The concept of sovereignty conferred the power for 
each state to be the sole authority within its own territory. This concept also implies that no state 
should interfere in the domestic affairs of another sovereign state.  
As has been noted in chapter 2, economic sanctions do violate the idea of sovereignty in the sense 
that economic sanctions are usually imposed by other states or external organisations with the aim 
of changing the foreign policy of another sovereign state. Economic sanctions are thus a foreign 
policy tool that shows that states do interfere in each other’s internal affairs. From the time of the 
League of Nations era to the formation of the UN, economic sanctions have been used not only as 
a substitute for armed conflict, but as a tool that is used by powerful countries to stamp their power 
on economically weak countries. The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) became the organ 
responsible for the maintenance of peace and security in the world and it made recourse to 
economic sanctions as its primary mechanism for the enforcement of peace and security globally. 
Through Chapter VI, the UNSC makes recommendations, but under Chapter VII, it gives binding 
resolutions. Economic sanctions were aimed at enforcing behaviour modification of the target state 
without resorting to military intervention. Regardless of the fact that economic sanctions have 
failed to bring about foreign policy change against the target states, as we shall see in the following 
chapters, powerful countries have continued to resort to the imposition of economic sanctions on 
poor countries. This chapter comprises of three sections. The first section briefly discusses the 
evolution of the UN economic sanctions in the modern political arena. In the second section my 
focus will be on the instrumental value of economic sanctions in the UN. The third section will 
demonstrate that economic sanctions have been used by the UN as a foreign policy tool that was 
often resorted to in order to resolve international conflicts. 
3.2 The evolution of the United Nations economic sanctions in the modern political arena 
The idea of international sanctions did not originate with the founding of the United Nations after 
the Second World War. Edmund Jan Osmańczyk observes that “[t]he term ‘sanctions’ was 
introduced by the Versailles Treaty to denote two things: in art. 16 as means of exerting pressure; 
in arts. 227–230 as punishment of war criminals; art. 16 referred to all members of the League of 
Nations violating commitments undertaken and provided for in the League’s Pact. Art. 16 was 
generally interpreted by the founders of the League of Nations in such a way that the military 
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sanctions provided for in the Treaty were of facultative character; however, economic and financial 
sanctions were compulsory” (Osmańczyk 1990:789). Since the League of Nations was mainly 
composed of European countries to the exclusion of non-European states, there was some 
opposition on when to impose economic sanctions and when not to do so. Joy Gordon observes 
that before World War I “sanctions were understood as economic warfare, and as such they fell 
under the rules of war. When the League of Nations was formed, the drafters of the League’s 
Covenant reframed economic sanctions as the alternative to war, a ‘peaceful’ instrument of 
international diplomacy that could effectively prevent military aggression. In the end, economic 
sanctions were described in odd, paradoxical terms” (Gordon 1999:138). Here it is important to 
note that the imposition of economic sanctions on the basis of the pursuit of national interests was 
already dominating the international political scene of the League of Nations. For example, the 
League of Nations never applied military action against any member state which was a violator of 
the League’s pact. In 1935 the League of Nations adopted the measure of economic sanctions 
against Italy as a punitive measure against its unprovoked aggression against Ethiopia. Those 
sanctions were opposed by France and Britain. “On May 9, 1936 Italy occupied Ethiopia, a fact 
which according to the interpretation of other member states made the League sanctions pointless” 
(Gordon 1999:138).  
The reason behind France and Britain’s opposition to economic sanctions against Italy can find a 
plausible explanation only in the fact that these two countries were colonial powers which had 
invaded and occupied many countries in Africa and other parts of the world. For these colonial 
powers, condemning Italy for the same practice in which they were world leaders would have been 
tantamount to practising hypocrisy. As Osmańczyk observes: “In turn, on July 24, 1938 the foreign 
ministers of Beligum, Denmark, Finland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden 
meeting in Copenhagen stated that … the sanctions system of the League of Nations in current 
condition and as a result of practice used in the past years ha[d] received a non-obligatory 
character; in our opinion this non-obligatory character of sanctions shall spread to include not only 
a particular group of States, but all member States of the League of Nations; we are convinced that 
explicit ascertainment of this right to free assessment is in the interest of the League of Nations 
itself” (Osmańczyk 1990:789). In light of the above citation, the whole idea of economic sanctions 
was not binding on those members of the League of Nations who were superpowers. In this regard, 
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from the very beginning, the idea of economic sanctions was connected with the exercise of power 
by powerful states over weaker member states of the international community. 
Lance Davis and Stanley Engerman recognised the use of economic sanctions by powerful 
countries against the weaker member states during the League of Nations era. This was a practice 
by means of which powerful countries bullied weaker states through the imposition of economic 
sanctions against them. Here it can be deduced that the use of economic sanctions was also related 
to the exercise of economic power over the poor states. One can only presume that poor states 
were expected by powerful states to behave in a way that was desirable. Failure to do so led only 
to incurring the wrath of powerful countries which then used economic sanctions as a foreign 
policy tool to enforce behaviour modification on poor states. This practise of using economic 
sanctions against poor countries was succinctly described by Davis and Engerman: 
From 1827 until the outbreak of the World War I, 21 pacific blockades were deployed. They were 
generally mounted by powerful European states against smaller nations in Europe and emerging 
nations in Latin America and Asia. The list of targeted states included Turkey in 1827; Portugal in 
1831; Holland in 1832-1833; Colombia in 1934; Panama in 1837; Mexico in 1838; Argentina in 
1838-1840 … Almost without exception, the targeted countries were small and underdeveloped. In 
contrast, the list of targeting countries included Britain (twelve times), France (eleven times), Italy 
and Germany (three times each), [and] Russia and Austria (twice each). Clearly, the great powers 
had found a weapon that they thought cost-effective. Indeed, a great power would often act alone, 
and only seven of the 21 pacific blockades between 1827 and 1903 drew support from more than a 
single country (Davis & Engerman 2003:188–189). 
Before the formation of the League of Nations, it appears that the idea of imposing trade embargoes 
on small countries was applied by powerful nations solely against weaker nations. However, 
coming back to the decision of Britain and France’s refusal to impose economic sanctions against 
Italy’s aggression on Ethiopia, this strongly reinforces the idea that the League of Nations was 
dominated by the powerful countries. As such, it can be deduced that economic sanctions were 
used as a tool whereby the economically powerful states enforced their will on the economically 
weaker states of the international community. Davis and Engerman went on to say that with the 
formation of the United Nations, the implementation of economic sanctions became the preserve 
of the United Nations even though individual states were at liberty to apply such punitive measures 
unilaterally. However, from 1960 to 1990, “the majority of sanctions were imposed unilaterally, 
most frequently by the United States; but in the 1990s, a large fraction were imposed by 
intergovernmental coalitions. The countries of Western Europe, especially the United Kingdom, 
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are playing a more active role, but these coalitions usually included, if they were not originated 
by, the United States” (Davis & Engerman 2003:189–190). The observation of Davis and 
Engerman is very crucial because the United States and Western Europe have always been close 
allies politically, economically and militarily within the United Nations. When the USA targets a 
particular country with economic sanctions, the whole of the European bloc has always followed 
the example of the USA in imposing sanctions on the chosen USA target state for economic 
sanctions. In this way, the USA and Europe use sanctions in pursuit of their shared national 
interests and not necessarily for the interest of the United Nations as a multilateral organisation. 
The USA and her European alliances or NATO do, however, still dominate the world in imposing 
sanctions against those countries that are deemed to be hostile to their political and economic 
interests. One can legitimately say that economic sanctions are an expression of power and prestige 
among the targeting powers on a target state. This is a manifestation of power dynamics. The 
Germany sociologist, Max Weber, captured this power dynamic as follows: 
The prestige of power, as such, means in practice the glory of power over other communities; it 
means the expansion of power, though not always by way of incorporation or subject. The big 
political communities are the natural exponents of such pretensions to prestige. Every political 
structure naturally prefers to have weak rather than strong neighbours. … Among a plurality of co-
existing polities, some, the Great Powers, usually ascribe to themselves and usurp an interest in 
political and economic processes over a wide orbit. Today such orbits encompass the whole surface 
of the planet. The general reason for ‘power dynamics’ per se, the Great Powers are very often 
expansive powers; that is, there are associations aiming at expanding the territories of their respective 
political communities by the use or the threat of force or by both. … Their attitude in this respect 
often changes, and in these changes economic factors play a weighty part (Weber 2009:160–161).  
The issue of power dynamics among states which is alluded to by Weber cannot be trivialised 
because it is at the very heart of the rationale behind the imposition of economic sanctions on target 
states as a way of subduing them, despite the usually made claim to the contrary by powerful 
countries. In our contemporary times, economic sanctions and military invasions have been 
undertaken by the USA and her European allies for access to control of the production of oil in the 
Arab world. It is not about the spread of good governance and the promotion of human rights. 
While I will come to this point later on, in the following section my focus is on the use of economic 
sanctions in the UN. My aim, as will be shown in the following section, is to provide a synoptic 
view of the anticipated objectives which the UN deemed to be served by economic sanctions in 
their various types.  
 
 
48 
 
3.3 Economic Sanctions and their Instrumental Value in the UN 
3.3.1 Inflicting Maximum Harm  
In the contemporary categorisations of sanctions, Edmund Jan Osmańczyk made the following 
observation, “International sanctions are divided into political, economic and military sanctions. 
Political sanctions include severance of diplomatic relations, suspension of expulsion of a state 
from the UN or other governmental organisations. Economic sanctions or trade sanctions may 
involve the total severance of all economic and financial relations or selected embargoes on 
imports or export, boycotts or blockade” (Osmańczyk 1990:789). The rationale behind this 
standard understanding of economic sanctions is to inflict maximum harm to the target state as a 
totality or indiscriminately. It is not the leaders or policy makers of the target country who are the 
primary casualties of economic sanctions; rather, the whole populace of the target state is severely 
affected by economic sanctions. As Maria Bengtsson puts it,: “A characteristic of economic 
sanctions is that they are designed to cause economic harm to another state. They resemble as well 
to war, because both types are used to harm another state in order to make them change their policy 
or behaviour.  
The basic idea is that the burden of economic hardship will become intolerable to the people of 
the targeted state, who in return will pressure the leaders to change the policies” (Bengtsson 
2002:14). The observation made by Bengtsson is that the UN’s understanding of economic 
sanctions is that they are a mechanism that is used to force the target state to change its policy or 
a means of enforcing behaviour modification on the target state. However, the problem that arises 
from an understanding of economic sanctions as stated above is the comparison between economic 
sanctions and war. In a situation of war, there is a deliberate discrimination between the soldiers 
and the other security apparatus as well as the civilians within the target state. Economic sanctions 
do not discriminate between policy makers, the securocrats and the civilians, because the whole 
country is punished in a collateral manner. It is for this reason that many scholars have described 
economic sanctions as the most inhumane manner employed when resolving international conflicts 
or disagreements. The examples that have been chosen in this study to illustrate the effects of 
economic sanctions will be empirical evidence in support of the inhumane nature of economic 
sanctions.  
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It cannot go without saying that Bengtsson’s position on economic sanctions is somewhat 
ambivalent. This ambivalence comes out clearly when she says: “In contrast to modern warfare, 
economic sanctions offer a theoretical possibility for international society to act without any 
bloodshed. Sanctions have been seen as more humane than military intervention, because they 
aren’t suppose [sic] to bring about any internal political costs if they should fail. Another reason 
for the rising popularity for sanctions in the 1990s is the development of the international 
economy” (Bengtsson 2002:16). There are two arguments I should like to raise against 
Bengtsson’s position on efficacy economic sanctions. The first argument is that economic 
sanctions inflict collateral damage because of their indiscriminate nature. The innocent and culprits 
are exposed to the same fate of economic hardship. In a situation of warfare or armed conflict, the 
principle of discrimination between civilians and soldiers is upheld as a binding ethical principle 
to be observes by all sides to the armed conflict. That is why it is part of the military rules of 
combat that bind all sides to the conflict that any side in the conflict that kills civilians is considered 
to have violated international law and is possibly liable to face charges of crimes against humanity. 
On the other hand, economic sanctions do not discriminate when it comes to inflicting harm to all 
civilians in the target state. Those who die as a result of economic sanctions are not accounted for 
by the senders. My second argument is that economic sanctions are advantageous only to the 
sender and not to the target state. In most cases, as we shall see in the case studies that have been 
selected for examination in this dissertation, those who are directly affected by economic sanctions 
are the general populace of the target state. Thus sender states are not usually concerned with the 
economic wellbeing of the citizens of the target state(s). In this regard, foreign sanctions are a 
foreign policy tool that is used for the promotion of particular national interest of the sender states. 
3.3.2 UN Collective Security System 
The modern understanding of economic sanctions is undoubtedly based on the UN Collective 
Security system as stipulated in the UN Charter. The philosophy behind the UN Collective Security 
system is based on the presumption that issues of peace and security should be understood as the 
responsibility of all nations, regional organisations, and multilateral organisations of the world. In 
the UN Charter member states are exhorted to desist from using military force against each other. 
This exhortation is mainly buttressed on the understanding that UN member states are sovereign 
entities who have the right to determine their own domestic and foreign policies without external 
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interference. For example, Article 2(4) of the UN Charter states that “[a]ll Members shall refrain 
in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or 
political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the 
United Nations”. The spirit of this article is that member states should always thrive towards the 
promotion of peaceful or harmonious co-existence. This ethos of promoting peaceful and 
harmonious co-existence is attainable only through mutual recognition of the inherent dignity of 
each member state as a sovereign. Article 41 of Chapter VII states: “The Security Council may 
decide what measures not involving the use of armed forces are to be employed to give effect to 
its decisions, and it may call upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. 
These may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, 
postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations [my italics]”. The presumption behind this article is that sanctions are more humane than 
the use of military force on the target state. It is also not clear as to who are expected to be the 
victims of those sanctions. In the case that sanctions have failed to achieve their intended objective, 
it is stated in Article 42: “Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in 
Article 41 would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by air, 
sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces 
of Members of the United Nations”. In Chapter VII it can be deduced that the aim of sanctions 
against the target state was to promote peace and security of the world against those countries 
which are deemed to be aggressors. 
In Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the imposition of economic sanctions against the target state or 
aggressor to international peace and security was presented as the responsibility of all members of 
the United Nations. In this regard, Chapter VII is understood as concerned more with promoting 
Collective Security among all member states of the UN. However, the main superpowers, which 
were then the USSR and the USA, competed for world dominance outside the United Nations and 
its organs. Economic sanctions were not deemed effective to promote peace and security in the 
world. Filippo Andreatta observes: “The only article in Chapter VII which was widely used 
between 1945 and 1988 was Article 51, which expressed the right of individual and collective self-
defence and which therefore somehow contradicted the collective security spirit of the Charter” 
(Andreatta 1996:149). Because of the arms race during the time of the world bipolar power 
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competition, sanctions were not used for collective security purposes, but rather for the promotion 
of the national interests of the two world superpowers. In most cases, economic sanctions have 
never been used as a tool to foster collective security as envisaged in Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter. 
3.3.4 Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions 
Nonetheless, in order to consider the effectiveness of economic sanctions, the various possible 
purposes of UN economic sanctions may need to be understood. The rationale behind sanctions 
rests upon: coercion, punishment, and symbolism. Often systems of sanctions have more than one 
underlying purpose (Hufbauer et al. 2007). Coercive economic sanctions are imposed in order to 
force the target state(s) to amend their behaviour. The intended coercive effect of sanctions within 
the UN framework was to force the target state away from breaching international peace and 
security. The UN charter gave the UNSC the power to declare the imposition of economic 
sanctions for the purpose of maintaining or restoring international peace. Reinisch, 2001 Barber 
(1979) stated that “sanctions being applied at first appeared as if they ha[d] a clear objective 
relating to changing the behaviour of the government against whom they were directed, hence 
reflecting UN behaviour. UNSC resolutions sited coercive sanctions [as the] reason for the 
invocation of economic sanctions and this caused the generally accepted purpose and emphasis of 
such sanctions as a modifying behaviour” (Barber (1979)). In this regard, the objective of the 
imposed sanctions does not lead to the desired behaviour modification as professed in the declared 
resolutions.  
Sanctions that were imposed on Libya required states to maintain economic sanctions until the 
UNSC determined the Libyan government had committed to cease all forms of assistance in 
terrorist activities. Resolution 841 was passed in order to set a measure which it said it would be 
put in place if attempts undertaken by the UN special envoy for Haiti and the organisation of 
American states to establish a political dialogue with the Haitian parties failed. The scenarios show 
that the UN economic sanctions were adopted for coercive purposes. In contrast, economic 
sanctions against Iraq were on their face coercive in that they were stated to be for the purpose of 
forcing Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait, which it had invaded (Resolution 661, 1990). Following its 
withdrawal from Kuwait, economic sanctions against Iraq remained in place. In order for an 
economic sanctions regime to have the power to force changes, the economic sanctions imposed 
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must have a detrimental effect on the target such that it perceives such detriment to outweigh the 
benefits it used to get as result of the undesired behaviour that led to the imposition of sanctions. 
Economic sanctions are inherently punitive (Foran 2008). The belief of the punitive function of 
economic sanctions was also reflected in the US foreign policy approach, where, if diplomacy 
failed to bring about a favourable outcome, it used crippling sanctions (Reid 2009). Economic 
sanctions as the provision for reparations by Germany were contained in the Treaty of Versailles 
following World War 1. In the treaty, Germany accepted responsibility for causing loss and 
damage to the allied countries and their nationals and agreed to make compensation for the damage 
to the civilian population of the allies and associated states and to their property. Abi-Saab states 
that UN Economic sanctions are based on a ‘finding’ of wrongdoing by the UNSC, which would 
be consistent with sanctions having a punitive function. Al-Anbari described the invocation of UN 
economic sanctions under Articles 39 and 41 of the UN Charter as ‘the equivalent to a judgment’. 
Punitive sanctions were imposed on Iraq.  
3.3.5 Point Utilitarian Calculation of Profit 
Sometimes scholars such as Kaempfer and Lowenberg (1988; 2007) have interpreted economic 
sanctions on the basis of the interest group theory, which says that international relations are 
basically an outcome of interests groups that exist in both the sender country and the target country. 
In this regard, the effects of economic sanctions are analysed in a way that is analogous to the 
behaviour of individuals within a free market economic system. While the states are deemed to be 
the main players, it is the interest groups which ultimately influence the foreign policy made by 
senders and targets. Interest groups are responsible for exerting pressure on their respective states. 
William Kaempfer and Anton Lowenberg observes the role of interest groups in the imposition of 
economic sanctions as follows: 
In general, however, political pressure for economic sanctions will arise not only because of the 
income effects of sanctions in terms of increased consumption opportunities for members of certain 
interest groups, but also because of utility-enhancing attributes of the sanctions themselves. That is, 
sanctions may be considered a public good (or bad) that directly contributes to individual utility (or 
disutility) by allowing individuals the satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) of experiencing their nation 
engaged in a foreign policy toward a certain goal. Some individuals might perceive their 
contributions to the sanctions policy as private goods, so that, in effect, sanctions jointly provide both 
public and private good attributes (Keampfer & Lowenberg 2007:883). 
 
 
 
53 
 
In the light of the above quotation, it can be deduced that economic sanctions are portrayed as 
fulfilling some utilities in different interest groups. The utility that can be derived from the 
imposition of economic sanctions can be either good or bad, depending on what economic 
sanctions contribute to the respective interest group’s social standing. For example, an interest 
group in the sender country that specialises in arms manufacturing and trade will favour the 
imposition of economic sanctions against a target state that has an interest group that specialises 
in the manufacture of arms and trade. Some interest groups may favour economic sanctions on 
moral grounds – for example, supporting economic sanctions as a vehicle of their disapproval of 
what may be perceived as inhumane policies of the target state. From this game theoretical 
conceptualisation of economic sanctions, emphasis is put on the utility which is derived from 
economic sanctions by different interest groups in the sender state and target state. The game 
theoretical analysis of economic sanctions is based on the liberal economic theory of 
methodological individualism. We have seen this commitment to methodological individualism in 
chapter two, when Golliard said that national governments do listen to interest groups on matters 
of foreign policy whereby pressures that are exerted on both sender and target states “are the results 
of private utility maximisation from individual members of interest groups” (Golliard 2013:45). 
In chapter two I argued that this conceptualisation of economic sanctions presumes that utility 
maximisation is a common factor that is found in both the sender and target states.  
The game theoretical approach on the conceptualisation of economic sanctions in respect of the 
premise of utility maximisation was well stated by Daniel Drezner as follows: 
There are two ways to formalize the conflict expectations model. The first is to assume that states 
are egoistic utility-maximizers with an expectation of a future dispute where the outcome depends 
on relative capabilities. The second is to create a reduced-form utility function, incorporating the 
conflict expectations into the actors’ utility functions in the form of a concern for relative gains 
(Drezner 1999:35). 
In other words, economic sanctions are based on a utilitarian calculation of profit and loss aimed 
at determining the impact of sanctions on the sender as well as the target states. Drezner went on 
to allege that states will resort to economic sanctions when it has been determined that military 
action would be too costly (Drezner 1999:15). Such a deduction is done mathematically. In this 
game theoretical assumption about economic sanctions, states are postulated as rational actors who 
“are concerned about whether their present actions will materially or reputationally affect their 
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bargaining position in future interactions” (Drezner 1999:53). It is eminently clear that states are 
portrayed as persons that are endowed with all the human qualities. As he puts it:  
While states must care somewhat about the distribution of payoffs in order to threaten economic 
sanctions, it has a paradoxical effect on the magnitude of the target’s concessions. As conflict 
expectations increase, the target will be more resistant to concessions, because the sender will benefit 
from whatever losses it incurs. The sender must reduce its demand in order for the target to prefer 
acquiescence (Drezner 1999:54). 
This game theoretical rationale about economic sanctions presupposes that when sanctions are 
imposed on the target state, the behaviour of the target state is predictable to the sender. In other 
words, there are expected outcomes by the sender(s).  
3.3.6 Game Theory Rationale 
Drezner argued against the domestic politics approach in support of a game theoretical approach 
to economic sanctions whereby senders and targets of sanctions strategies on the basis of the 
anticipated future conflicts. In this regard, economic sanctions are used as a tool for coercion. He 
writes: 
Therefore, states will use economic coercion when the costs of military intervention are too great. If 
the target is physically distant, power projection becomes a more difficult enterprise, and sanctions 
are therefore likely. Two predictions can also be made about the likelihood of sanctions success. 
First, if the target government is domestically unstable, it may lack the means to convert a sanctions 
dispute into political support. Such a government would be more likely to acquiesce so as to hold on 
to power, or be removed in favour of those who prefer accommodation. Second, if target elites are 
made to suffer as much as target populations, there is no opportunity for rent-seeking, which puts 
elite pressure on the target government to concede (Drezner 1999:14–15). 
Drezner’s game theoretical approach to sanctions is rather problematic in the sense that history is 
replete with examples where target states have survived economic sanctions rather than what 
would have been the case if they had been subjected to military invasion. Also, the problem with 
a game theoretical analysis of economic sanctions arises from the fact that it is based mostly on 
speculation because of the adopted mathematical paradigm whereby intervening factors are usually 
discriminated against in the analysis on the basis that they are variables. The main aim in this game 
theoretical approach to economic sanctions is to predict the outcome. For example, Drezner would 
go as far as to say that “the statistical [analyses] of sanctions outcomes support the conflict 
expectations model and reject other system-level explanations. The target’s opportunity costs of 
deadlock, the sender’s opportunity costs of deadlock, and the prior relationship between the two 
countries trend in the predicted directions and in all but two instances are statistically significant” 
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(Drezner 1999:73). Sometimes economic sanctions are known to hurt the sender economically 
more than the target state in the sense that the revenue that was accrued from trading with the target 
state prior to economic sanctions is lost.  
According to the conflict expectations model which is presented by Drezner, it is presumed that 
senders and targets are strategists which act on the basis of strategies that can advance their national 
interests in each given situation. According to Drezner: “In game theory, a complete strategy must 
provide instructions for a player at each of its decision nodes. A subgame perfect equilibrium 
strategy must provide the player with an incentive-compatible decision at every choice node, even 
if that choice is off the equilibrium path. In other words, if one of the players makes a mistake, and 
both players find themselves at a point in the game that is unexpected, the players still pursue a 
rational course of action” (Drezner 1999:82–83). The belief in this given scenario is that all players 
in the game of economic sanctions are rational. However, an example that will succeed in showing 
that both sender and target acted irrationally in the game of economic sanctions will undermine 
such a presumption. As we shall see in the case studies that are provided in this study, economic 
sanctions against Cuba, Iraq and Zimbabwe have proved to have been disastrous from a 
humanitarian perspective in the sense that they have resulted in untold human suffering – thus 
inflicting harm to those people who were supposed to have been helped by economic sanctions. In 
most cases, the target state is sanctioned for policies that grossly violate human rights, and the 
sender states sometimes perpetuate this gross violation of human rights by imposing economic 
hardships upon the innocent citizens of the target state.  
Apart from the game theoretical approach to economic sanctions which is rather speculative, 
another dominant belief in economic sanctions is based on the idea that they are an effective 
foreign policy tool that can help in the promotion of human rights. In the UN Charter, all members 
of the United Nations are required to promote and protect human rights. Countries or regimes that 
have been accused of failing to do so have had economic sanctions imposed on them as a punitive 
measure. The promotion and protection of human rights can thus be regarded as the utility of 
economic sanctions. 
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3.3.7 Human Rights as the Utility of Economic Sanctions 
While economic sanctions have been used for various reasons, one of the popular justifications for 
them is the promotion and protection of human rights. According to Lawrence Brady: “The utility 
of economic sanctions is a broad topic, which must be narrowed considerably if we are to make 
useful statements about sanctions as policies. We cannot generalise about sanctions as though they 
were all alike and will all have predictable results. In actual fact, there are [sic] an infinite number 
of possible variants in the conditions under which sanctions might be imposed and in the results 
they might have” (Brady 1987:297). In this subsection I am deliberately narrowing the utility of 
economic sanctions to the promotion and protection of human rights. Maria Bengtsson observes:  
Today human rights are no longer a matter just for the state; the state answers as well to the 
international community for their treatment of individuals. The most important concern for the state 
has been its own survival, not the rights of individuals. Following the realist line, nation states have 
striven to maintain and strengthen their own power and sovereignty. The national self-interest has 
efficiently prevented meaningful measures in order to handle crimes against human rights earlier 
(Bengtsson 2002:35).  
What has been problematic in the promotion and protection of human rights are issues such as 
national self-interest and nation-state sovereignty which have made human rights relative to 
national self-interest and national sovereignty. In other words, human rights do not have an 
absolute value. In recent years, the idea of protecting national interest and national sovereignty at 
the expense of human rights is increasingly coming under attack within the international political 
terrain. In the light of these developments, Bengtsson went on to observe:  
Economic sanctions might therefore be an indicator, among others, that the sovereignty notion is 
about to change. The states are withering away a bit and this paves [the] way for intergovernmental 
organisations (IGO) such as the EU and the UN. In the name of human rights, this evolution is 
positive since IGOs often have extensive human rights programmes, and therefore the state is 
needed” (Bengtsson 2002:38).  
While Bengtsson asserts that “sanctions might be an indicator” of the fact “that the sovereignty 
notion is about to change”, such an assertion implies that economic sanctions evolved with the UN 
system. As we have seen in the preceding discussion, economic sanctions existed even prior to the 
League of Nations. 
However, the question of justifying economic sanctions on human rights has been met with a lot 
of criticism. Some Third World scholars and governments have argued that the notion of human 
rights derives from the Western philosophy of atomic individualism which was later on imposed 
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on the rest of the world as the ideal understanding of a person. In this philosophy of atomic 
individualism, the individual is understood as an isolated entity who is free to pursue his or her 
interests without any social constraints. It is thus argued that the concept of human rights “was an 
entirely Euro-centric concept that did not have cultural universalizability” (Chiwenga 2014:64). 
One finds that post-colonial African legal scholars such as Edson Zvobgo advanced the argument 
that the UN Declaration of Human Rights in 1948 should be seen as a declaration of atomic 
individualism, “hence it was something intelligible to the Western ontology of an individual 
whereby an individual is seen as a ‘separate, isolated, autonomous and self-determining individual, 
who apart from any social context, is a bearer of human rights’ ” (Zvobgo 1979:90; Chiwenga 
2014:64). The point that is being made in such arguments is that human rights are not universal 
goods. Rather, they are a Eurocentric concept the intelligibility of which should therefore be 
limited to Western society with regard to Western ideals of a good political society. Such a critique 
raises the question of the justifiability of economic sanctions on the basis of protecting human 
rights.  
The diversity that inheres in the conceptualisation of human rights was well captured by Milburn 
Thompson when he argued that this concept was not understood in a homogenous way and that 
should not be understood loosely. He writes: 
Human rights make strong claims. ‘Right’ is not a word to be thrown around loosely. If a person has 
a right, then the community and other persons have a duty to protect and fulfil that right. Because a 
right confers an obligation on the community, it is not surprising that various societies have contested 
the foundation, meaning, and scope of human rights. During the Cold War, each of the three ‘worlds’ 
was said to emphasize a different aspect of human rights. The First World stressed civil and political 
rights and the right to private property. The Second World gave priority to social, economic, and 
cultural rights as prerequisites to civil and political rights. The Third World also emphasised social, 
economic, and cultural rights, as well as the right to self-determination…These, however, are self-
serving, ideological distinctions that have little basis in any sound theory of rights (Thompson 
2003:99). 
The point which is being made by Thompson is that human rights should not be understood as a 
homogeneous concept because different parts of the world do attach different aspects to this 
concept. The capitalistic world attached great importance to the inviolability of the individual and 
ownership of private property. In this context, the community and the state are understood as being 
there to protect individual private property. On the other hand, other countries that are socialist 
have emphasised economic egalitarianism as indispensable to human rights. Previously colonised 
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and oppressed countries saw human rights in terms of emancipation from cultural and political 
oppression. If there is no agreement on the meaning of human rights, the idea of imposing 
economic sanctions on the basis of protecting human rights becomes problematic in the sense that 
it raises the question as to which type of rights the intended economic sanctions are protecting. 
This question cannot be answered adequately without an analysis of the role of national self-
interests of the sender states and interest groups. For example, it is a general motif in many books 
on US economic sanctions against Cuba that these sanctions had nothing to do with the protection 
of human rights in Cuba, but were more motivated by the US national interest in warding off the 
socialist ideological influence in Latin America. Similarly, economic sanctions against Iraq were 
not about the promotion and protection of human rights in Iraq and Kuwait, but about the need for 
cheap oil by US and its NATO allies.  
Apart from the relationship between the economic sanctions and human rights, another dominant 
theme in the UN conceptualisation of economic sanctions is based on foreign policy. Economic 
sanctions are usually resorted to as a protest against the target state’s foreign policy. In other 
instances, economic sanctions are used as an instrument to advance the national self-interest of the 
sender state. In such instances, the economic sanctions are imposed in a manner that does not take 
into account the wellbeing of the citizens of the target state. Proponents of economic sanctions 
usually argue explicitly and sometimes implicitly that such measures are intended to send a 
message to the international community that the UN does not condone such-and-such a behaviour 
from its members. Countries are thus expected to comply with certain approved norms of the 
international community. Those countries that fail to comply with the UN-approved norms are 
usually considered outlaws.  
3.4 Economic Sanctions as Tool for Enforcement of Foreign Policy 
The UN approval of sanctions is based on the presumption that it is a foreign policy measure 
against an outlaw or rogue state. A state is classified as rogue or outlaw when it wantonly violates 
human rights and commits war crimes. Adeno Addis observes that “a regime may be designated 
as an outlaw regime if it engages in massive violations of internationally guaranteed rights of its 
citizens or when it considers it a sufficiently good reason to use war as a means of advancing what 
it regards as its national interest. … Put simply, the outlaw regime is the negation of a fundamental 
aspect of the identity of the international community, and economic sanctions could be utilised to 
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mark the outlaw regime” (Addis 2003:605). Here the argument is that an international community 
with commonly shared political norms exists. The prior existence of this international community 
makes it imperative that all states should abide by its norms. The imposition of economic sanctions 
is dovetailed with the belief that they will ultimately lead to behaviour modification of the outlaw 
regime or errant state. When sanctions are imposed on the target state or outlaw regime, the belief 
is that as a result of economic hardships the citizens of that outlaw regime will revolt against its 
rule. This is the view which one finds being articulated by the former Sub-Commission of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights as it observes, “The ‘theory’ behind economic sanctions is that 
economic pressure on civilians will translate into pressure on the Government for change. This 
‘theory’ is bankrupt both legally and practically, as more and more evidence testifies to the 
inefficacy of comprehensive economic sanctions as a coercive tool. The traditional calculation of 
balancing civilian suffering against the desired political effects is giving way to the realisation that 
the efficacy of a sanctions regime is in inverse proportion to its impact on civilians” (Sub-
Commission of CHR, cited in Addis 2003:606).  
3.5 Legal Considerations Surrounding the Imposition of UN Sanctions 
Since 1990, United Nations has become an essential instrument for multilateral action, with the 
imposition of trade sanctions on Iraq in resolution 661(1). The Security Council opened a new era 
in the use of a coercive economic measure as a deterrent tool to violation of international norms. 
In the late 45 years of United Nation experience, the security council employed sanctions only 
twice, in the case of Southern Rhodesia (1966) and South Africa (1977) (Cherserman, 2001). 
Sanctions were imposed to serve a wide range of objectives which include, restoration of 
democratically elected governments, to prevent aggression, protect human rights, end international 
civil war and bring terrorist to justice and to counter the threat of international terrorism.  The legal 
authority for the imposition of UN sanctions rests on the provision of Chapter V11 of the UN 
charter, which provides in article 41 that the council may call upon states to impose non-military 
measure to call for economic interruption of diplomatic relations to protect international peace and 
conflict (Roberts, 2004). The political thinking behind sanction was to avoid cost of military action 
moreover providing policy options more forcible than action. Sanctions serve as bargaining 
dynamics in which the promise of lifting sanctions becomes an incentive to encourage the political 
concession and corporation. Sanctions preferred as a form of action by the council for various 
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reasons which comprises of the application of Chapter V11 was an acceptable form of council 
action which permitted great power cooperation as the UN entered the post-cold war era. The fact 
that the sanctions were imposed mostly against states which were not critical allies of the 
superpowers made the cooperation feasible. Secondly, unlike the earlier times in which the 
dynamics of international trade provide benefits in the short run to states subverting embargoes. 
Sanctions also served as a public indicator that the Security Council was prepared to take action 
(Wheeler, 2000). 
3.5.1 UN Sanctions as Conflict Resolution Mechanism 
The beginning of the Cold War period with South Africa and Southern Rhodesia and continuing 
today, following the post 9/11 experience with Al Qaeda and the Taliban sanctions are a key 
strategic tool in the UN efforts to resolve conflict.  The question of sanctions application is 
approached by classifying all 27 mandatory Security Council sanction regimes into conflict types: 
interstate, intrastate, international norm- breaking states and support to terrorism.  All the types of 
sanctions within each conflict type are analysed for the objectives sought by the council through 
the application of sanctions measures, the intended target and the measures applied in relation to 
the sequence compared to other Security Council tools.  
Various authors have written about peace keeping and peace enforcement missions employed by 
the council to tackle conflicts in the world and there is also a wealth of academic literature available 
on sanctions by Doxey, Hufbaueret and;, Cortright and Lopez (2000). The Council applied four 
different categories of threat to international peace and security ; 1) armed conflict between states; 
2) armed conflict within states; 3) international norm breaking states; 4) international terrorism 
(Charon, 2011). Sanctions have been applied by kings to impose order by warring armies to 
blockade cities and individuals’ states or groups to protest particular actions for example states 
sanctioned Russia for its invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 (Charon, 2011). These cases treated 
sanctions more as a tool of punishment, but however the UNSC applied sanctions very differently. 
Beginning in the Cold War, the first mandatory UN sanctions were applied against South Africa 
in protest of its policy of apartheid and to prevent future aggression by its neighbouring states. The 
objectives of the sanctions, were not limited to denouncing the targeted states, but also effect a 
change in the policies. Cold War politics prevented the creation of mandatory regimes although a 
number of voluntary sanctions measures were recommended, for example to prevent supplies of 
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arms and assistance to North Korea in 1950, the council adopted resolution 82, which called on 
states to refrain from giving assistance to North Korean authorities interpreted by allies of South 
Korea as a ban of weapons to the North. In the 1960s at the height of decolonisation, the council 
called on all states to refrain forthwith from offering Portuguese government assistance which 
would enable repression of the peoples of the territories under its administration and to take 
measures to prevent the sale and supply of arms and military equipment to Portugal (SCR 180). In 
1988 Council adopted resolution 620 in order to curb against the use of chemical weapons in the 
Iran-Iraq war, it called for states to apply strict controls on the export of chemicals used to make 
chemical weapons to the parties to the conflict.  
After the Cold War the Permanent Five (P5) of the UNSC comprising of USA, United Kingdom, 
France, Russia and China developed a consensus amongst the members, which enabled the council 
to respond to more conflicts with more ambitious measures. The 1990s were quickly dubbed the 
‘sanction decade’ (Cortright and Lopez 2000) because the number of mandatory sanctions regime 
created to address the interstate conflicts, but especially African intrastate wars and several norm-
breaking states. The number of mandatory UN sanctions regime jumped from 2 during Cold War 
to 14 regimes representing a 600 percent increase in the number of mandatory regimes. Indeed the 
Council’s enthusiasm to address conflicts with sanctions was almost its mandate; particularly harsh 
sanctions applied against Iraq, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY or Serbia and 
Montenegro) and Haiti in 1990s prompted much handwringing and a fundamental re-evaluation 
of the use of sanctions including the pledge by the P5 to minimize unintended adverse side effects 
of sanctions and as well as to create an Informal Group on General issues of sanctions.  
The UNSC had a number of sanctions tools ranging from rather blunt instruments (comprehensive 
and unnecessarily damaging measures that cut off all trade into and out of the country in question 
and they are sometimes referred to as ‘dumb’ sanctions) to targeted sanctions (focusing on very 
specific targets including non-state actors like rebel groups or particular commodities like 
diamonds or timber and even particular regions of a state like North and South Kivu in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo [DRC]). The latest trend is to focus sanctions on stabilizing states 
in the post-conflict stage of crises with particular emphasis on improving governance and 
democratic processes. Further, and despite the efforts of the Council to limit the adverse effects of 
sanctions, creating the perfect sanctions regime that serves as an ends to immediately resolve a 
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conflict (preventing the key individuals from receiving crucial commodities or services) remains 
an ideal only. The Council’s adoption of sanctions is always a reaction to dynamic events rather 
than a means of prevention. 
3.5.2 UN Sanctions in the Context of Non-Proliferation 
In contrast to the US government’s broad definition of sanctions, the UN defines them narrowly 
as one of the two coercive measure under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the other being military 
force. Article 41 of the UN Charter mentions a variety of measures available to the UN Security 
Council, including “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, postal, 
telegraphic, radio and other means of communication and the severance of diplomatic relations.” 
The invocation of chapter VII is limited to cases in which the UN Security Council determines the 
existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace or act of aggression (Article 39). UN 
sanctions were rare during the Cold War. Sanctions under Chapter V11 were mandated in only 
two cases: Rhodesia and South Africa. After the end of the Cold War, it became easier to collect 
sufficient majorities and avoid vetoes in the Security Council.  
Since 1990, more than 20 governments and armed groups as well as several hundred individuals 
have been targeted by the UN Security Council. The growth of the use of sanctions was facilitated 
by a broadening of the Security Council agenda beginning in the late 1980s. Alongside aggression 
and interstate war, the Security Council has identified a significant number of other threats to 
international peace. Examples include massive human rights violation, civil wars and large 
humanitarian disaster (Cortright and Lopez 2000). Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
was a threat to international peace and security and entered UNSC language in 1991 when the 
Security Council adopted a resolution that spelled out the conditions of the ceasefire between Iraq 
and the UN authorized coalition that freed Kuwait. As part of the obligation, Security Council 
Resolution (SCR) 687 stated, with reference to Chapter VII, that the comprehensive trade sanctions 
adopted in SCR 661 after Iraq invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 would remain in force until Iraq 
demonstrated mandated disarmament. Iraq used chemical weapons against Iran and Kurds in the 
1980s and it was described as a notorious move, but the Security Council members came out with 
a resolution related to weapons of mass destruction under Chapter VII. The Iraq case also stipulated 
a border discussion on non-proliferation and coercive measures under Chapter VII.  
 
 
63 
 
In January 1992, the Security Council member states, represented for the first time ever by their 
respective heads of government or state, gathered with their main thrust to discuss the principles 
of a new world order. Events in the 1990s showed that S/23500 was more of a declaration than a 
policy. The UNSC discussed many issues alleged WMD proliferation without issuing resolution 
under Charter VII. The debate on North Korea’s nuclear program in 1993 (SCR 825) was an 
example. The Security Council did not impose any sanctions, despite pressure from a number of 
UN member states (Mistry, 1999). Russia and China were the main opponents to the adoption of 
a stronger resolution. But other governments, both in the Security Council among the wider UN 
membership, were also reluctant. One argument discussed was that it would be unfair to target 
North Korea, India and Pakistan, but not Israel. After the terror attacks of September 11, 2001, the 
Security Council issued a resolution linking non-proliferation with Chapter VII, thus raising 
possibility of UN sanctions. Two years later, the Security Council followed a resolution with its 
first non-proliferation sanctions. Pressure from the United States, supported by the Western states, 
helped to overcome strong initial opposition from Russia, China and a number of other UN 
member states to pass the resolution. 
In July 2006, the Security Council adopted SCR 1695, explicitly condemning the nuclear weapons 
program and missile launches of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Although 
it called for a diplomatic solution, the resolution banned all member states from transacting with 
North Korea for material, technology or financial resources connected to DPRK’s missile or 
weapons of mass destruction programs. In October the same year the DPRK conducted a nuclear 
test, the Security Council unanimously added embargoes on military and technological materials 
and luxury goods as well as financial travel sanctions. The list of sanctions adopted in SCR 1718 
was a compromise between the USA and China. The USA pressed for a long detailed list which 
was also opposed by China. The USA had also lobbied to include in the resolution a reference to 
the provisions for military action contained in Chapter VII of the UN Charter should the DPRK 
not to stop its military programs. When the USA dropped the demand, China was willing to 
compromise. After renewed testing, the Security Council adopted SCR 1874 adding further 
financial and trade related sanctions. In The case of Iran, the debate on whether to refer to the case 
to the UNSC began in 2005. Despite the disagreement of a number of governments and academic 
experts, the governing board of the international Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) decided to refer 
the matter to the Security Council. 
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3.5.3 UN and USA Sanctions Regimes in the Context of Counter Terrorism 
Following the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, President Bush 
prepared the country for a "war on terrorism" (Hufbauer et al, 2001). As outlined in his speech 
before the joint session of Congress on September 20, the war on terrorism would be fought on 
many fronts: diplomatic, intelligence, covert action, economic sanctions, law enforcement as well 
as military. Diplomacy, intelligence, covert action, and economic sanctions have historically 
served as auxiliary measures in wartime. Economic sanctions, in particular, have routinely 
foreshadowed or accompanied broader war efforts. What sets the campaign against international 
terrorism apart from other wars is the emphasis on economic tools. Several senior US officials, 
including Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, have suggested that economic and financial 
efforts will be as important in winning the war on terrorism as the military campaign. Determined 
to bring US economic as well as military power to bear in the fight against terrorism, the Bush 
administration deployed a variety of economic tools such as preferential trade measures, the 
removal of existing sanctions coupled with loans to reward allies, and new sanctions to intimidate 
adversaries. In this war, sanctions policy is being used both as a stick and a carrot, which is a new 
and welcome twist.  
Despite this enthusiasm, the history of economic sanctions in the past century reveals very few 
instances where economic weapons achieved major foreign policy goals (Hufbauer et al 2001). 
Striking terror is the raison of terrorist groups. To eliminate these groups, or persuade them to 
abandon their objective, would rank as a major policy triumph (Hufbauer et al 2001). The history 
of economic sanctions amply demonstrates that only military force and covert action can play a 
decisive role in a battle of this magnitude. At best, economic sanctions can play only a supporting 
role with respect to terrorist groups. While economic sanctions alone may not dissuade terrorist 
groups, they may cause states that harbour and support terrorist groups to reconsider the extent of 
their support. The Libyan extradition of the two Pan Am suspects illustrates an important shift in 
state policy induced in part by economic sanctions. One of the first measures implemented by 
President Bush in the war on terrorism was aimed at disrupting terrorist finances. On September 
23, he issued an executive order freezing the assets of named terrorists, terrorist groups, and 
terrorist fundraising organizations in an effort to weaken the financial lifeline of the al Qaeda 
network (Katzman, 2001). To coordinate the activities of the various US agencies on the financial 
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front, the administration created the Foreign Terrorist Asset Tracking Center in the Treasury 
Department. 
These measures carry on the tradition of past US counterterrorism efforts. Indeed, US 
counterterrorism policy, dating back to the early 1970s, has been heavily sanctions oriented. US 
counterterrorism sanctions policy rests on two primary legislative tools, the designation of state 
sponsors of terrorism and Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs), and the presidential 
determination of Specially Designated Terrorists (SDTs). In the 1970s and 1980s, US 
counterterrorism policy primarily focused on state sponsorship of international terrorism. State 
sponsors of terrorism are countries designated by the Secretary of State under Section 6 (j) of the 
Export Administration Act of 1979 as countries that have "repeatedly provided state support for 
acts of international terrorism." Currently the list of state sponsors includes seven countries: Cuba, 
Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan, and Syria.  
Naming a country on the terrorism list triggers a series of economic sanctions under different US 
laws. These sanctions include: restrictions on export licenses (or a general ban) for dual-use items 
or critical technology (under the Export Administration Act of 1979), ban on sales or licenses for 
items on the US Munitions Control List (under the Arms Export Control Act), ban on US foreign 
assistance including Export-Import Bank credits and guarantees (under the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961), authorization for the president to restrict or ban imports of goods and services from 
designated terrorist countries (under the International Security and Development Cooperation Act 
of 1985), prohibition of financial transactions by US persons with the governments of designated 
terrorist countries (under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996), requirement 
that US representatives at international financial institutions vote against loans or other financial 
assistance to that country (under the International Financial Institutions Act of 1977) and 
ineligibility for the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP, under the Trade Act of 1974). 
Although naming a country as a state sponsor does not automatically trigger a total economic 
embargo, with the exception of Syria, all countries currently designated as state sponsors-Cuba, 
Iran, Iraq, Libya, Sudan, and North Korea-are also subject to comprehensive trade and financial 
sanctions imposed by the executive branch under the International Emergency Economic Powers 
Act (IEEPA). In some of these cases-particularly Cuba and North Korea-US sanctions policy is 
less determined by concerns over terrorism than broad foreign policy conflicts. 
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Iraq was first placed on the terrorism list by the USA in December 1979 and removed in 1982. 
After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the State Department again placed Iraq on the terrorism 
list. Meanwhile, as noted by Patterns (2000) Iraq has been subject to the most comprehensive US 
and UN trade and financial sanctions regime mounted since the Second World War. US and UN 
sanctions probably curbed Iraq's ability to instigate very high-tech terror, such as suitcase nuclear 
weapons and sophisticated biological weapons, by reducing resources available to Saddam 
Hussein. But Patterns (2000) reports that Iraq continues to plan and sponsor international terrorism 
focused on Iraqi dissident groups abroad and continues to offer safe haven to various expatriate 
terrorist groups such as the Palestine Liberation Front and the Abu Nidal organization. 
Furthermore, post-September 11 investigations revealed Iraqi contacts with one of the lead 
hijackers (Mohammed Atta) and possible links between Iraq and anthrax. These offenses, together 
with US-Iraq differences over Iraq's regional ambitions and its record of noncompliance with UN 
weapons inspectors, will probably keep Iraq on the terrorism list for the foreseeable future. 
However, the effort to consolidate a pro-West post Saddam Hussein government may yield quicker 
results if insurgent groups such as the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) are contained. 
According to Patterns (2000), Libyan terrorism was sharply reduced after the imposition of UN 
sanctions. Pressure from the international community was credited as a deterrent to Libyan 
sponsorship. Mandatory UN sanctions, the first to be imposed in response to government 
involvement in an act of terrorism, ultimately secured the extradition of the two Libyan Pan Am 
suspects in April 1999. This led to the suspension of UN sanctions. The suspects were subsequently 
tried and one was convicted and imprisoned for life, but conviction and punishment were not 
conditions for lifting UN sanctions. 
In continued efforts to improve its international standing, Libya not only expelled the radical 
Palestinian terrorist group Abu Nidal but also compensated the victims of the France UTA flight. 
Libya also accepted "general responsibility" for the 1984 shooting of a policewoman outside the 
Libyan embassy in London and agreed to compensate her family. While Libya has made progress 
toward meeting US demands, the Bush administration insists that US unilateral sanctions will 
remain in place until Libya accepts responsibility for the Pan Am bombing, compensates the 
victims, and renounces all support for terrorism.The success of UN sanctions in the case of Libya 
suggests that economic sanctions, if imposed multilaterally, can achieve clearly defined and 
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relatively modest policy goals. This was illustrated by the extradition of the two mid-level Pan Am 
suspects. 
3.5.4 UN Sanctions Regime as an Incentive for Democratization 
Instigating democratization has been by far the most common goal of sanctions initiated by the 
United States, the European Union, and the United Nations against authoritarian regimes in the 
post-Cold War period. Given previous research on the democratic effects of sanctions, the frequent 
use of sanctions as a tool for democratization is rather surprising (Drury 1998; Haass 1998; Pape 
1997). In a seminal and widely cited study, Peksen and Drury (2010) argued that sanctions have 
an adverse effect on the level of democracy in targeted countries. According to the logic presented 
by Peksen and Drury, the negative democratic effect of sanctions is a consequence of increased 
levels of repression used by political elites in targeted countries as they attempt to cope with 
increased domestic pressure (also Wood 2008). Indeed, severe and widespread repression has often 
followed international sanction as a means to fight off increased opposition. However, previous 
research in the comparative democratization literature have shown that economic stress is one of 
the most robust determinants of democratization and or regime change in authoritarian regimes 
(e.g. Geddes 1999; Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2010; Teorell 2010). 
Authoritarian regimes tend to survive with a mixed strategy of repression and co-optation (Rotberg 
2007; Wintrobe 1998). Without the financial ability to co-opt counter elites, authoritarian regimes 
often resort to a strategy of increased repression. However, repression is generally a less efficient 
tool for long-term regime survival than co-optation (Bueno de Mesquita & Smith 2010; Gandhi & 
Przeworski 2007). Although often temporarily effective, repression is an imprecise instrument that 
often leads to an increase in both opposition support and levels of dissent (Lichbach 1987). As a 
consequence, economic downturn often results in regime accommodation or, even more 
dramatically, regime collapse. Sanctions can, if effectively designed and strategically imposed, be 
used to increase such economic pressure on authoritarian elites. Moreover, by targeting central 
elite figures or strategically important industries, sanctions can also effectively undermine the 
inner elite’s support for top-leaders or current institutions. 
Although the current literature on comparative democratization makes it plausible that sanctions 
could have a positive effect on the level of democracy in the targeted country, this is not to say 
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that all sanctions necessarily have the same effect. As several authors have acknowledged 
(Kirshner 1997; Allen 2005; Hufbauer et al. 2007), implementers or senders have used a multitude 
of sanction designs to achieve their desired goals. It is also not at all evident that sanctions aimed 
at goals other than democratization would have the unexpected, and in some cases even undesired 
effect of causing regime change. For instance, we cannot expect sanctions aimed at ending nuclear 
weapon proliferation to have the same democratic effect as a sanction purposefully designed to 
instigate democratic reforms, such as introduction of multiparty elections or reinstatement of an 
elected civilian leadership. In earlier research on sanctions and democratization, sanctions have 
not been clearly separated in relation to their explicit goal. Thereby, the question of democratic 
sanction effectiveness has been left largely unanswered. In our study on sanctions and 
democratization, we are therefore especially interested in the democratic effect of those sanctions 
that explicitly aim to increase the level of democracy in the targeted country. 
Earlier studies have described the process of democratization as being a predominantly domestic 
affair (O’Donnell et al. 1986: 5). Only more recently have scholars of democratization emphasized 
its international dimension and discussed different ways of exerting influence from the outside 
(Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; for an early account, see Whitehead 1996). 
At the same time, sanction research has found that the international relations of targeted regimes 
mediate the effect of sanctions (Early 2011; Hufbauer et al. 2007; McLean and Whang 2010).  
The relationship between the initiator of sanctions and the targeted regime is characterized by two 
closely intertwined elements, namely the linkage between the entity imposing sanctions “sender” 
and the authoritarian regime “target” receiving them and the target’s vulnerability to external 
pressure. Scholars dealing with the international dimension of authoritarianism and 
democratization have recurrently used the concept of “leverage” to assess the direct influence that 
a (Western) power has over the targeted regime (Levitsky and Way 2010). Likewise, sanctions 
research has found that economically and politically less healthy targets are more likely yield to 
sanctions (Drury 1998; Jing et al. 2003). Such vulnerability can be assuaged by third party 
assistance, also referred to as “sanctions busting” (Early, 2011) or “black knight” activity 
(Hufbauer et al. 2007). For our concept of vulnerability, we hence use a combined measure of any 
target specific sensitivity and third party assistance potentially reducing the vulnerability of targets. 
Documentary review has also revealed that the existence of amicable political and economic 
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relations between states that impose sanctions and the targets of them increase the overall 
effectiveness of coercive measures (Allen 2005; Jing et al. 2003). Levitsky and Way (2010) 
demonstrate that linkages understood as the density of ties and cross border flows between two 
parties increase the prospects of democratization. In a nutshell, both weak sender target ties and a 
lack of target vulnerability may negatively affect the ability of sanctions to induce democratization. 
Yet, research on democratization on the one hand and on sanctions on the other has actually 
supported contradicting assumptions. If Levitsky and Way (2010) are right, authoritarian rule can 
only persist in contexts with a low density of ties while a low level of vulnerability alone would 
not prevent democratization from unfolding. If, however, sanctions researchers are correct, both 
weak sender target ties and low vulnerability contribute to the persistence of authoritarian rule. 
3.5.5 UN Sanctions Regime in Protection of Civilians 
The protection of civilians is one of the greatest issues of international relations and it is at the core 
of the UN. Work on international peace and security. The UNSC holds debates on the protection 
of civilians, it has been a subject of a number of thematic council resolutions and more than 90 
percent of UN keepers deployed today are mandated to protect civilians. According to the UN 
Secretary General annual report to the Security Council on the protection of civilians, covering a 
range of aspects including, the use of force by peacekeepers, humanitarians and human rights law 
and development of responsibility to protect doctrine. The discussion is going to examine how the 
UN has responded to the changing nature of conflict, tracing the development of the civilian 
protection concept from its humanitarian roots and questioning whether the UN, comprising a 
collection of politically motivated actors, has effectively used the range of tools at its disposal to 
protect civilians in conflict. The UN crafted a broad definition of protection of civilians (Pantuliano 
et al, 1995). Navigating between the aspirations of the UN Charter and the realities of politics and 
resources, the definition includes both the concept of physical protection through the use force and 
the concept of restructuring the capacity of States to protect their own civilians.  Despite frequently 
lofty rhetoric, the political will to ‘persuade’ states to protect their own civilians’ populations is 
often absent or dependent on strategic alliances. The UN and its Security Council, only gradually 
became aware that they would not be faithful to the spirit of the UN Charter if they did not put the 
safeguarding of civilians lives at the center of their concerns. The first post- Cold War decade was 
marked by the Rwandan genocide (Gourevitch, 1998) and the killings of the Yugoslav, and in 
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particular the Srebrenica massacre, in which 7000 Bosnics lost their lives despite being in a safe 
area established by the resolution of the Security Council. Mc Robbie (2014) envisaged that the 
strategic level in Rwanda and the tactical Srebrencia, the ‘international community massively 
failed the people of the UN’.  
In 1999, from the reports on Rwanda and Srebrenica, the UN Secretary General and the Security 
Council began a regular cycle of reporting and a series of debates on the protection of civilians in 
armed conflict, resulting in a number of resolutions. Since 1999 the council met, issued statements 
and resolutions dealing with the protection of civilians in armed conflict (Wilmot et al. 2000). The 
former deputy North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
(SACEUR), British General Rupert Smith, described new wars as ‘war amongst the people’ 
(Smith, 2005) The wars of the twentieth century exacted a heavy toll on civilians, the need to 
destroy the industrial support system of the war machine which led to massive bombings that killed 
many innocent souls and many indiscriminate weapons decried today developed during the 
traditional war (Hobsbawn, 1994). The evolution in warfare has its counterpart in diplomacy, as 
economic sanctions also became more individualized. 
3.5.6 The Problem of Consistency in the Imposition of Economic Sanctions  
At present, sanctions have uncertain grounding in ethics and little or no standing in international 
law. Even if the United Nations Security Council decrees economic sanctions against certain 
nations, then members of the United Nations who are sympathetic to the regime will still find ways 
to render economic support (Schott, 2006). Economic sanctions against Cuba, enacted more than 
40 years ago, have failed because of a lack of commitment among allies (Jacobs, 2008). This 
ambiguity and moral uncertainty must be overcome if sanctions are to serve a legitimate purpose 
in international affairs (Lopez and Cortright, 2000). In essence, ethics must be based in virtues, in 
objective morality, declared by an authority that transcends the human implementers. The 
alternative will be that people are forced to work with and come to agreement regarding personal 
opinions voiced either individually or collectively.  
In the current global political climate, justification for sanctions is usually reactionary and it is 
reactionary on the basis of implicit self-interest, often overtly justified in stated humanitarian 
considerations. The moment a particular, usually economic interest, is threatened, then economic 
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sanctions, the politician’s compromise between dialogue and all-out war, is seriously discussed. 
The resultant action will generally be carried on the basis of what is essentially an ego-centric, 
political-economic motive (Shuja, 2002). Even when considering human workers’ rights in 
particular countries such as Burma (Macan-Markar, 2005) and India (Lukas, 1998b), the suspicion 
is clearly present that, despite the horrendous work conditions that many of these workers are being 
subjected to, the underlying consideration to militate against cheap labour is the protection of the 
national workers’ market.  
The result of such approaches is that economic sanctions will be pragmatic, rather than principled. 
If economic sanctions were exercised on the principle that sweat shops and forced labour are 
unacceptable in the context of human dignity, relations with three-quarters of the world’s people 
would be ruptured (Griswold, 1997). Religious lobbying groups in the USA are making an effort 
to seek the legal establishment of an Office of Religious Persecution Monitoring that would give 
the President an annual list of those nations which either persecute people actively on account of 
faith or fail to prevent systematic persecution. The aim is to ban the export of “persecution-
facilitating products, goods and services” to such places. Apart from the fact that this would 
marginalize most countries on the globe, governments that are authoritarian enough to risk the ire 
of other countries with religious persecution show remarkable insensibility to economic pressure 
(Rai and Eden, 2001). In order to avoid disenfranchisement of most of the world’s countries, 
prioritization would be required. This leads to ethical questions in terms of who should do the 
prioritizing, why certain countries are left out, which goods and services are deemed persecution 
facilitating. The pragmatism embedded in the process would thwart ethical and principled action. 
It is in this particular ethical arena that the apparent lack of ethical justification for economic 
sanctions emerges. In order to ground sanctions in ethics, such ethics must be taken from a source 
beyond. 
3.6 Conclusion 
Regardless, all the issues that have been discussed in this chapter the main aim was to explore an 
overview on the evolution of the idea of sanctions. As previously discussed in the chapter, The 
UN imposed sections under Chapter VII of UN Charter in imposing sanction to Rhodesia and 
South Africa. The sanction that was imposed was targeted to change the behavior of the targets 
and these sanctions caused a significant damage to the targeted states. Dwelling on the idea of 
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economic sanctions, the sanctions that were imposed against Cuba was a threat to stability of 
Western hemisphere since the aim was to foster radical policies and bolstering Cuba’s political 
stability and economic relationship with Soviet Union. The collective economic sanctions whether 
directly or indirectly, cause harm to the innocent civilians at the end. The rationale behind the 
imposition of sanctions includes coercive, punitive purpose and this will also affect human beings 
at large since the economic sanctions have a negative impact to the civilians at large. UN sanctions 
in the context of non-proliferation, counter terrorism, protection of civilian, democratization, 
conflict resolution mechanism was ethical basing on law but in terms of application it became 
unethical since there were big five super powers which also have direct impact in the passing of 
Security Resolution and conflict of interest was also a problematic factor in the imposition of 
economic sanctions. 
Economic sanctions have been used over the last three decades more than ever before even though 
the evidence regarding ineffectiveness is quite overwhelming in many cases, with the possible 
exception being when they were used against apartheid South Africa, as some authors intimate. 
This begs the question why politicians still persist with them. Consensus of analysts is that, in tune 
with the remark made by former US Secretary of Defence, James R. Schlesinger, sanctions appeal 
to America because they seem to be a substitute for stiffer measures that may be required. In short, 
they are a way of making ourselves feel that we are doing something substantial about a serious 
problem without really doing anything at all (Bartlett, 1985). The weapon of economic sanctions 
would appear to be generally undesirable for those holding to the Biblical worldview, except 
possibly in the case of a war between two nations. Sanctions tend to alienate parties and make 
conflict resolution more difficult to achieve.  
Furthermore, research has shown that sanctions leave the real targets, the political manipulators 
and despots, largely unscathed. Also, no self-respecting government has been prepared to lose 
standing by succumbing to such measures. If anything, as has also been noticed, alternative trading 
partners would be sought and found, in most cases making the subjected nation stronger over time. 
It should be no surprise that sanctions, however well intended, lead to unexpected and unwanted 
results. In order to progress relationally in this world, be it at a personal or at any public level, 
there must be relationship building through dialogue, through willingness to stand beside the other 
person or nation. The effectiveness of sanctions is questionable. It is clear that the more harm 
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sanctions have on their target, the more likely they are to influence the target's behavior. The 
human costs of such sanctions, however, are often unacceptable and make international support 
unlikely. Moreover, sanctions are likely to have greater effect on their target if the target 
government is faced with domestic opposition; otherwise, sanctions may simply encourage greater 
political cohesion around the targeted leadership. Conflict often arises due to one party's feeling 
that they lack political, economic, or security resources. The next chapter is going to discuss the 
UN application of economic sanctions during Cold war era, an era whereby the practice of 
economic sanctions was mainly practised on the basis of the bipolar power system between the 
then USSR and the USA.  
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE UNITED NATION’S APPLICATION OF ECONOMIC 
SANCTIONS DURING THE COLD-WAR ERA 
4.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the preceding chapter, the founding of the United Nations (UN) was the second 
attempt at creating a world collective security system within a space period of a few decades. Yet, 
during the Cold War, the UN collective security system was going to fail once again, as most of 
the world was divided into two blocs – the Eastern bloc as opposed to the Western bloc. The UN 
found itself divided according to the then prevalent bipolar economic ideological power system 
when it comes to the issues of peace and security in the world. Similarly, its organ for the 
maintenance of peace and security in the world, the UN Security Council (UNSC), often found 
itself in a stalemate situation, unable to act efficiently. Indeed, on several occasions, it can be said 
that the UNSC was used as a tool of superpower influence. While the UN did not achieve its 
founding mission of promoting peace and security throughout the Cold War (and still has not done 
so up to today), it was more successful in fields such as decolonisation and human rights. A brief 
general overview of the UN system is given in this chapter, followed by a more focused analysis 
of cases in which the UN was said to have been used as a superpower tool, such as Korea and the 
Congo.  
The UN was created with the liberal idealist intentions of trying to avoid a third destructive World 
War and preserve world peace and security. In this regard, emphasis was put on the need to 
recognise the sovereignty of each member state in the UN General Assembly. During the Cold 
War era, economic sanctions were not used as frequently as a foreign policy tool for behaviour 
modification for errant States. Sanctioning of States was difficult as countries could still trade 
regardless of the economic sanctions. For example, if the US imposed economic sanctions against 
a particular state, that state would still trade with the Soviet Union and vice versa, thereby 
rendering economic sanctions counterproductive. This led to the unveiling of an analogue of the 
Cold War ideologies where it was noted that the Cold War between communism and liberalism 
continued at the close of the Second World War as the power relations between the two sides 
escalated into what came to be popularly known as the Cold War. The age of unrestricted Western 
imperialism had come to an end as the intelligence systems of the liberal and communist nations 
confronted one another on the plane of ideas in Europe. Not all UN failures during the Cold War 
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were caused by the East-West division; there were also other deep divisions between States, such 
as between Israel and its neighbouring Arab countries. In the light of the briefly discussed world 
political scenario, this chapter will be structured as follows. 
Firstly, the chapter discusses the political dynamics that surrounded the application of economic 
sanctions during the Cold War, where it postulates that this tool of economic ostracism has been 
applied increasingly since the beginning of the 20th century. Some cases were catered for in 
Chapter IV of the UN Charter, for instance. The rationale behind economic sanctions was to cripple 
the economy within a territory. In line with this, there is the evaluation of the effectiveness of the 
application of economic sanctions in the Cold War environment, where it can be noted that 
sanctions have failed as a means of changing behaviour, and are not free of ethical cost as they 
impact on the livelihoods of innocent civilians and can kill more people than the wars they are 
purported to supplant. In appreciating the post-Cold War trends and the use of economic sanctions, 
the chapter notes that sanctions imposed during the 1990s were pre-eminently comprehensive 
embargoes which had little effect in changing the state policies and additionally caused immense 
suffering to the population of the various sanctioned countries. International economic sanctions 
are characterised as over-used, ineffective, and unfair.  
4.2 The Cold War Era and the UN’s Role of Maintaining Uneasy Peace 
While it was hoped that the UN would be more successful than its predecessor, both organisations 
were challenged by very similar issues. Both the League of Nations and the UN were built upon 
two fundamentally opposed approaches to international relations: the tradition of the ‘Concert of 
Europe’ and the ‘Peace Project’ tradition (Brown & Ainley 2009:144). According to the Concert 
of Europe, the Great Powers were to have extensive responsibility for managing and coordinating 
policies on matters of common concern, so maintaining a balance of power among States (Brown 
& Ainley 2009:145). Of course, ‘common interest’ was usually interpreted through the lens of the 
Great Powers’ interests. The Peace Project, on the other hand, was very much influenced by Kant’s 
theory of ‘Perpetual Peace’, and rested upon the assumption that eventually war could be made 
obsolete through the regional and international cooperation of States (Brown & Ainley 2009:145). 
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The UN was therefore created with liberal idealist intentions primarily to avoid a third destructive 
World War and to preserve world peace and security (Article 1.1 of the UN Charter), as well as to 
recognise the sovereignty of States and give a voice to each state in the General Assembly (GA). 
Stalin remarked at Yalta in 1945 that “the main thing was to prevent quarrels in the future of the 
three Great Powers [USA, Britain, and the USSR] and the task, therefore, was to secure their unity 
for the future” (FRUS 1955:666). His view was shared by President Roosevelt (FRUS 1955:667). 
Thus, from the beginning, the UN also reflected a realist Great Power chain of command, as the 
main decision-making organ of the UN, the Security Council, included only five permanent 
members: the US, the UK, the USSR, France and China (Cassese 2005:317). These five Great 
Powers agreed to maintain peace and security for the common good, but especially, of course, 
when it was in their own interests. According to Articles 2.3 and 2.4, States should peacefully 
settle disputes and the use of force is prohibited. Under Article 39, the Security Council (SC) may 
decide on the use of force if there is a threat to peace, a breach of the same, or an act of aggression 
(Higgins 1995:446). Each of the Big Five received a veto power, which could stop SC decisions 
from being made. To this date, the liberal and realist elements of the UN System remain one of its 
greatest paradoxes. The UN still reflects conditions as they were in 1945, as its structure does not 
easily allow for reform (Luck 2004:361). 
In the aftermath of the Second World War, most of the world soon split into two camps, under 
either US or Soviet influence. Roosevelt’s vision of the Security Council as “a board of directors 
of the world” with the responsibility of enforcing “the peace against any potential miscreant” 
collapsed (Kissinger 1995:395). Each of the two superpowers focused on preserving order and 
stability in its own sphere of influence, while respecting the other’s bloc (Cassese 2005:323). 
Superpower competition came to the surface mainly in relation to spheres of influence in the 
developing world, as well as in strategic areas, and often led to proxy war-type conflicts in these 
regions (Cassese 2005:323.). This competition was, of course, reflected in the SC, and the P-5’s 
veto power would often serve as a tool to create a stalemate, such as in the 1956 Suez Crisis, the 
situation in Vietnam from 1946-1975, the Sino-Vietnamese conflict in 1979, and Afghanistan from 
1979 (Roberts & Kingsbury 1993:6). 
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As the UN’s principal crisis-management body, the Security Council may respond to global threats 
by cutting economic ties with state and non-state groups. Sanctions resolutions must pass the 
fifteen-member Council by a majority vote and without a veto from any of the five permanent 
members: the United States, China, France, Russia, and the UK. According to Smith (2004:5), the 
most common types of UN sanctions, which are binding on all member States, are asset freezes, 
travel bans, and arms embargoes. This notion of a resolution having to pass through the fifteen-
member Council by a majority vote has seen countries coming together with the same voice and 
imposing sanctions on offending countries. In such scenarios the successful implementation of 
sanctions would have been manifested. 
4.2.1 The UN’s Reluctance Over the Use of Sanctions 
Economic sanctions were rarely used during the Cold War. In line with this, Smith (2004) observes 
that for most of the 20th century, sanctions were rarely used. During the Cold War, both the USSR 
and the United States tried to gain a competitive edge over each other by cooperating with corrupt 
leaders. This policy made sanctions an ineffective tool. Before the fall of the Berlin Wall, there 
were only two UN-approved sanctions, against Rhodesia and South Africa. If the US sanctioned a 
state, that state would trade with the USSR and vice versa, rendering the act of sanctioning 
counterproductive. Furthermore, the UN was incapable of imposing any sanctions as the two 
superpowers used their right of veto to block any such action with the exceptions of Rhodesia in 
1965 and South Africa in 1962. In reinforcing this notion of reluctance over the use of sanctions 
during the Cold War it can be noted that prior to 1990, the Council imposed sanctions against just 
two States: Southern Rhodesia (1966) and South Africa (1977). 
However, since the end of the Cold War, the body has used sanctions more than twenty times, 
most often targeting parties to an intrastate conflict, as in Somalia, Liberia, and Yugoslavia in the 
1990s. But despite this cooperation, sanctions are often divisive, reflecting the competing interests 
of world powers. For instance, since 2011, Russia and China have vetoed all four Security Council 
resolutions concerning the conflict in Syria, some of which could have led to sanctions against 
President Bashar al-Assad’s regime. This standoff changed in the 1990s with, firstly, the fall of 
Communism, and, secondly, a wave of humanitarianism that sought alternatives to the threat of 
war. In this new climate, the world embraced sanctions. While there were only 248 cases of 
sanctions from 1914-1990, there were 343 cases in the 1990s (Smith 2004). 
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One of the main goals of sanctions has been regime change agenda and democratisation, most 
particularly in the Third World. While there is a plethora of reasons for States to sanction other 
States, Oechslin (2011:2) says that “[i]n practice, sanctioning States have indicated a variety of 
goals but the most frequent by far is to promote democratization by pushing autocratic (or even 
despotic) regimes out of power (46% of the cases in the 1914-2000 period)”. The role of economic 
sanctions as a foreign policy tool for democratisation has continuously been questioned in the 
academic and political circles with regard to its efficacy. It has been mostly argued that sanctions 
are not that efficacious in the democratisation process of autocratic States but rather worsen the 
situation. Goldsmith (2007) observes that sanctions have been mostly ineffective in achieving 
political and economic objectives. He further argues that “of all cases examined starting in World 
War I, only about one third were judged to be even partly successful. These cases included 
multilateral sanctions and unilateral embargos [sic] and boycotts by the United States and other 
countries, aimed at a variety of economic and political objectives” (Goldsmith 2007:4). It can be 
observes that economic sanctions have been hardly successful or have had minimal impact in 
influencing governments of States to democratic reform (see Drury et al. 2010:1–2; Hufbauer et 
al. 1983, in Oechslin 2011:4, 2).  
In support of the above school of thought, Smith (2004:1) had this to say about sanctions in general 
and economic sanctions in particular:  
Sanctions are often viewed as an alternative to military force. By punishing an offending party 
economically, socially, or politically, rather than militarily, those who impose sanctions hope to solve 
a conflict without the mass suffering and sacrifice required by war. Indeed, sanctions have sometimes 
been effective, and are widely used. But their use is much more common than their success: studies 
indicate that only five to, at most, 30 percent of sanctions result in the desired change. The use of 
sanctions also comes with significant risks. 
Drury et al (2010:1–2) argue that when States are threatened by sanctions they tend to react 
negatively to coercive external policies and democracy-related sanctions may actually be 
counterproductive and undo progress towards political liberalisation. Thus, sanctions sometimes 
result in unintended consequences, creating new complexities that reverse democratic transitions 
in the Third World. In the Cold War period between 1945 and 1990, the UNSC imposed economic 
sanctions in only two cases, Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe) in 1965, and South Africa 
in 1977. In 1965, after the unilateral declaration of independence by Ian Smith in Southern 
Rhodesia, the UN Security Council installed a voluntary oil embargo on Southern Rhodesia. This 
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was later made mandatory, adding an arms embargo and wide trade sanctions, travel bans, 
diplomatic blockades, and financial measures. This ban was lifted only in 1979 following the 
changeover to black majority rule. 
The other case of UN sanctions during the Cold War was then-apartheid South Africa. When South 
Africa acquired arms in 1963 it was deemed to constitute a threat to the maintenance of 
international peace and security. In response, the UN Security Council imposed a mandatory arms 
embargo against South Africa, which remained in force until multiracial elections were held. South 
Africa introduced apartheid in 1948 in a post-World War II political climate that saw anti-racial 
discrimination blowing away with winds of change, starting with Ghana’s independence in 1960. 
South Africa’s racial policy was put on the UN agenda by India and other States that criticised 
apartheid. The South African government responded to the criticism, stating that apartheid was 
part of the internal affairs of South Africa and fell outside the UN mandate. The USA, UK and 
France supported this view at first. This support was, however, challenged after the horrific 
Sharpeville Massacre, which received worldwide condemnation. Global opinion openly criticised 
South Africa, and western countries no longer justified the view that the racial policies were the 
internal affairs of South Africa and not the concern of the UN. On 1 April 1960, the UNSC held 
that the Sharpeville incident was indeed a threat to world peace and security. In 1974, the UN 
resolved to expel SA from the UN, but the UK, USA and France did not accept this. The result 
was UN economic sanctions and the isolation of South Africa. Nevertheless, the main trading 
partners of SA voted against mandatory economic sanctions. 
In 1962, the General Assembly proposed further economic sanctions by cutting off trade, 
diplomatic and transport relations in an attempt to force SA to abandon apartheid. In 1963, the SC 
appealed to member States to stop selling arms to South Africa. It was only in 1977 that the 
sanctions became mandatory. In 1982 the GA declared it the International Year of Mobilization 
for Sanctions against South Africa. In 1988 the UK and the USA vetoed SC further economic 
sanctions against SA. Inevitably, efficient UN action was in fact stymied by superpower conflict 
that was based on both geopolitical and ideological factors. These circumstances led to many brutal 
proxy wars, such as in Korea, the Congo and Vietnam, which were often even prolonged by 
superpower divisions. Many peacekeeping missions failed or never left to pursue their intent. 
Atrocious genocides such as in Cambodia and in Guatemala were not prevented by the UN. Rather 
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than acting as a collective security system, the SC mostly remained divided throughout the Cold 
War. Hence, ‘Divided States’ may indeed have been a more accurate term than ‘United Nations’ 
(Roberts & Kingsbury 1993:10). Yet the UN was not a complete disaster, and undoubtedly the 
Cold War world was better off with it than without it (Weiss & Daws 2007:11). Some 
improvements towards peaceful cooperation were made, largely by simply providing a peaceful 
platform for global discussion. Throughout the Cold War, the value of the UN developed into one 
that was different from initially intended, focusing more on aspects such as human rights and self-
determination. This is still true to this date, and perhaps it is high time to rethink the role of the 
UN. Maintaining global peace and security has so far proved impossible; however, it is possible 
to make small steps forwards to make this world a better place gradually, hopefully. 
As the UN’s organ entrusted with the mandate for the maintenance of peace and security in the 
world, the UN Security Council (UNSC) may respond to global threats by imposing the cutting of 
economic ties with state and non-state groups. Sanctions resolutions must pass the fifteen-member 
Council by a majority vote and without a veto from any of the five permanent members: the United 
States, China, France, Russia, the UK. According to Smith (2004), the most common types of UN 
sanctions, which are binding on all member States, are asset freezes, travel bans, and arms 
embargoes. UN sanctions regimes, including most of the sixteen in place in early 2015 (the most 
in history), are typically managed by a special committee and a monitoring group. The global 
police agency Interpol assists some sanctions committees, particularly those concerning al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban, but the UN has no independent means of enforcement and relies greatly on 
member States, many of which have limited resources and little political incentive. Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that enforcement is often weak for reasons that will be discussed later, in the 
following chapters. 
4.3 An Analogue of the Cold War Ideologies 
The Cold War era, characterised by competition for world dominance between communist 
ideology and capitalism that had receded in 1941, resumed at the close of World War II. The power 
relations between the sides had, however, twisted. There was a resistance to military recourse and 
neither side had adequately recovered from the war. The age of unrestricted Western imperialism 
had come to an end. No one could foretell when and how the colonised would attain independence 
from the superpowers or how the newly self-governing peoples would organise and align 
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themselves in the world order. The intelligence systems of the liberal and communist nations 
confronted one another on the plane of ideas in Europe, and then militarily in those colonies, which 
collectively constituted what is now called the developing world (Warner 2014). World War II 
ended in Europe with the victorious Allies arguing over the shape of the peace to come in 1944 
and 1945. Stalin kept the Soviet Army in the lands it had taken from Hitler in Eastern Europe. The 
word ‘’liberation’’ hardly seemed apt for people who had exchanged one tyrant for another. The 
Americans had to leave Europe as fast as possible, shifting forces to the Pacific and, when Japan 
capitulated that September, demobilising their huge military establishment with all possible haste. 
In 1946 the Americans left behind on the continent light constabulary forces, but hardly any 
combat formations. With the resumption of the Cold War, the US Army returned with full force, 
with major headquarters in Stuttgart in Germany. In 2016, the Russian President Vladmir Putin 
described this presence as unnecessary and probably a threat to international peace. The US 
president-elect described the US presence in Europe as not only unnecessary but an unwarranted 
expense on the public purse. 
In Eastern Europe, local Communist parties and the organs of Soviet state security set about re-
demarcating the countries that Stalin had promised his allies would be granted self-determination. 
Political stability and the very future of liberal democracy in Europe required economic stability. 
The continent had been exhausted by war, with whole societies decimated by the Nazi occupation. 
Germany was physically devastated. France and Italy were recovering but had constantly shifting 
coalition governments, as well as strong leftist movements that had recently fought the Germans 
and commanded the loyalty of sizeable voting blocs. For a period of time, Communists in the West 
cooperated with the “bourgeois” governments and pleaded for one Europe, undivided by 
ideological cleavages, while working to take control of labour unions and their parliamentary clout. 
Opposition to the communists seemed weak and divided.  
Meanwhile, President Harry Truman’s announcement of the Truman Doctrine to confront 
Communist agitation against Greece and Turkey in early 1947, was followed quickly by the 
Marshall Plan to spread America’s purchasing power and rebuild the continent’s economies, 
forced the issue. President Truman invited the USSR to accept Marshall Plan aid, but Stalin 
commanded obeisance from every communist party in the world and in response to the Marshall 
Plan he assembled the key parties in a new Communist Information Bureau known as the 
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Cominform. At Cominform’s inaugural meeting in Poland, his delegates reversed the wartime 
notion of “national roads of socialism”, which vowed to expunge the vestiges of pluralism in 
Eastern Europe. They ordered the parties in the West to do what they could, short of armed 
insurrection, to oppose the consolidation of American “hegemony” in their countries. By the year 
end, France and Italy were paralysed by waves of strikes before Marshall Plan aid could arrive. 
The Cominform also mounted a “peace offensive” in October 1947, reaching out via party 
operatives and fellow travellers to unions and peace organisations, urging them to adapt a common 
message: the United States was seeking to divide Europe and precipitate a third world war. 
Meanwhile Stalin dominated Eastern Europe through coups in Hungary (1947) and 
Czechoslovakia (1948), and he blocked access to the Western allies’ sector of West Berlin in an 
attempt to halt the creation of a Federal Republic of Germany out of the French, British and 
American occupation zones.  
Countering communism forced a dilemma on European leaders. They could not ignore pressure 
tactics exerted from within their societies by a united dissident movement obedient to Moscow, 
yet they were reluctant to suppress the parties and the groups that they were in control of, in fear 
of an uprising support to communist charges of armed American hegemony. While many in the 
West appreciated the Marshall Plan and eventually NATO, Western governments argued over the 
particulars of these measures in public, submitting them to democratic processes. However, French 
leaders and other private groups and politicians on the continent did not want open subsidies, 
especially from America, as these opened them to rhetorical assaults from the left. The riposte to 
Moscow’s vicious psychological efforts came via a Western psychological offensive against the 
Communists on both sides of the Iron Curtain. The main effort of the counter-offensive was always 
overt and conducted by the Voice of America, the BBC, the US Information Agency, the British 
Council, and various programmes for cultural and educational exchanges. What ultimately won 
the ideological conflict in Europe were realities on the ground. The effects in the short term of 
Western covert psychological and political action were most trivial. In the long run, however, the 
economic disparity between East and West was more than communism could bear. Moscow’s exile 
of the writer Alexander Solzhenitsyn in 1974 ended any idea that art flourished under Marxism, 
so the West won the cultural struggle as well. 
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Economic sanctions usually refer to the imposition of international economic boycotts and 
embargoes. The term can also be used in domestic conflicts to refer to labour strikes and economic 
boycotts, shutdown and intervention (Anon 2005). Economic sanctions are economic penalties by 
one country on another for a variety of reasons. Economic sanctions include tariffs, trade barriers, 
import duties, import and export quotas, and other monetarily damaging penalties (Anon 2005). 
They can be unilateral or multilateral measures of deprivation imposed on individuals or national 
economies (Davidsson 2003). Penalties threatened or imposed are declared as a consequence of 
the targets’ failure to comply with international standards or obligations (Doxey 1996). The notion 
behind economic sanctions infers from the above definitions that economic sanctions are imposed 
by those nations that hold a certain whip in hand over other nations. The nations that hold a whip 
try to impose their views on the political powers of the target nations by means of causing 
economic distress, or discomfort at least. This tool of economic ostracism has been applied 
increasingly since the beginning of the 20th century. Some sanctions are catered for in the UN 
Charter System in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. According to this, the Security Council may be 
called upon to decide that there is a threat to the peace or breach of the peace, or an act of 
aggression. According to the UN Charter (Articles 39, 41 and 42), the council may then rule 
whatever coercive measures of a non-military or military kind are deemed necessary to preserve 
world peace and international security. In the post-Cold War era, the driving force behind the 
imposition of economic sanctions was conflict resolution. The UNSC was authorised to impose 
sanctions when a nation threatened peace and security or was guilty of aggression against another 
state (UN Charter Article 39). The imposition of economic sanctions is a step towards hostile 
foreign policy which, if effective, can be followed by military force, according to the UN Charter.  
The implied logic of economic sanctions is that, by crippling the economy within a territory, the 
authorities of that territory are prevented from satisfying popular needs such as the supply of 
commodities, services and work. Massive shortages that ensue are supposed to cause popular 
discontent, which would translate into a call for the removal of the authorities or a pressure on the 
authorities to comply with external demands. The theory is thus predicated on causing civilian pain 
to achieve political gain (Davidsson 2002:6). Sanctions may be comprehensive, comprising the 
full gamut of means (trade boycotts and embargoes across the board), or selective, covering only 
certain areas. Furthermore, they also may be mandatory by decision of the UN Security Council, 
or voluntary, leaving their implementation to the respective sanctioning States. Moreover, 
 
 
84 
 
sanctions may be imposed unilaterally, by one state against another, or multilaterally, by a broad 
front of States against a target state (Tostensen & Bull 2002:374). However, most studies of 
sanctions have shown that despite the differentiation between economic, political, smart and 
targeted sanctions and all other forms of sanctions, there is hardly any evidence showing different 
impacts. What seems to differ is the degree of acceleration in feeling the impact, but all are 
premised on the civilian pain = political gain formula. This is propounded by Davidsson (2002:7–
11), who argues that the discourse of sanctions is full of euphemisms, such as: ‘target state’, 
‘conflating a population with its leader’, ‘collateral and unintended effects’, and ‘humanitarian 
exemptions’. Therefore, despite an attempt to separate the types of sanctions, they still all lead to 
the same effects.  
4.4 The Efficacy of UN Economic Sanctions in the Cold War Era 
Economic sanctions are an important feature of the modern economic, political and social 
landscape, lauded as the humanitarian alternative to war, with over 500 cases of sanctions being 
implemented in the 1990s alone. They are implemented with the stated intention of altering a 
targeted state’s behaviour, to elicit conformity with international ethical norms. An analysis of the 
effectiveness and ethics of economic sanctions reveals that they have been a resounding failure. 
The only remaining focus of academic debate is centred on exactly how ineffective economic 
sanctions are. 
Data and theory demonstrate the failure of economic sanctions as a means for the enforcement of 
behaviour modification on the target state. Furthermore, economic sanctions are not free of ethical 
cost. They impact on innocent civilians and, at worst, can kill more people than the wars they are 
purported to supplant. Therefore, the question must be asked: why are sanctions still implemented 
so frequently? The answer is that economic sanctions serve a symbolic function. They signal to 
the target, and the world, what is and is not acceptable ethical behaviour. This is an important act 
when examined through the ethical lens of constructivist theory. This is a political theory which 
argues that many of our beliefs, behaviours and institutions are consequences of social interaction. 
Their structures can be and are actively changed, as opposed to the inevitable consequences of 
nature or necessity. Through this framework, the symbolic function of sanctions is important, for 
it helps construct new ethical norms of belief and behaviour by signalling that acts such as 
sponsoring terrorism are unacceptable in the world today. The symbolic function serves as an 
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important lesson for people and institutions alike: even when acting ethically seems to have little 
immediate or evident impact, it is still important to continue. Ethical acts and symbols have the 
capacity to shape normative practices and beliefs over time. 
Tostensen and Bull (2002:374) further argue that the fundamental flaw in conventional sanctions 
theory is its assumption that hardships inflicted on the civilian population of a targeted state will 
lead to grassroots political pressure on that state's leaders to modify their behaviour. In other words, 
a transmission mechanism often referred to as the “pain–gain” formula is presumed to be operative. 
Therefore, there is no linear projection to causality between sanctions and desired results because 
this may vary from case to case, depending on a number of factors that are internal and external to 
the sanctioned state. However, while a transmission mechanism is operative in some cases, 
particularly if there is reasonably strong internal opposition to the targeted government, it cannot 
be assumed that it holds universally. In fact, the consequences of some sanctions regimes make 
their imposition counterproductive (Tostensen & Bull 2002:374–345). Additionally, Davidsson 
(2003) cites Cortright and Lopez (2000), who also argue that there is no direct transmission 
mechanism by which social suffering is translated into political change. Sanctions have been 
observed to give rise to the sanctions paradox, or unintended results. Therefore, sanctions may 
lead to unintended consequences, as observed by Tostensen and Bull (2002:377): they may 
produce unexpected changes in the internal political constellations, thus resulting in realignments 
that may alter the balance of power in favour of the very culprits that the sanctions aimed at 
punishing. In authoritarian States in which the government can manipulate information flows for 
propaganda purposes, this effect may tend to be reinforced.  
Sanctions have generally been criticised for their indiscriminate nature, for it has been observes 
that there is no clear separation between those that it seeks to protect on one hand and those on 
whom it seeks to inflict punishment. Tostensen and Bull (2002:377) argue that comprehensive 
conventional sanctions also have been subjected to much criticism on grounds of political 
ineffectiveness and humanitarian bluntness. This position is further reinforced by Davidsson 
(2003) when he observes that the weapon of economic sanctions is incapable of discriminating 
between combatants and civilians. It is levelled at the (national) economy, composed mainly of 
the civilian population. Therefore, most criticism or limitation of sanctions as an instrument of 
coercion has been its blindness in terms of the damage that it inflicts even on innocent civilians. 
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On the other hand, sanctions require international cooperation to be effective, and in certain cases 
national interests prevail over the collective interest and consequently weaken the potential impact 
of sanctions on a recalcitrant state. Therefore, in situations where the costs of sanctions to 
neighbouring countries are high, there would be greater likelihood of “leakage” in sanctions 
implementation. This creates an environment in which the target state has ample opportunities for 
circumvention, ultimately weakening the pressure brought to bear by the sanctioning State or 
States (Tostensen & Bull 2002:378). In some cases, nations have resisted sanctions despite the 
huge cost associated with non-compliance, in particular where it threatened the sovereignty of a 
state.  
The link between democratisation and sanctions has been a grey area, but most literature points to 
a disjuncture or contradictory evidence. There is thus broad agreement that because of their 
complexity, sanctions are problematic and have often produced paradoxical and contradictory 
effects (Tostensen & Bull 2002:378). In some cases, sanctions may produce results contradictory 
to the set goals and creating further complexities, which may undermine democracy. There is a 
tendency for sanctions to create a “rally around the flag” effect, buttressing the perceived autocratic 
regime and undermining democratic forces. Brooks (2002:3) argues that comprehensive sanctions 
are likely to be effective in democracies, but not in authoritarian regimes, where they may trigger 
a rally effect or merely impoverish the masses.  
4.4.1 The Effectiveness of Sanctions against Southern Rhodesia and South Africa 
The effectiveness of sanctions in the Cold War period against Southern Rhodesia and South Africa 
is subject to much debate, considering that the sanctions imposed on these two States were strongly 
resisted by some western countries and that the sanctions remained in place for a long time. In the 
case of Southern Rhodesia, the SC itself agreed that a number of western States were failing in 
their obligations to apply them. The UNSC Resolution 232 under Chapter VII contained blunt 
language emphasising implementation obligation. The initial resolution in 1965 did not address 
the obligation on member States to report on their compliance to implement the sanctions. The 
Smith regime’s bustling survival years after 1965 was ipso facto proof that the sanctions did not 
work. 
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According to Strack (1978:237–238), the Rhodesian sanctions were not only ineffective in terms 
of policy changes, but they were also counterproductive, causing “the deterioration of a situation 
they were designed to alleviate”. Losman (1979:123–124) stated that the Rhodesian government’s 
willingness to negotiate for majority rule was due to the increased costs of war and the hostility of 
neighbouring States, but not to sanctions. In contrast, Baldwin (1985), in his Economic Statecraft, 
considered the sanctions against Rhodesia a success. He argued that there is a failure many authors 
with the wrong perception that sanctions must work quickly and by themselves bring out the 
objectives. He concluded that sanctions cannot be the only factor that brought down the Smith 
regime in Rhodesia, but they made a significant long-term contribution to black majority rule.  
In the case of South Africa, while the international community was focusing on sanctions and 
embargoes, it seemed that the sanctions were clearly working against them. South Africa was the 
most stable country in the region, and most neighbouring countries depended on it. Imposition of 
sanctions would result in the other countries suffering even more than South Africa. Another 
obstacle was that companies could circumvent the sanctions. The problem with comprehensive 
sanctions is the willingness by corporations to cheat when they feel they had no say in the making 
of the original rule. In an effort to draw a conclusion as to the effectiveness of sanctions on South 
Africa, one is left in a difficult position. Rodman (n.d.) made it clear that sanctions did affect South 
Africa and to some degree influenced its decision to end apartheid. Many observers believe 
economic sanctions were marginally effective. Internal events such as boycotts, strikes, 
demonstrations and violence played a more significant role than sanctions did. Without doubt, the 
forces beyond South Africa’s government contributed to an end to apartheid. However, to 
determine the exact level that sanctions had contributed to that end may be contestable on either 
side, and yet one has mixed feelings that on one hand it helped create an international atmosphere 
which resulted in a concerted effort to stop apartheid. Yet on the other hand, the thriving economy 
of the South African government and the suffering of the Southern African region really provides 
disconcerting evidence as to their utility and effectiveness. 
Sanctions effective in one setting may fail in another, depending on innumerable factors. Sanctions 
programmes with relatively limited objectives are generally more likely to succeed than those with 
major political ambitions. Furthermore, sanctions may achieve their desired economic effect, but 
they may fail to change behaviour. United Nations sanctions on Afghanistan in 2000 and 2001 
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exacted a heavy toll but failed to move the Taliban regime to surrender Osama bin Laden (Brooks 
2002). Sanctions often evolve over time and a classic illustration of this is the US regime on Iran. 
Except for a brief period in the 1980s, Washington has had sanctions against Tehran since US 
hostages were taken in 1979. However, the scope of these measures and the logic behind them has 
changed dramatically (Smith 2004). The imposition of sanctions changes depending on the 
national interests of the imposers as well as how they align with the whims and expectations of the 
reigning administration. 
4.4.2 Unintended Consequences Following the Imposition of Sanctions 
Over and above these considerations, it can be noted that economic sanctions may have unintended 
consequences. Alexander George, as cited in Smith (2004), discusses the potential “boomerang 
effect” of economic sanctions or “coercive diplomacy”, as others would portray them, when he 
suggests that Japan's decision to attack Pearl Harbour, and the subsequent entry of the United 
States into World War II, stemmed from economic sanctions: “The oil embargo the United States 
imposed on Japan in July 1941 was so credible and so potent that it quickly provoked Japanese 
leaders into making a very difficult and desperate decision to initiate war rather than capitulate to 
Washington's extreme demands that it get out of China and, in effect, give up its aspirations for 
regional hegemony in Southeast Asia.” Similarly, Smith (2004), citing Louis Kreisberg, suggests 
that sanctions can widen the conflict as well as adding to its destructiveness, and sometimes extend 
it. Sanctions are also destructive to the targeted societies. A 1999 study suggests that post-Cold 
War sanctions may have contributed to more deaths than all “weapons of mass destruction” used 
throughout history. In Iraq, for instance, it has been estimated that hundreds of thousands of 
children died between 1991 and 2001, in part as a result of sanctions. Such effects weaken the 
political support necessary for effective trade bans. In Iraq's case, there were significant 
fluctuations in international support for the decade-long sanctions.  
Another problem with sanctions is that threats cost more when they fail because the sender must 
follow through with a punishment. A larger threat is likely to be cheaper, because it is less likely 
to fail. To reduce potential costs, a sender may build up a threatened punishment, thinking that 
otherwise it will fail. As a result, senders may overdo the level of threat needed for a situation. 
Additionally, threats inherently cause stress and can affect one's rationality or problem-solving 
capacity. They can also generate resistance. There is a difference between opposition to an outside 
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attempt to influence and opposition generated by the attempt to influence. Often, the target would 
rather face a threat than be perceived as weak by giving in to a threat. Sanctions convey a message 
of indifference and hostility. Furthermore, when senders impose sanctions on a target, the target is 
much more likely to impose sanctions on the sender when given the chance. In further capturing 
the effectiveness of economic sanctions in the Cold War era, it can also be noted that rather than 
having a pacifying effect on the targeted actor, sanctions then strengthen a leader's domestic 
support. The sanctions that were imposed upon Ian Smith’s UDI in the 1960s actually enabled him 
to gain domestic support as he bolstered the economic performance of the then Rhodesia. By and 
large, the performance of Rhodesia was made better than it had been earlier, before the sanctions. 
Outside pressure can also be used by leaders to ignore domestic troubles, placing the blame for 
economic instability on the outsider, and providing political cover to repress domestic dissidents 
further, while directing resentment towards those who have imposed the sanctions. This has been 
the chorus by the Zimbabwean Government since the early 2000s, and they have always directed 
resentment toward the West, who in this case are the imposers of those sanctions. In addition to 
the above, some scholars, such as Daniel Fisk (2000: 65), conclude that “economic sanctions are 
a policy instrument with little, if any, chance of achieving much beyond making policy-makers 
feel good about having done something for a particular domestic community”. In this vein, 
economic sanctions tend to benefit the imposers more by exhibiting some form of punishment and 
ruthlessness on the receiving country. 
4.4.3 Trends in the use of Sanctions in the Transitional period from the Cold War Era to the 
Post-Cold War period 
The end of superpower rivalry in the Cold War coupled with the emergence of new conflicts and 
challenges changed the focus of sanctions policies but did not diminish their use (Peterson Institute 
for International Economics 2004:138). Implied here is the fact that sanctions were continuously 
used even after the Cold War though however, their focus and magnitude as well as dimensions 
had changed and shifted. In chronicling the historical dominance of the superpowers and their key 
role in the imposition of economic sanctions in the post-Cold War era, it can be noted that the 
United States continued to be the predominant sender country and a few high profile United States 
cases were launched unilaterally in the 1990s for example, the non-proliferation sanctions against 
India and Pakistan. Peterson Institute of International Economics (2004:140) avers that reflecting 
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its roles as economic hegemony and political and military superpower in the decades following 
World War II the United States attempted to impose its will on many countries through the use of 
economic sanctions, seeking broad array of objectives. By comparison, the Soviet Union generally 
confined its use of sanctions to efforts at keeping rebellious allies in line. 
The Peterson Institute for International Economics (2004:141) asserts that over the succeeding 
decades, the objectives of economic sanctions have evolved and widened sometimes to act as a 
substitute for war; sometimes to signal that military conflict lies around the corner; sometimes to 
achieve lesser changes in target country policy such as freeing political prisoners and sometimes 
merely to placate domestic constituencies in the sender nation. Over the past century, the types of 
sanctions have also evolved and widened from prohibitions on merchandise imports and exports, 
to multiple forms of financial restraint, to measures aimed only at select members of the governing 
class (Peterson Institute for International Economics 2004:141).  
The sanctions imposed during the 1990s were pre-eminently comprehensive trade embargos which 
were enforced on States such as Iraq, Yugoslavia and Haiti. These had little effect in changing the 
States’ policies and, additionally, caused immense suffering among their populations. The failure 
to change behaviour, combined with their capacity for inflicting suffering on civilians, led scholars 
to reassess the use of such all-encompassing methods at the turn of the century. The proposed 
alternatives were called ‘smart’ sanctions. These specifically aimed at the elite, and their 
supporters, within a target state. The hope was that smart sanctions would be more effective as 
they put pressure primarily on leaders while solving the humanitarian problems encountered with 
comprehensive sanctions. A decade later, these hopes have not come to fruition. 
In highlighting the post-Cold War use of sanctions, Smith (2004) made the following remarks: 
After the Cold War, the UN Security Council ordered sanctions against a number of countries, 
Afghanistan, Angola, Haiti, Iraq, Serbia, Somalia, Sudan, and others. Their violations include 
external and internal aggression, support of terrorism, and suppression of democracy. Also during 
this time, the United States rose to unprecedented international power, giving greater authority to its 
unilateral sanctions. The United States' economic strength, combined with a reluctance to deploy its 
military force to address economic, moral, or political problems resulted in a sharp increase in 
unilateral sanctions. In 1998, one commentator estimated that “two-thirds of the world's population 
[was] subject to some sort of US sanctions”. However, the United States has not been the only nation 
to employ economic sanctions. In addition to thousands of single-nation bans and proposals, the 
increasingly viable European Union has been sponsoring its own brand of sanctions. 
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In a related development, Kaempfer and Lowenberg (2000:2) observe that it is a reasonable 
generalisation to characterise international economic sanctions as overused, ineffective, and 
unfair; they further argue that sanctions are overused, as demonstrated by the unwieldy number of 
sanctions episodes currently in force. They are ineffective given the number of seeming failures in 
sanctions policy. There is emerging consensus that sanctions as tools of statecraft have generally 
failed to be effective. This debate is further captured by Pape (1997; 1998), Elliott (1998) and 
Baldwin (1998 and 2000), where they quiz the utility of sanctions as a tool of statecraft. Therefore, 
it can be argued that despite their continued use, there is an emerging consensus that they are either 
redundant or need to be revised if they are ever to be effective. Barber (1979:367) and Doxey 
(1980:9, 125) share the same pessimism on the utility of sanctions and argue that they are more 
dependent on the link between economic pressure and political goals despite the fact that sanctions 
have goals which may be elusive and at the same time unrelated to the economic stress that 
sanctions cause. 
In presenting the debate of how uncertain sanctions can be as a tool to whip nations into line in 
relation to the post-Cold War era, Jentleson (n.d.:125) noted the following: 
The uncertainties of the sanctions efficacy debate have become even more problematic in the post-
Cold War era because of the frequency with which sanctions are used, as a veritable weapon of 
choice, in many different cases by many different actors. Some cases have involved the United States 
acting unilaterally; others have involved multilateral action by the UN and regional organizations 
such as the Organization of American States and the Organization for African Unity; still others have 
involved other international actors, as with Greece against Macedonia and Russia against various ex-
Soviet States. All told, sanctions have been used in pursuit of a broad range of objectives related to 
international conflict prevention, conflict management, and conflict resolution. Yet as one recent 
study put it: “Contemporary scholarship and policy analysis [lag] behind the current plethora of 
sanctions episodes … [and] scholars and policy makers readily acknowledge that judgments about 
current sanctions cases are made on the basis of ill-defined generalizations.” Of course, there cannot 
be a single theory or strategy, foolproof and universal. But we can do better in developing middle-
range and conditional generalizations that balance the desirability of parsimony of explanation with 
the complexity of the range of factors that affect the policy utility of sanctions. 
In another study, Chingono (2010:193) observes that the most comprehensive study of all time on 
the effectiveness of sanctions is the one by Hufbauer et al. (1983); which States that 49% of the 
cases studied revealed that democratisation was the major goal of sanctions. Therefore, the link 
between sanctions and democratisation, and in particular whether causality does exist, is 
paramount to this study. However, Pape (1997:92) contends that sanctions are generally 
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ineffective. Along with Pape (1997), my study challenges the emerging optimism about the 
effectiveness of economic sanctions. The decisive question I ask is whether economic sanctions 
are an effective tool for achieving international political goals, and if so, under what conditions.  
Meanwhile, Bowden and Farall (2007:1) observe that the mandate to impose sanctions lies with 
the United Nations and the legal basis of UN sanctions can be found in the UN Charter, Chapter 
VII, Articles 39–42, which empowers the UN to maintain or restore international peace and 
security through various enforcement measures, including sanctions and the use of military force. 
This mandate has gradually been broadened to permit the institution of measures to deal with 
massive human rights violations, breaches of international humanitarian law, transgressions of 
democratic rule, and acts of aggression where military forces have crossed national borders 
(Tostensen & Bull 2002:374). According to Article 41 of the UN Charter, these sanctions may 
include “complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations” 
(Bowden & Farrall 2007:1). However, the application of sanctions in international relations has 
been in some cases either unilateral or collective action against a state considered to be violating 
international law designed to compel that state to confirm [to the law] (Daoudi & Dajani 1983:5–
8). Furthermore, according to Bowden and Farrall (2007:1), sanctions can be collective, as in the 
case of mandatory UN sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council or the European Union; or 
they can be bilateral, as in the case of measures currently applied against Zimbabwe and Fiji by 
the Australian (and other) governments. Another illustration is the Zimbabwe Democracy and 
Economic Recovery Act (ZDERA). Therefore, the UN, a regional organisation or a country may 
impose sanctions to register its displeasure or demand certain behavioural change from the 
sanctioned state, and this may involve a range of measures.  
By and large, sanctions have traditionally been used as an instrument to achieve political 
objectives. Paramount to the use of sanctions has been the exertion of economic pressure that will 
lead to compliance from the sanctioned state. While there is a finely veiled line between political 
and economic sanctions, it should be noted that this difference is bifurcated. Barber (1979:1) 
observes that economic sanctions are economic measures directed to political objectives. They are 
normally supplemented by other measures, such as the severance or restriction of diplomatic and 
cultural ties. Moreover, Davis and Engerman (2003:187) observe that sanctions include the 
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withholding of diplomatic recognition, the boycotting of athletic and cultural events, and the 
sequestering of property of citizens of the targeted country.  
This second tier usually pertains to political sanctions. They further contend that the forms of 
sanctions that attract the most attention and that are likely have the greatest impact are composed 
of various restrictions on international trade, financial flows, or the movement of people (Davis & 
Engerman 2003:187). In assessing the efficacy of sanctions, it is imperative to understand the 
objectives of sanctions and to measure their efficacy as a policy of statecraft within a given realm. 
Sanctions have three objectives (primary, secondary and tertiary): 
• Primary goals: to encourage democracy, stop human rights violations and suppression of 
internal opposition; enforce peace agreements; assist in the pursuit of individuals for 
prosecution before international courts; ensure compliance with treaty obligations; 
• Secondary goals: to promote the sanctioned state’s reputation domestically and 
internationally; and 
• Tertiary goals, to maintain international structures and norms (Sitt et al 2010:24, see also 
Barber 1979:368–73). 
Therefore, in some cases, sanctions may be successful in secondary objectives while they are a 
failure in the primary objectives.  
Meanwhile, Collins (2009:71) posits that the literary corpus on economic sanctions extends back 
well over two thousand years, as Thucydides examined in 431 BC the role of the Athens embargo 
on Megara as a catalyst for the Peloponnesian War. On the other hand, Davis and Engerman 
(2003:188) observe that in the nineteenth century, economic sanctions consisted primarily of 
pacific blockades that involved the deployment of a naval force by a country or a coalition of 
countries to interrupt commercial intercourse with certain ports or coasts of a state with which 
these countries were not at war. Although most naval blockades involved wars, pacific blockades 
(a term originated in about 1850 to distinguish those blockades within a declared war from those 
between nations legally on peaceful terms) evolved gradually over time as a coercive tool, short 
of war, designed to compel recalcitrant nations to pay their debts (often reparations) and to settle 
other international disputes. These sanctions episodes were more of a bilateral nature as by then 
there was no formal platform or world body to institute sanctions and implement them. The formal 
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legal discussion of the legitimacy of pacific blockades, or sanctions more generally, occurred only 
with the formation of the League of Nations in the twentieth century, and then later of the United 
Nations. For the League of Nations, the power to deploy sanctions was primarily embodied in 
Article 16 of the League's Covenant, which authorised collective economic and military action 
against a state that resorted to war in disregard of the League's Covenant (Davis & Engerman 
2003:189). Thus the subject of sanctions dates long back in history, but for the purpose of the 
study, the focus is more on the sanctions applied from the twentieth century. Collins (2009:72) 
argues that the analysis of economic sanctions employing rigorous social science methodology did 
not appear, however, until the mid-twentieth century when in 1945, Albert Hirschman investigated 
one of the first rigorous theoretical explorations of economic sanctions in “National Power and the 
Structure of Foreign Trade”.  
In much the same way, trends in the use of sanctions throughout the 1990s and early 2000s are by 
no means clear cut. Their mapping is muddled by the lack of a commonly accepted definition of 
what constitutes economic sanctions. Far from being a semantic of no consequence, the definition 
one adopts determines whether the 1990s are seen as a period of sanctions mayhem or, in the view 
of Senator Jesse Helms, whether counting any restrictions on US economic activity with country 
for any purposes such as limiting imports of tuna from Mexico for environmental reasons as a 
sanction is likely to lead to the first conclusion insisting that only nearly comprehensive embargoes 
imposed political reasons constitute a sanction lends itself to the opposite judgement. Similar 
discrepancies about what percentage of the World’s population is “under sanctions” reflect the 
same lack of common currency in defining sanction. Neither definition at either end of the 
spectrum is technically wrong, although there is no question that each has been employed in a 
calculated manner by groups arguing for either a rollback of unilateral sanctions or a continuation 
or extension of their use. The number of times the US imposed new sanctions against States rose 
significantly in the early part of the decade yet declined as the decade wore on. Between 1990 and 
1996 the US imposed almost fifty sanctions against States, while it imposed fewer than ten new 
such sanctions in the last four years of the decade.  
In addition to the increase in the number of times sanctions were initiated, the range of goals 
pursued with sanctions broadened, just as the type of entities subject to sanctions expanded. At the 
same time, congressionally legislated sanctions became as common as their counterparts mandated 
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by their executive branch. Political and economic circumstances have long influenced American 
enthusiasm for economic instruments to pursue security goals. As argued by Michael Mastanduno, 
during the Cold War, the willingness of the US to use economic power to pursue strategic political 
goals depended largely on how it viewed the international system and the position of the US 
economy relative to that of the rest of the world. Policymakers were willing to use economic tools 
to advance foreign policy goals at a time when the United States saw the world as threatening and 
unstable, yet believed its own economic position was unassailable. During the immediate post-
World War II period when United States faced uncertain threats and weak allies but basked in its 
economic dominance, policy makers used financial assistance under the Marshall Plan, and 
transfers of technology and differential access to US markets to stabilise Europe and parts of Asia 
and cement American influence abroad. Efforts to economically isolate the Soviet Union were also 
critical elements of US foreign policy during that time. The international system seemed stable 
and orderly, while Americans noted surging economies in other parts of the world and feared a 
major US economic decline.  
Notably, the United States moved from using economic instruments primarily for strategic political 
purposes in many arenas; economic instruments were instead preserved for the pursuit of strategic 
economic goals. The world has changed dramatically since that time, yet economic and political 
factors and perceptions continue to shape decisions with regard to America’s use of economic 
tools. At the turn of the millennium, globalisation and American pre-eminence were the realities 
influencing how vigorously the United States used economic tools to further its strategic aims. 
New political and economic realities in the 1990s and early 2000s changed the menu of goals 
pursued with sanctions, not only by adding new entries, but also by removing old ones. During the 
Cold War, sanctions often were used as a means of conveying US resolve against communism, 
both to reassure American allies on the front line with the Soviet Union and to deter countries and 
factions within them from embracing communism. US sanctions on Cuba during this period, 
although unsuccessful in dislodging Fidel Castro, served purposes. However, in a world devoid of 
superpower threats to the United States, a unipolar world, old sanctions were more difficult to 
justify solely along these ideological lines, while new sanctions episodes could no longer be 
advocated for such purposes.  
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The United States often used sanctions against States to constrain or influence the external 
behaviour of a country or to destabilise a regime. Sanctions were rarely called upon to alter the 
internal behaviour of regimes, with the notable exception of a period in the 1970s when the Carter 
administration placed improving human rights at the centre of its foreign policy and used sanctions 
to advance this cause. Since 1990, the majority of non-UN sanctions imposed by the United States 
against state actors have had the aim of changing the domestic conduct of the target. In contrast, 
post-1990 economic and political changes opened the door for both supra- and subnational state 
actors to influence the shape of the world. The collapse of superpower rivalry offered the United 
Nations a new opportunity to exert itself on the global stage. No longer hamstrung by the zero-
sum manoeuvres of Moscow and Washington, the international body offered a newly effective 
vehicle to address global concerns. At the other end of the spectrum, the influence of subnational 
state actors on the international politics also sky rocketed as globalisation gave them new tools to 
create and maintain worldwide networks and new mechanisms with which to influence global 
events. In view of that, the Peterson Institute of International Economics (2004:147) observes that 
economic sanctions are still working hard to resolve old challenges while reaching out to address 
new problems; beyond their utility in resolving the immediate conflicts and disputes, economic 
sanctions signal that a watchdog – usually the United Nations, the United States or the European 
Union – may step in to penalise future behaviour. 
As observes above, prior to 1990, the United Nations Security Council imposed sanctions against 
just two States: Southern Rhodesia (1966) and South Africa (1977). However, since the end of the 
Cold War, the body has used sanctions more than twenty times, most often targeting parties to an 
intrastate conflict, as in Somalia, Liberia, and Yugoslavia in the 1990s. But despite this 
cooperation, sanctions are often divisive, reflecting the competing interests of world powers. For 
instance, since 2011, Russia and China have vetoed all four Security Council 
resolutions concerning the conflict in Syria, some of which could have led to sanctions against 
President Bashar al-Assad’s government. Here again, it cannot go without mention that the Syrian 
conflict has brought into focus the role that is played by national interests in the imposition of 
economic sanctions against the target state. Some scholars and media commentators have observes 
that the overthrow of Bashar al-Assad’s government was of critical importance for the USA and 
her European allies as a stepping stone towards the overthrow of the Iran government, which is 
deemed to be hostile to USA and European allies’ interests in the Middle East. On the other hand, 
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Russia and Iran are involved in the Syrian conflict in support of President Bashar al-Assad’s 
government for their own strategic national interests in the Middle-East. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Economic sanctions are a tool of a state’s foreign policy that have been used frequently for the last 
20 years since the fall of communism and championed as the humane alternative to war. Despite 
their prevalent use, they have conclusively failed in their stated purpose. Sanctions almost never 
succeed in stopping or changing the unethical behaviour of target States, particularly when enacted 
over long periods of time or through multilateral actions. Sanctions are not cost free from an ethical 
perspective. Comprehensive sanctions especially cause great pain and suffering to the innocent 
and weak within the sanctioned state’s population, as seen with the humanitarian disaster that was 
Iraq. Smart sanctions have mitigated the worst impacts on civilians but still carry costs that may 
be difficult to justify when weighed against their comparatively miserable efficacy. The only way 
economic sanctions make sense is if we view the power of sanctions as symbols in a constructivist 
light rather than their bare political form. Then, arguably, there is a place for sanctions as a means 
of shapyng international ethical norms for the better. 
 This chapter basically presented an exploration of the United Nations’ application of economic 
sanctions during the Cold War, where it highlighted issues such as the UN maintaining uneasy 
peace, the analogue of the Cold War ideologies, and the dynamics surrounding the application of 
economic sanctions. In these scenarios, it was noted that there was reluctance in the use of 
sanctions during the Cold War era as the countries would circumvent or bypass the sanctions and 
continue with their trade. This was an upshot of the diverse and distinct ideologies (communism 
and liberalism) that characterised power relations during this particular time. In highlighting the 
dynamics surrounding the imposition and usage of sanctions, the chapter categorically presented 
that economic sanctions were increasingly applied during the beginning of the 20th century as 
some of these economic sanctions were enshrined in the United Nations Charter system in Chapter 
IV. The chapter presented an evaluation of the effectiveness of the application of the United 
Nations sanctions in the Cold War environment where it noted that sanctions have failed as an 
instrument to change behaviour and are not free of ethical costs as they impact on innocent 
civilians. Lastly, the chapter outlined the post-Cold War trends and the use of economic sanctions 
where it traced the nature and severity of sanctions imposed by the UN. It was noted that sanctions 
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that were imposed during the 1990s were pre-eminently comprehensive embargoes which had little 
effect in changing the policies of the target State(s) and achieved little except causing immense 
suffering to the populations of the respective target State(s) that were the victims of those economic 
sanctions. As we shall in the following chapter, the senders’ motives on the imposition of economic 
sanctions against the target state differed remarkably after the Cold War. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AFTER 
THE COLD WAR ERA 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter captures the dimensions of economic sanctions that were applied after the Cold War 
era which are noted as both smart and comprehensive in nature. Smart sanctions serve as the 
precision-guided ammunition of economic statecraft and consist of arms embargoes, targeted 
financial sanctions, travel bans, restrictions on flight connections, representative restrictions, 
freezing of assets, and restrictions on particular goods and services, notably certain natural 
resources and processed commodities such as diamonds, timber, oil, arms, and spare parts of 
specific products (see Davidson 2003; Portela 2014). Comprehensive sanctions tend to have a 
humanitarian effect on the civilian population as they can lead to the destruction of infrastructure 
as well as annihilation of the people. Comprehensive sanctions are more efficient than smart 
sanctions. However, since they are too destructive for the ends to justify the means, they are 
considered too unethical to be implemented. Using the ethical view of sanctions, the problem of 
ethics, and the need for efficient tools for economic statecraft led to the development of smart 
sanctions.  
In addition, the chapter also focuses on the role and usage of smart sanctions where it notes that 
smart sanctions seek to alter the behaviour of precise actors by hurting elite supporters of the 
targeted regime as well as the targeted regime itself, while imposing minimal damage on the 
population. In addition, the chapter presents a resourceful discussion of the usage of smart 
sanctions across the selected parts of the world. Problems associated with the usage or imposition 
of smart sanctions hinging on their arduous nature will also be captured. In line with this, further 
examination and analysis will be undertaken in respect of difficulties associated with the 
identification of the target actors, determining which resources should be subjected to sanctions, 
and counteractions of the targeted sanctions, among others. 
As indicated in earlier sanctions, the rationale behind the imposition of economic sanctions after 
the Cold War will also be highlighted. In this vein, economic sanctions as a mechanism for 
enforcing international humanitarian law will be covered. Since most of the crises facing the world 
in the post-Cold War era had humanitarian roots, and as such, humanitarian disasters prompted 
humanitarian support. The imposition of economic sanctions therefore forces countries to comply 
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with and uphold international humanitarian laws, principles and conventions. Economic sanctions 
as an ethical tool for conflict prevention will also be captured. Economic sanctions are non-military 
measures that restrict or out an end to normal international economic exchanges with a state or a 
non-governmental group for the purpose of compelling, denying, or deterring political or military 
behaviour by the targeted government or group. Economic sanctions are meant to restore 
international peace and security. 
In addition, economic sanctions as a measure for combating terrorism will also be highlighted, 
where terrorism is considered as an instrument in the hands of weaker actors in their war against 
stronger systems such as States. After the Cold War, terrorist networks with an ethnic or religious 
base increased their grassroots capacities. Terrorism led States to devise methods for fighting 
against it; hence economic sanctions were used as a foreign policy tool before enforcing behaviour 
modification on countries that were suspected of actively supporting international terrorism. 
5.2 A Paradigm Shift from Comprehensive Sanctions to Smart Sanctions 
Powerful countries, regional organisations and the United Nations have in various instances 
resorted to the use of economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool to influence behaviour 
modification in the targeted States. Many scholars have maintained that economic sanctions are 
used as a tool of foreign policy by many governments. Economic sanctions are therefore usually 
imposed by a powerful country upon a weaker one mainly for two reasons – either the latter is a 
threat to the security of the former nation, or that country treats its citizens unfairly. Moving on, 
as observes by Decaux (2008:1): “Since the emergence of the state system, States have, either 
individually or collectively, adopted a range of reactions against the perpetrator of an 
internationally unlawful act in order to ensure respect for and performance of a right or obligation.” 
Accordingly, Leyton-Brown (1987:1) opines that international economic sanctions have recently 
enjoyed an upsurge of governmental and public attention because over the last few decades, 
various governments, but especially those of the United States and other Western countries, have 
imposed or threatened economic sanctions in a wide variety of conflicts.  
Sanctions, while a form of intervention, are generally viewed as an alternative to military force – 
a lower-cost, lower-risk, middle course of action between diplomacy and war. Sanctions are 
sometimes referred to as coercive diplomacy. Countries are exposed to coercion in their bilateral 
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and multilateral relations by their more powerful counterparts. There have been more frequent 
demands from the general public for the imposition of sanctions against foreign targets. Decaux 
(2008:1) notes that “sanctions are generally a legal policy tool under international law only if 
sanctioned by the United Nations (UN)”. In the UN charter, sanctions are set out in Chapter VI as 
a peaceful means of settling inter-state and intra-state disputes as well as ways of changing the 
behaviour of rogue States. In line with this, policymakers may consider sanctions a response to 
foreign crises in which the national interest is less than vital or where military action is not feasible. 
According to Baldwin (1990), economic sanctions are defined as the withdrawal of customary 
trade and financial relations for foreign and security policy purposes. They may be comprehensive, 
prohibiting commercial activity with regard to an entire country, such as the longstanding US 
embargo of Cuba; or they may be targeted, blocking transactions of and with particular businesses, 
groups, or individuals. Accordingly, Smith (2004) points out that since 9/11 (11 September 2001, 
when the terrorist group Al Qaeda targeted various areas in the eastern United States, causing 
massive destruction and loss of life), there has been a pronounced shift towards targeted or so-
called “smart” sanctions, which aim to minimise the suffering of innocent civilians. Sanctions take 
a variety of forms, including travel bans, asset freezes, arms embargoes, capital restraints, foreign 
aid reductions, and trade restrictions. (General export controls, which are not reactive by nature, 
are often excluded from sanctions discussions.) 
On the one hand, international economic sanctions are deliberate Government actions to inflict 
economic deprivation on a target state or society through the limitation or cessation of customary 
economic relations which involve trade and financial measures, including controls on exports to 
the target, restrictions on imports from the target, and interruption of official or commercial finance 
such as cutting off aid or freezing assets (Leyton-Brown 1987). Nossal (1987), cited in Leyton-
Brown (1987), explains that by economic sanctions are meant those instruments of national policy 
intended to deprive other target States of the benefits of economic intercourse in order to effect a 
change in the target state’s behaviour. These practices have come to be known as smart sanctions 
as they complement the overall punitive efforts of the sending countries. On the other hand, 
economic sanctions can be part of an overall war effort, where the interest is in economic sanctions 
as an alternative to military force, rather than a complement to it. This captures the comprehensive 
dimension of economic sanctions.  
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5.2.1 Development and Use of Smart Sanctions 
Nowadays, after the different criticisms against comprehensive sanctions, because of their 
humanitarian effects on the civilian populations, and more particularly after the comprehensive 
sanctions episode against Iraq in the early 1990s, the trend is to use smart sanctions. Smart 
sanctions, also defined as targeted sanctions, are “the precision-guided munitions of economic 
statecraft” (Drezner 2010:2). There is a variety of actors, a range of legal entities included, that are 
targeted by smart sanctions. They can be individuals such as, for instance, key decision makers, 
government officials, or family members of these individuals; military organisations, ranging from 
conventional armed forces to guerrilla forces; political organisations; corporate entities from both 
private and public sectors; and other non-state entities. These entities can be targeted by smart 
sanctions simply because of the exercise of some activity prohibited by the UN Security Council 
or their suspected relationships with terrorist organisations (Drezner 2011:97; Watson Institute for 
International Studies (WIIS) 2006:21). Moreover, they can also be targeted because of their 
support for primary targeted entities.  
The aim of smart sanctions is to alter the behaviour of precise actors (Wallensteen, Eriksson & 
Staibano 2003:91). Defenders of targeted sanctions claim that “economic coercion has had such a 
poor past record of success because they have often missed the locus of the target state’s offending 
policies: the policy elite”. As a consequence, the objective of smart sanctions is to hurt elite 
supporters of the targeted regime as well as the targeted regime itself, while imposing minimal 
damage on the population (Drezner 2010:2). In this perspective, smart sanctions are directed not 
only against the above-referred entities but also against resources that are indispensable for the 
targeted regime’s rule. The focus on specific actors and specific resources constitutes the key 
feature of targeted sanctions (Wallensteen et al. 2003:iii, 91).  
Smart sanctions consist of arms embargoes, targeted financial sanctions, travel bans, restrictions 
on flight connections, representation restrictions, freezing of assets, and restrictions on particular 
goods and services, notably certain natural resource and processed commodities such as diamonds, 
timber, oil, arms, and spare parts of specific products (Drezner 2010:4; Wallensteen et al. 2003:91). 
They should be used only when the domestic political economy of the target country is 
conceivable. Moreover, smart sanctions are commonly used either as incentives to change 
behaviour or as preventative measures. It is argued that by affecting the material inducements of 
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powerful supporters, the latter will eventually press the targeted authorities into making 
concessions. Indeed, smart sanctions should increase the target country’s costs of non-compliance 
while averting the collateral hardship that comprehensive trade embargoes imply (Drezner 2010:2–
4).  
Moreover, smart sanctions were the subject of a dialogue at the international level between 1998 
and 2003. Indeed, a series of conferences on smart sanctions, where delegates from the United 
Nations, government and the private sector regrouped, started in 1998. This series of conferences, 
the aim of which was to determine methods of applying sanctions in a more efficient and targeted 
way, constituted a period of reflection on smart sanctions. In total, three so-called processes took 
place: the Interlaken Process, the Bonn-Berlin Process, and the Stockholm Process. Each process 
focused on an aspect of smart sanctions. The Interlaken Process dealt with issue of targeted 
financial sanctions while the Bonn-Berlin Process concentrated on arms embargoes, travel bans 
and aviation sanctions. Finally, the Stockholm Process focused on the practical feasibility of 
implementing and monitoring targeted sanctions. 
Thanks to the development and use of targeted sanctions, many policy-related problems that had 
been created previously because of the use of comprehensive trade sanctions have been solved. 
Targeted sanctions serve now as a key instrument for policy coordination among the medium and 
great powers as well as for the global civil society (WIIS 2006:5–6). Their performance can be 
evaluated by looking at the humanitarian costs and state compliance’s results obtained with the 
use of smart sanctions compared to the use of comprehensive sanctions (Drezner 2010:6.). 
Moreover, as Drezner observes: “The evidence provides moderate support for smart sanctions 
being more humane but less effective than more comprehensive measures. Recent research on the 
impact of economic coercion in the target country would appear to support the humanitarian 
arguments in favor of smart sanctions” (Drezner 2010:6–7).  
Traditionally, sanctions prohibit only a home country’s or region’s corporations and citizens from 
doing business with a blacklisted entity (unlike UN sanctions, which are global by nature). 
However, extraterritorial sanctions (sometimes called secondary sanctions or a secondary boycott) 
are designed to restrict the economic activity of governments, businesses, and nationals of third 
countries (Carter, Lettre & Smith 2001; Crumm 1995; Fisk n.d.; Smith 2004). As result, 
governments typically consider these sanctions a violation of sovereignty and international law. 
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The controversy came to a head in the mid-1990s after President Bill Clinton signed the Cuban 
Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act (Rodriguez 2016). The law, which strengthened the 
embargo on then-President Fidel Castro’s regime, permitted US companies and individuals to sue 
foreign entities that trafficked in confiscated US property. In retaliation, Canada, Mexico, and 
the European Union all passed mitigating laws or regulations. Most US allies have said they will 
not recognise secondary sanctions. In recent years, the reach of US sanctions continued to draw 
the ire of some close allies. France’s leadership criticised the US prosecution of BNP Paribas as 
“unfair” and indicated there would be “negative consequences” on bilateral as well as US–EU 
relations. “The extraterritoriality of American standards, linked to the use of the dollar, should 
drive Europe to mobilize itself to advance the use of the euro as a currency for international trade,” 
said Finance Minister Michael Sapin (Jones & Portella 2014). 
The collapse of the Soviet Union allowed the United Nations to act more aggressively in 
international affairs and led to an increasing use of economic sanctions (Elliott & Hufbauer 
1999:403). The end of tension between East and West allowed the United Nations to play its role 
actively within the international community. All the cases of UN sanctions during the 1990s were 
directed against authoritarian or totalitarian regimes, which are able to command the country’s 
resources almost without opposition in dealing with the effects. In addition, they are able to hide 
the sender’s purposes in imposing the sanctions. Certainly, the leaders desire a situation where the 
sanctions are lifted, but that is not the same as stating that the sanctions have not had the political 
effects intended. Often the demands from outside mean that a regime will have to step down or 
that it has to abandon a central element of its internal or international policy. Such shifts are more 
difficult to contemplate, and the economic costs to the country may appear, to the leaders, to be 
smaller than the changes in a central policy concern would be. The trade- off too often speaks in 
favour of defiance.  
As the negative externalities of comprehensive trade sanctions became apparent in the 1990s, 
many scholars have advocated for smart sanctions (Weiss 1999; Cortright & Lopez 2002a, 2002b; 
Brzoska 2002; Wallensteen & Staibano 2005). Ostensibly, smart or targeted sanctions are the 
precision-guided munitions of economic statecraft. They are designed to hurt elite supporters of 
the targeted regime, while imposing minimal hardship on the mass public. By altering the material 
incentives of powerful supporters, the argument runs, these supporters will eventually pressure the 
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targeted government into making concessions.The history of targeted sanctions as a policy tool is, 
in many ways, a rare success story of fruitful collaboration between scholars, policymakers, and 
diplomats. The smart sanctions approach has been accepted as an example of “best practices” in 
both the United Nations and the United States. In line with this, Nossal (1987), cited in Leyton-
Brown (1987:15), asserts that if economic sanctions are employed in a political context, as, for 
example, under the Charter of the United Nations, these universal sanctions will atrophy as a means 
towards that larger end of the maintenance of peace, order and security in the international system. 
In this perspective there is a need for wide consensus – a sufficient consensus to produce no 
negative vote from one of the permanent members of the Security Council. Only then will the 
international organisation be able to impose universal sanctions on offending States.  
United Nations economic sanctions during the 1990s have been defined as a “tool for all seasons”. 
Leyton-Brown (1987:2) connotes that at times it appears that economic sanctions are being looked 
upon as an instrument of first resort – any easy way out for governments anxious to act, and to be 
seen to act, whether or not economic sanctions can or do achieve the objectives claimed for them. 
Powerful countries relied and still rely on the imposition of sanctions on weaker States in order to 
force them to act in a way that the powers desire and expect them to do. Indeed, after the end of 
the Cold War, a broad and growing range of situations has been determined by the United Nations 
Security Council as threatening or breaching international peace and security. The Security 
Council, while occasionally authorising the use of military force (Iraq, Somalia, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Rwanda), has more often utilised non-military measures in order to enforce 
compliance with its decisions. Examples go from the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq and the later 
discovery of the latter’s arsenal of weapons of mass destruction during First Gulf War era, to the 
conquest of territory by force and gross violations of humanitarian law in the case of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia; and from the support of international terrorism in the case of Libya, Sudan 
and Afghanistan’s Taliban, to particularly vicious civil wars in countries such as Somalia, Liberia, 
Sierra Leone and Rwanda (Doxey 2000). In the extreme case of Haiti, the breakdown of 
democratic governance, coupled with massive violation of human rights, was the trigger for the 
imposition of sanctions. 
The decade between 1990 and 2000 is even claimed by Hove (2012) as the ‘sanctions decade’. 
Hove argues that “[i]t would be befitting to refer to the post-Cold War era as the sanctions era. 
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Several sanctions regimes were adopted by the Security Council from 1990 to the present”. The 
dominant trend in UN policy making has been the shift away from general trade sanctions toward 
more targeted and selective measures. Since 1994 all UN sanctions have been targeted. Financial 
sanctions, travel bans, arms embargoes, and commodity boycotts have replaced general trade 
embargoes as the preferred instruments of UN policy. The sweeping counter-terrorism measures 
adopted in SCR 1373 (2001) continued this trend, imposing targeted financial, travel, and other 
restrictions on terrorists and those who support them. Leaders can in certain circumstances impose 
sanctions hurriedly in a bid to buy supplementary time to weigh up and set up more castigatory 
action. For example, the UN Security Council imposed comprehensive sanctions (PDF) against 
Iraq just four days after Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. The Council did 
not authorise the use of military force until months later. The imposition of the sanctions was a 
preparatory gesture that paved way for the adoption and implementation military force. 
What is thus remarkable is the increased willingness of the Council to determine that internal 
situations which do not materially threaten international peace in the sense of being likely to 
provoke an international armed conflict meet the requirements of Article 39 of the UN Charter. In 
particular, massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law, as well as massive 
displacement or suffering of civilian populations deriving from or increased by internal armed 
conflicts (with or without external support), have prompted the Council to take action under 
Chapter VII. In a parallel development, the Council has on several occasions based its finding of 
a threat to the peace and the consequent imposition of sanctions on a determination of a violation 
by the target state of legal obligations of fundamental importance for the international community. 
Examples go from the act of aggression and the other grave violations of international law 
committed by Iraq, to the massive violations of humanitarian law and basic human rights 
committed in the former Yugoslavia. 
In capturing the practical cases where the deployment of economic sanctions was seen to be 
successful, Shane Smith (2004) noted the following: 
On December 21, 1988, Pan Am Flight 103 disintegrated in the skies over Lockerbie, Scotland, after 
a bomb ripped a hole in its fuselage. The Qaddafi regime of Libya was accused of the attack and of 
harboring two suspects, Amin Fhimah and Abdelbaset al-Megrahi. Led by the United States, the 
United Nations Security Council passed resolutions that threatened international sanctions including 
military embargoes and prohibiting the sale of industrial equipment to Libya unless it handed over 
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the suspects. Qaddafi resisted for years, but in 1999 succumbed to global pressures. The trial found 
al-Megrahi guilty of the murders, while his colleague was acquitted. Other examples of the effective 
use of sanctions include South Africa where it is thought that international sanctions isolated the 
government and helped bring its policies of apartheid to an overdue end. Similarly, global sanctions 
placed on Serbia, after Slobodan Milosevic's cruel campaigns in Bosnia and Kosovo, helped bring 
about Milosevic's downfall and subsequent extradition to face an international war crimes tribunal 
(Smith 2004:3). 
In such a scenario, the UNSC used sanctions in a bid to expose war criminals who perpetrated 
gross atrocities. The Security Council has utilised a variety of non-military measures under Article 
41 of the Charter. In the case of Iraq, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Yugoslavia) and Haiti, 
the Council imposed a full commercial and financial embargo, complemented by measures such 
as a flight embargo and prohibition of participation in sporting events. In most other cases, 
however, the Council has been more selective. In the case of Resolutions 748 (1992) and 883 
(1993) on Libya, for example, prohibition of flights to and from that country was supplemented 
by the obligation to freeze Libyan assets and the prohibition on exporting oil-related equipment. 
In the cases of Angola, Haiti and Sudan, the authorities considered responsible for the occurrence 
of a threat to the peace were targeted through, among other things, limitations to their movements 
outside their countries. In a remarkable number of cases of civil war, as noted above, the Council 
imposed an arms embargo against the country concerned, not so much to target one of the parties 
to the conflict as to prevent the escalation of the conflict by stemming the flow of weapons to all 
the parties.  
The practice of the Security Council during the 1990s shows a growing inclination to target 
sanctions, either by imposing a limited range of measures or by trying to affect decision makers 
directly by, for example, providing for the freezing of individual bank accounts or the prohibition 
of entry visas, as in the case of Haiti. The conditions for the entry into force and the termination 
of the sanctions have also undergone an evolution during the 1990s, by, for example the setting of 
objective conditions for the automatic lifting or suspension of the sanctions without the need for a 
further decision by the Council, thus avoiding a possible exercise of the veto by the permanent 
members (the so- called “reverse veto”). Another development was the progressive reduction of 
the scope of the sanctions, linked to certain actions by the target state, to reward and encourage its 
compliance with the Council’s requests. 
The third debate can be dated to the decision by the UN Security Council to impose sanctions on 
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Iraq. The purpose was to end Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait (Doxey 2000). The sanctions were 
imposed immediately after the invasion in August 1990. They remain in force at the time of 
writing. In a way, this application of sanctions was more closely parallel to the first debate and its 
focus on territorial aggression. The Security Council defined Iraq as the country that had broken 
the peace and that measures under Chapter VII could therefore be taken (Doxey 2000).In effect, 
Iraq was branded as an aggressor, although this language was avoided. A military build-up 
followed and a short, intensive war in January and February 1991 resulted in the forceful eviction 
of Iraqi troops from Kuwait. Sanctions remained in place, however, but now for the purpose of 
forcing Iraq to agree with the inspection provisions imposed after the Gulf War. As this short 
description makes clear, sanctions were not the only instrument. In both the first and the second 
debates, sanctions were seen as the option for achieving desired change, to be kept separate from 
military action. In the Gulf crisis they were one of the instruments. After the Gulf War, pressure 
was also kept up on Iraq with repeated air raids on Iraqi installations. Following the Gulf War, the 
UN Security Council has initiated ten new cases of economic sanctions, sometimes as the only 
action, sometimes in combination with other measures. Thus, the debate has had a rich array of 
cases for discussion. 
A mark of the sanctions of the 1990s, as compared to previous periods, is their link to internal war 
situations. This is clear-cut in the cases of Somalia, Liberia, Angola, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and 
FR Yugoslavia (Kosovo). The breakup of former Yugoslavia could be seen as a special case of 
internal war becoming international. Haiti was a case of pre-empting an internal war by exerting 
international pressure. Two cases are related to the phenomenon of terrorism (Libya and Sudan). 
In the first and second sanction debates, such motivations would not have been acceptable. The 
sanctions on Southern Rhodesia and South Africa, although concerning internal affairs, were 
internationally legitimate as they connected to the decolonisation process. This process was 
supported by the two alliances of the Cold War and belonged to the few agreements between these 
two sides. The sanctions directed against internal rule, such as those against Cuba and Albania, 
were not accepted in international organisations outside the domination of sanctions-imposing 
major powers.  
Since the end of the Cold War, restrictive measures have been deployed with greater frequency. 
The sanctions imposed on Saddam Hussein’s Iraq under the aegis of the UN after its invasion of 
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Kuwait in 1990 were comprehensive economic sanctions, which exacted major humanitarian costs. 
Yet the UN-sponsored ‘oil-for-food’ programme introduced in 1998 to alleviate the suffering of 
the civilian population was later criticised for giving rise to widespread corruption both inside and 
outside Iraq. International sanctions have since tended to shift from being comprehensive to 
targeted (or ‘smart’), focusing on individual leaders and organisations mainly to punish human 
rights violations.  
With threats to international security emanating primarily from intra-state conflicts, fragile or 
failed States, and transnational terrorist networks able to carry out their operations regardless of 
state borders, sanctions policies have undergone a fundamental shift, targeting non-state actors as 
well. The UN doctrine of R2P, conceptualised and developed in the early 2000s, made sanctions 
part and parcel of a series of measures taken by the international community to punish the 
aggression of governments against their own citizens – as was the case with Libya and Syria in 
2011, in spite of R2P arguably being operationalised only in the former. Other actions have also 
become major justifications for the imposition of sanctions: nuclear proliferation, as in the case of 
Iran and North Korea, and terrorist activities, as in the case of al-Qaeda, Boko Haram or the Islamic 
State of Iraq and the Levant. The post-Cold War was also characterised by the use of smart 
sanctions as a substitute for comprehensive economic sanctions that were deemed to be 
indiscriminate when it came to inflicting harm on the target state. Comprehensive sanctions were 
mainly criticised in that both the innocent and the culprit members of the target state suffered the 
same fate.  
5.3 Post-Cold War Era and the Imposition of Smart Sanctions 
Anglin, cited in Leyton-Brown (1987:23), contends that recent experiences with the employment 
of external economic sanctions to effect domestic policy change has seriously shattered the popular 
myth that they offer a cheap and easy (and not just morally acceptable) alternative to war as an 
instrument of national policy. However, smart sanctions are also not insulated from some languor 
or inertia in their execution and operationalisation. First, the imposition of targeted sanctions has 
proven to be arduous in practice. One example is the difficulty that both the American Government 
and the United Nations had in confiscating the personal assets held by Saddam Hussein and his 
family before the second Gulf War (Major & McGann 2005:341). Furthermore, Wallensteen et al. 
(2003) explicated the following key problems in targeting the targeted actors: “… the identification 
 
 
110 
 
of the actor, determining which resources should be subject to sanctions, the counter-reactions of 
the targeted actor, and the ability and willingness of third States to make the sanctions effective” 
(Wallensteen et al. 2003:92). Moreover, the increasing use of targeted sanctions during the past 
years have generated new issues linked to the rights and standing of parties that may be listed 
wrongly.  
5.3.1 Shortfalls Associated with Smart Sanctions 
In addition to the challenges cited in the previous section, Smith (2004:2) highlighted some 
shortfalls associated with the imposition of smart sanctions where he gave a presentation of a 
number of scenarios where the consequential perspectives of sanctions were witnessed by noting 
that:  
[s]mart sanctions tend to have a ‘boomerang effect’ as was witnessed in Japan’s case. Japan's decision 
to attack Pearl Harbor led to the subsequent entry of the United States into World War II, and this by 
and large stemmed from the economic sanctions: The oil embargo the United States imposed on 
Japan in July 1941 was so credible and so potent that it quickly provoked Japanese leaders into 
making a very difficult and desperate decision to initiate war rather than capitulate to Washington's 
extreme demands that it get out of China and, in effect, give up its aspirations for regional hegemony 
in South-east Asia. Similarly, Smith (2004), citing Louis Kreisberg, suggests that sanctions can 
widen the conflict, add to its destructiveness, and sometimes prolong it. Sanctions are also destructive 
to the targeted societies. A 1999 study suggests that post-Cold War sanctions may have contributed 
to more deaths than all weapons of mass destruction used throughout history. In Iraq, for instance, it 
has been estimated that hundreds of thousands of children died between 1991 and 2001, in part as a 
result of sanctions. Such effects weaken the political support necessary for effective trade bans. In 
Iraq's case, there were significant fluctuations in international support for the decade-long sanctions. 
The economic sanctions that were imposed on Japan led the Japanese government to exhibit some 
hostility as they ventured into war instead of submitting to the wishes of the United States 
government. In this case, sanctions can fall short in producing or generating the expected or desired 
outcome or end, as was witnessed in the Japanese case, thereby producing the so-called 
“boomerang effect”. As noted above, such a scenario compounds the destructiveness of the 
conflict. The worst-case scenario was witnessed in Iraq where the sanctions actually led to deaths 
of large numbers of children as a result of the economic strangulation that made access to basic 
goods and essential services difficult, thereby leading to the mortalities.  
Accordingly, Smith (2004:3) asserts that another problem with sanctions is that threats cost more 
when they fail because the sender must follow through with a punishment. A larger threat is likely 
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to be cheaper, because it is less likely to fail. To reduce potential costs, a sender may build up a 
threatened punishment, thinking that otherwise it will fail. As a result, senders may overdo the 
level of threat needed for a situation. Additionally, threats inherently cause stress and can affect 
one’s rationality or problem-solving capacity. They can also generate resistance. There is a 
difference between opposition to an outside attempt to influence and opposition generated by the 
attempt to influence. Often, the target would rather face a threat than be perceived as weak by 
giving in to a threat. Sanctions convey a message of indifference and hostility. Furthermore, when 
senders impose sanctions on a target, the target is much more likely to impose sanctions on the 
sender when given the chance, thereby creating scenarios of deeply-entrenched grudges that wait 
for the most opportune time for retaliation by the aggrieved nation.  
Consequently, if there is domestic support for the targeted leader, sanctions may generate a "rally 
around the flag" or nationalist response, in which a population under threat unites around its leaders 
(Smith 2004, citing Johan Galtung). Rather than having a pacifying effect on the targeted actor, 
sanctions then strengthen a leader’s domestic support. Outside pressure can also be used by leaders 
to ignore domestic troubles, placing the blame for economic instability on the outsider, and 
providing political cover to repress domestic dissidents further, while directing resentment toward 
those who impose the sanctions. Some scholars, such as Daniel Fisk as cited by Smith (2004), 
conclude that “economic sanctions are a policy instrument with little, if any, chance of achieving 
much beyond making policy-makers feel good about having done something for a particular 
domestic community”. This implies that the sanctions have a soothing effect on the senders, who 
in this case feel that they have done something positive to other nations. 
In addition, several member States pointed out the lack of due process and the absence of 
transparency. Drezner wrote:  
Nevertheless, there is no systematic evidence that smart sanctions will yield better policy results vis‐
à‐vis the targeted country. Indeed, in many ways, the smart sanctions framework has been too 
successful {Author’s sarcasm}. Recent research suggests that, in some instances, options other than 
smart sanctions should be pursued. It would behove policymakers and scholars to look beyond the 
targeted sanctions framework to examine the conditions under which different kinds of economic 
statecraft should be deployed. (Drezner 2011:97).  
Effectively, the accuracy of targeting determines the solidity of the entire chain of implementation 
measures. Likewise, requests for more comprehensive and more coercive sanctions are likely to 
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arise if smart sanctions do not achieve their objectives (Wallensteen et al. 2003:92). Lastly, recent 
research suggests that alternatives other than targeted sanctions should be considered in some 
cases. In conclusion, scholars and policymakers should analyse the smart sanctions framework and 
determine the conditions under which different types of economics statecraft should be used 
(Drezner 2011:97). Over and above that, David Cortright and George Lopez, as cited by Smith 
(2004:5), established that the so-called “smart” sanctions carry much less weight, are easily 
circumvented, and, as a result, have less chance of success, whereas, on average, comprehensive 
sanctions have been more effective when compared to smart sanctions. 
5.4 Reasons for the Usage of Economic Sanctions 
National governments and international bodies such as the United Nations and European Union 
have imposed economic sanctions to coerce, deter, punish, or shame entities that endanger their 
interests or violate international norms of behaviour. Anglin, cited in Leyton-Brown (1987:24), 
notes that sanctions can be designed to serve a number of distinct and not necessarily mutually 
exclusive purposes. Economic sanctions have been used to advance a range of foreign policy goals, 
including counterterrorism, counter-narcotics, non-proliferation, democracy and human rights 
promotion, conflict resolution, and, most recently, cyber-security.  
5.4.1 Economic Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool for Enforcing Behaviour Modification 
against the Target State 
Economic sanctions are imposed in a bid to punish other States. In this regard, punitive measures 
are at the centre of economic sanctions. The States that take these measures are so desirous to 
punish the target States for their behaviour. Governments and multinational bodies impose 
economic sanctions to try to alter the strategic decisions of state and non-state actors that threaten 
their interests or violate international norms of behaviour. For instance, through deprivation of 
certain goods and services the target state will be forced to comply with the demands and 
expectations of the sending country. The United Kingdom, for example attempted to deprive the 
Argentines of normal channels of economic intercourse after the Argentine invasion of the 
Falklands or Malvinas in April 1982 (Nossal 1987 in Leyton-Brown 1987:13). Another case was 
the coercive efforts of the Arab States to deter both the Canadian government and of course others 
from moving the Canadian embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem by threatening sanctions. Punitive 
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measures were the cardinal motivating force in prompting the imposition of these economic tools 
of statecraft against specified targets.  
Accordingly, each of these involves the use of economic measures by States to secure political 
ends and sanctions belong to the repertoire of a state’s foreign policy. Economic sanctions can be 
viewed as the forms of economic reprisals imposed in response to transgressions against a state’s 
interest. Sanctions are premised on safeguarding the sending country’s national interests. A 
violation of a powerful nation’s national interests attracts economic sanctions on the violators. The 
United Nations Security Council has a tendency of applying the sanctions inconsistently such that 
countries are punished differently for the same offence. Actually, some countries get off scot-free. 
For instance, when the Tanzanians overthrew the government of Idi Amin in Uganda and replaced 
it with one more to its liking, there was barely any negative reaction internationally. In line with 
this, Nossal (1987), cited in Leyton-Brown (1987), postulates that whether or not a transgression 
has even occurred or whether there should be punishment of that violation depends on the 
subjective and ad hoc judgement of each state. In light of this, one is forced to conclude, by the 
inconsistent behaviour of States, that the action found offensive is an action that they regard as a 
violation of their interests, and is not necessarily actionable because it is a violation of law.  
5.4.2 Deterrence and Economic Sanctions 
States make use of economic sanctions in a bid to deter the receiving country from acting in a way 
that is not favourable to the sender of the sanctions. Deterrence brings out the desire to signal that 
similar behaviour by the target state or by other States would have recognised attendant costs and 
thereby deter such behaviour (Nossal 1987, cited in Leyton-Brown 1987). Deterrence as a 
preventative measure involves the use of economic pressure perhaps in the form of a slow-turning 
screw or merely credible threats, as a signal to alert a prospective transgressor of the consequence 
and futility of breaching accepted norms of behaviour. According to Nossal (1987) in Leyton-
Brown (1987:13), punishment itself suggests a hurtful penalty or reprisal imposed for a 
transgression or violation. Accordingly, economic sanctions serve as a short, sharp shock in the 
form of carefully designed psychological sanctions which may be a prerequisite if individuals are 
to overcome their inherent reluctance to face reality and thereby restore a measure of cognitive 
consistency. Punishment helps to bring deterrence to the would-be offenders. In line with this, 
smart sanctions serve as the kinds of economic reprisals imposed in response to transgression 
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against a state’s interest. Accordingly, Hufbauer and Schott (1983:19) note that deterrence is 
another frequently cited reason for sanctions whereby a sender country can supposedly discourage 
future objectionable policies by increasing the associated costs. 
Economic sanctions are meant to change the target state’s behaviour by depriving that state of 
something it values, in essence forcing it to abandon the behaviour offensive to the initiating state 
or States. For example, Nossal (1987) in Leyton-Brown (1987:15) notes that the attempts by the 
US government to deprive the Cuban government of Fidel Castro or the Chilean government of 
Salvador Allende of access to unrestricted commercial intercourse. Compulsion in this scenario is 
at the centre in the imposition of economic sanctions. For example, the declared aim of United 
Kingdom government policy was to compel the Southern Rhodesian whites to repent or at least 
reform. According to Anglin, cited in Leyton-Brown (1987:25), if Mr. Ian Smith and his supporters 
proved intractable, then perhaps sanctions could help to undermine his regime and contribute to 
the emergence of a more amenable successor leadership. The idea behind these sanctions was to 
bring about a change of heart in Rhodesia by inducing a revulsion of feeling in the territory leading 
to the overthrow of the regime and its replacement by a government of moderates.  
5.4.3 Economic Sanctions as a Strategy for Coercion in International Relations 
Economic sanctions can be used as a coercive measure for achieving particular policy goals related 
to trade or for humanitarian violations. Economic sanctions are used as an alternative weapon 
instead of going to war to achieve desired outcomes. As a coercive stance towards Rhodesia, the 
only appropriate measure and response to Ian Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence was 
action to crush the minority regime swiftly, surely and decisively – preferably by military means, 
but otherwise by economic strangulation – whatever the cost to the Rhodesian economy (Anglin 
1987). In some circles, there was also a demand for retribution – coercion for its own sake – on 
the grounds that rebel perversity deserved severe punishment. Drezner (1999:4) presents a model 
on the role of economic coercion in international relations where he notes:  
Coercion alters the allocation of benefits by imposing costs on both the sender and the target 
countries. The short-run costs of sanctions imposition are important to the target and sender, but they 
are not the only factor. Conceding in the face of economic coercion implies a redistribution of 
political assets between the target and the sender. Nation-States care about this redistribution if they 
think it will harm their bargaining position in future conflicts […] The expectation of future conflict 
is translated into a short-run concern for relative gains and reputation that varies with the expectation 
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of future threats or conflicts in the bilateral relationship between the sender and the target. The 
expectation of future conflict has a contradictory effect on economic coercion. On the one hand, it 
makes senders more willing to threaten economic sanctions. The greater the concern for relative gains 
and reputation, the more likely the sender will prefer a stalemate or deadlock outcome of disrupted 
economic exchange and attempt to coerce. Ceteris paribus, senders will be eager to coerce 
adversaries and reluctant to coerce allies. 
By and large, it can thus be noted that economic sanctions affect the target nation in an adverse 
and coercive way. The sender will actually yield some benefits (which include loyalty and 
allegiance as well as compliance by the receiving country). Senders are at liberty to resort to the 
imposition of economic sanctions on the receiving nation because they glean some gains in the 
process. However, it can be noted that senders always make some calculated moves when they 
impose their sanctions, that is, they can only coerce their foes and spare their allies.  
Over and above these considerations, it can be noted that coercion can be used as a tool only 
against the adversaries who would have threatened the interests of the sender (which in this case 
is a more powerful state). In substantiating this, Hufbauer and Schott (1983:10) noted that 
sanctions are part and parcel of international diplomacy, a tool to coerce target governments into 
particular avenues of response where the use of sanctions presupposes the sender country’s desire 
to interfere in the internal affairs of the target government. Coercion is made possible by the fact 
that the countries that impose sanctions generally are large nations that pursue an active foreign 
policy; but in the main, sanctions have been used by big powers precisely because they are big and 
can seek to influence events on a global scale (Hufbauer & Schott 1983). The need to influence 
global events makes coercion a reliable tool at these States’ disposal to whip into line any 
dissenting voice. In the process, these sender countries will be in need of demonstrating 
steadfastness or resolve, thereby spurring the imposition of economic sanctions. For instance, the 
United States of America has frequently deployed sanctions to try to assert its leadership in world 
affairs. 
To buttress this notion, Hufbauer and Schott (1983:12) are of the opinion that United States 
presidents seemingly feel compelled to dramatise their opposition to foreign misdeeds, even when 
the likelihood of changing behaviour is in the target country seems remote. In these cases, 
sanctions are often imposed because the cost of inaction – in lost confidence at home and abroad 
in the ability or willingness of the United States to act – is seen as greater than the cost of the 
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sanctions. Accordingly, such action is often expected by the international community to 
demonstrate moral outrage and to reassure its allies that the United States will stand by its 
international commitments (Hufbauer & Schott 1983; Leyton-Brown 1987; Smith 2004).  
5.4.4 The Symbolic Facet of Economic Sanctions in the International Relations Arena 
On a contrary note, Anglin (1987) cited in Leyton-Brown (1987:24) contends that sanctions may 
be conceived as having no more than symbolic significance. In this case, support for economic 
sanctions becomes merely a means of expressing moral outrage, showing solidarity, upholding a 
vital principle, or boosting the national ego, without any serious expectation of their exerting any 
real pressure on the target state or even perhaps their being fully implemented. From a slightly 
different perspective, Hufbauer and Schott (1983) note that sanctions are used as a surrogate for 
other measures; a diplomatic slap on the wrist may not hurt where it hits, and more extreme 
measures such as covert action or military measures may be excessive. So the adoption of sanctions 
can be a remedy to these extremities. In addition, the imposition of sanctions in a sense conveys a 
triple signal; to the target country it says that the sender does not condone its actions; to allies, it 
says that words will be supported with deeds; to domestic audiences it says the sender’s 
government will act to safeguard the nation’s vital interests. 
5.4.5 Economic Sanctions as a Mechanism of Enforcing International Humanitarian Law 
A new element in the economic sanctions debate is the question of the humanitarian effects of 
sanctions. This has been given particular significance in the case of sanctions against Iraq. It is 
surprising that the same aspect has not received prominence in the sanctions against former 
Yugoslavia. The basis for the claim of the particular humanitarian effects of the sanctions against 
Iraq is an article in the medical reports published in Lancet in 1995. The calculations made by the 
FAO on the basis of this study suggested that up to 560 000 Iraqi children may have died as result 
of UN economic sanctions. However, few observers seem to have taken note of the subsequent 
letter to the editor by one of the authors, reporting that the results from the 1995 survey could not 
be verified in follow-ups for 1996 and 1997. Clearly, the death rates of children were much lower 
and consequently the effects of sanctions less dramatic, to the extent that there is a direct link 
between the sanctions and the suffering. The humanitarian concern is new. There were reports 
suggesting that sanctions on South Africa would in fact hurt the black African population more, 
but these were often dismissed as part of South African propaganda. In the case of Iraq, which is 
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not likely to meet human standards of honesty, the impact of the discussion has been different. It 
is interesting to establish why.  
There are two plausible explanations, neither of which excludes the other. The first is that in 
general, humanitarian concern has become greater. The reactions to many of the crises facing the 
world in the post-Cold War period has had a humanitarian root. The conflicts have been seen 
primarily as humanitarian disasters, and have thus prompted humanitarian support. It is a sign of 
the times that the UN created a Department of Humanitarian Affairs only in 1992, following a 
General Assembly resolution in 1991. The interventions in the wars in Bosnia and Somalia were 
undertaken as ways of protecting humanitarian deliveries. In the Cold War period, humanitarian 
concerns were, in the dominant discourse, made dependent on whether it benefited one or the other 
side in the Cold War. Wars since the early 1990s may be seen more realistically as the human 
suffering they have actually always been. The imposition of these economic sanctions will force 
nations to comply and uphold international humanitarian law as they can be coerced or punished 
or deprived of certain goods and services until or unless they satisfy the provisions of the 
international humanitarian law. This is visible in circumstances where, for instance, there is the 
proliferation of weapons. 
Sanctions against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction began with Iraq in 1990 and 
were most recently imposed against North Korea and Iran in 2006 In the early- to mid-2000s, 
human rights abuses, breaches of international humanitarian law, and the pillaging of natural 
resources were addressed by sanctions on Darfur (Sudan), Côte d’Ivoire, and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC), as were issues of sexual violence in conflict and children in combat. 
Sanctions deployed in 2011 on Libya with resolutions 1970 and 1973 represent the first case of 
Security Council sanctions explicitly deployed for the purpose of the responsibility to protect 
(R2P, as it is called), which is based on the principle of protecting innocents and reinforcing as 
well as penalising breaches of human rights and international humanitarian law. In Libya, 
sanctions stipulating an asset freeze successfully denied the regime of Colonel Qaddafi of the 
benefits of its vast sovereign wealth and the income from its oil production, limiting its ability to 
fund military operations. The sanctions were not universally embraced, and even the Arab League, 
which unanimously endorsed the no-fly zone on 12 March and presented a formal request for UN 
intervention, expressed misgivings and considered withdrawing its support in the face of the broad 
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scope of the military intervention. In addition, the abstentions by China, Russia, Brazil, India, and 
Germany from the Security Council vote for resolution 1973 in respect of the question of the 
enforcement of the no-fly zone, as well as robust opposition by the African Union to the 
determined NATO intervention, heightened the lack of consensus on implementation standards of 
international sanctions. The most immediate indications of these differences may involve the 
recent unsuccessful attempts by some Council members to gain the necessary support to impose 
sanctions on Syria and Yemen. At the same time, the sudden and unexpected imposition of 
sanctions on Syria by the Arab League in November 2011 created new room for the possible 
deployment of UN sanctions. 
5.4.6 Economic Sanctions as a Foreign Policy Tool for Conflict Prevention 
The rest phase dates from the end of the Cold War to the mid- to late 1990s. The sanctions regimes 
of this period were directed primarily at intra-state and inter-state conflicts. These sanction efforts 
had ambitious goals: their strategic objective was corpulence the reversal of policies that provoked 
or sustained violent conflict. They were comprehensive in scope and encompassed the totality of 
the target’s economy. The effectiveness of these sanctions regimes was poor. They led to 
tremendous economic costs to the target countries, but often not to changes in the political 
behaviour of the leaders of those countries. The economic impacts on the countries in question 
also had damaging social and humanitarian effects, leading many commentators to question the 
morality of economic sanctions as policy instruments. These sanctions often hurt innocent 
neighbouring countries as well.  
Economic sanctions are non-military measures that restrict or put an end to normal international 
economic exchanges with a state or a non-governmental group, for the purpose of compelling, 
denying or deterring political or military behaviour by the targeted government or group. 
Economic sanctions are different from trade wars, in which governments restrict or stop 
international economic exchanges in order to gain more favourable terms of trade. Underlying the 
theory of sanctions is the expectation that economic costs will translate into political effects such 
that economic deprivation will produce public anger and politically significant protest. It is 
expected that this, in turn, will lead to changes in the behaviour of trouble- making elites, or their 
removal from power.  
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UN sanctions are coercive measures intended to restore or maintain international peace and 
security. They are elements of a bargaining strategy that includes measures ranging from the 
severance of diplomatic ties to interruption of economic relations to the threat and use of military 
force. Under provisions of the United Nations Charter, the Security Council, faced with a conflict, 
may begin with actions under Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes), before resorting to more 
robust actions under Chapter VII (Actions with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the 
Peace, and Acts of Aggression). Once it progresses to the Chapter VII stage, the Security Council 
may choose sanctions as an appropriate tool, in which case it will decide on the design of a 
sanctions regime, usually involving an arms embargo and a mixture of other targeted measures. 
Sanctions are imposed by the Council through the adoption of a resolution. A resolution imposing 
sanctions normally establishes a sanctions committee to monitor the sanctions regime, and 
frequently requests the Secretary-General to establish a Panel of Experts. 
In the heady period of new-found unity among the five permanent members of the Security Council 
after the end of the Cold War, beginning in 1990 until the early 2000s and called the “Sanctions 
Decade” by Cortright and Lopez,the Council deployed sanctions in two cases of cross-border 
aggression: on Iraq and the former Yugoslavia in 1991; and in civil war (the National Union for 
the Total Independence of Angola, UNITA) and civil dispute (Haiti), in 1993. The Council also 
imposed sanctions on several other state and non-state actors in Africa for actions considered as 
threats to, or breaches of, international peace and security: Liberia and Somalia (1992); Rwanda 
(1994); the Revolutionary United Front (Sierra Leone, 1997); Eritrea and Ethiopia (2000, for their 
border dispute); and Liberia again in 2001 in response to Charles Taylor’s support for the 
Revolutionary United Front (RUF). In the mid-2000s, the Council deployed sanctions on the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Côte d’Ivoire, and Darfur (Sudan). 
The reactions of the international community are obviously important for the success of sanctions. 
The political and economic isolation of the target country is a prerequisite for the chances of 
success. This is a reason why international organisations are used for sanctions, as this will 
generate more international support for the sender and more isolation for the target. Most important 
are the reactions among major powers and the target’s neighbours. The most obvious change 
among the three sanctions debates is the difference in the major power configurations. This is 
captured by the commonly used labels: “Inter- War”, “Cold War” and “post-Cold War” periods. 
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The world has move from a system of five to six major powers via bipolarisation to the present 
situation with one superpower. The sanctions against Italy were abandoned as several major 
powers (in particular the USA and Germany) were not supportive. In the period of the second 
debate, sanctions were mostly made outside the UN framework and often became part of the Cold 
War dynamics. The two UN-imposed sanctions in this period had significant support of major 
powers. Even that proved insufficient to achieve the isolation desired by the sanctions initiators.  
It is noteworthy that in the third debate, the isolation issue has not been as prominent. Instead 
impatience with the sanctions record has resulted in a strategic discussion about military action. In 
the cases of Iraq and Sudan such measures were actually taken (Doxey 2000). The bombings were 
repeated against Iraq, a peak being the heavy bombardments in December 1998. The actions were 
performed outside the framework of the United Nations. This is, first of all, a clear indication that 
the sanctions have not achieved the desired goals, and second, that the UN is increasingly seen as 
an obstacle for US policy. The sanctions against Sudan in 1998 were supplemented by the 
bombings in Khartoum, following the attacks on the US embassies in Dar-es-Salaam and Nairobi. 
Already before this the US was supporting a military strategy against the Sudan. The various 
movements resisting the National Islamic Front regime in Khartoum were brought together in a 
broad alliance. A new military front was opened in 1997. The military actions have so far not 
brought about the desired changes.  
Military action was in 1998 repeatedly threatened against Yugoslavia, in connection with the 
Kosovo conflict. In this case, the US acted in concert with leading allies of NATO (Doxey 2000). 
The option of renewed sanctions, apart from the arms embargo imposed in 1998 against 
Yugoslavia, seemed to be less important, perhaps indicating dissatisfaction with their impact in 
the previous period. In the case of Haiti, a military invasion was very close when the military junta 
agreed to step down. In some of the remaining cases, the threat of military action has been less 
important or non-existent (Angola, Liberia, Somalia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, and perhaps Libya).  
The threat of escalating sanctions into military action by major powers was a new feature in the 
debate. It can be linked to the changed international scene. In the Cold War years, there was always 
a danger of military measures bringing a conflict into the Cold War, followed by nuclear 
escalation. In some instances, military actions were taken (for example, Czechoslovakia, 
Afghanistan, and Granada, Panama) without considerations of sanctions. In these cases, the danger 
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of escalation was low, as the interventions occurred in areas part of the “sphere of interest” of 
either side. In the post-Cold War period there have been fewer constraints of this sort (Doxey 
2000). The military intervention option has gained ground. In the future, this may be a more 
ominous development. As a relatively peaceful option, such as sanctions, is seen as unsuccessful, 
the temptation for military action may increase as the “only alternative” available (Doxey 2000). 
While many early sanctions cases were related to cross-border aggression or civil conflict, over 
time the Security Council expanded its interpretation of threats to international peace. Security 
sanctions against international terrorism began with Libya for its involvement in the downing of 
two civilian aircraft (1988 and 1989), and against Sudan for an attempt on the life of Egyptian 
President Hosni Mubarak (1996). Sanctions for the purpose of counter-terrorism were deployed 
against the Taliban in 1999 and expanded to include Al-Qaeda and associates after the 
11 September 2001 attack against the United States. The UN Security Council Resolution 1373 
adopted on 28 September 2001, though not technically a sanctions regime, established a counter-
terrorism committee and obliged States to enact legislation criminalising terrorist acts.  
5.4.7 Economic Sanctions as a Measure for Combating Terrorism 
Terrorism is considered as an instrument in the hands of weaker actors in their war against stronger 
systems such as States. During the Cold War, the threat stemming from terrorist groups was 
insignificant when compared to the threat of the conventional war. Owing to the ideological nature 
of global competition, the ethnic and religious movements were weak either because of the lack of 
resources of the movements or because they moved along ideological lines. There was a limited 
space for mass movements to be organised at grassroots level. Since the Cold War, however, 
terrorist networks with an ethnic or religious base have increased their grassroots capacities. Gains 
from globalisation and the power gap resulting from the collapse of certain regimes have left the 
new environment vulnerable to deterrent security threats.  
Whereas the traditional security threats have been diminishing since the Cold War, unconventional 
threats have been more common and pernicious. Terrorist groups relying on ethnical and cultural 
factors have emerged as a threat to the stability of the international system. Some of the terrorist 
groups are transnational by nature and this fact makes it difficult for States to fight against them. 
Such transnational terrorist threats necessitate coordination of diplomatic efforts of several States 
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in the fight against terrorism. As a form of unconventional threat, terrorism leads States to devise 
methods for fighting against it, to adapt their security assessments and to take countermeasures in 
order to overcome them. When central state authorities clearly start to lose their legitimacy, non-
state actors increase their capacities with a view to being organised at the grassroots level. Most 
of the new terrorist groups are initiated at transnational or regional level. Because of their capacity 
to build closer and face-to-face networks, they increase their legitimacy and soft power over 
people. Central authorities have clearly proved that they had more difficulty in connecting with 
people and developing a force of attraction. In this context, changing security perceptions in the 
post-Cold War period facilitated a country’s relationship with its soft power and expanded the 
space given to soft power in the country’s power ratings analysis; this power was used in foreign 
policy. With the increase of asymmetric threats at global and regional scale, such as terrorism, 
States are searching for new methods and tools to combat these types of threats. Soft power and 
diplomacy are seen as important elements of the state in this context.  
Unconventional security threats against the central authority require States to use both traditional 
and non-traditional instruments in the fight against terrorism. States have to develop new 
instruments in order to increase their legitimacy and their capacity to inform people about the 
problems regarding illegal organisations. The sanctions imposed against Libya in 1992, accused 
of involvement in the terrorist attacks in 1988 and 1989 on American (Pan Am) and French (UTA) 
airliners, spearheaded the UN Security Council concern with terrorism.The Council went on to 
impose mandatory Chapter VII sanctions to fight terrorism on two other occasions in the 1990s: 
in 1996 against Sudan and in 1999 against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. By imposing 
sanctions in the 1990s on Libya, Sudan, and the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Security Council had 
two main counter-terrorism objectives: to compel the States concerned to change the behaviour of 
state-sponsors of terrorism and make sure that individuals believed to be responsible for specific 
terrorist attacks were extradited; and to deter to discourage States from providing support to 
terrorist groups. 
In the case of Libya, UN sanctions were fairly effective. Even before sanctions took effect, Libya 
offered to surrender the suspects of the UTA bombing to a French court and those responsible for 
the Pan Am explosion to an international court. However, the broader security objective weakening 
Libya’s support for terrorist groups required the continuation of sanctions. By the late 1990s, this 
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broader objective was largely achieved. In 1996, the US State Department noted that Libya’s 
support for terrorism had been sharply reduced. Maintaining UN sanctions consequently became 
difficult to justify. In addition, international support of the sanctions regime was crumbling. These 
developments led the United States and the UK to develop a proposal whereby the two Libyan 
suspects would be tried under Scottish law in a court in the Netherlands. The Libyan government 
accepted the plan early 1999, and sanctions were suspended on 8 April 1999, three days after the 
two Libyan suspects had arrived in the Netherlands. Members of the Security Council in the United 
States, in particular, became increasingly concerned about the changing nature of the terrorist 
threat in the 1990s. Terrorist groups seemed to be operating more and more as part of a global 
network. In addition, the 1995 sarin nerve gas attack in the Tokyo subway by Aum Shinrikyo 
increased fears that terrorists might one day use chemical, biological or nuclear weapons. The 
September 2001 attacks showed how difficult it was to compel regimes such as the Taliban and 
transnational groups such as al-Qaeda. UN sanctions had no noticeable effect on the Taliban 
mainly because of their isolated economic position. Although the UN sanction regimes of the 
1990s failed to stop worldwide terrorist activities, they helped to change at least the declared 
attitudes of States towards terrorist groups, particularly the attitudes of state sponsors of terrorism. 
5.5 Conclusion 
The chapter gave a run-down of the issues underlying the dimensions and the rationale of economic 
sanctions in the post-Cold War era. The chapter looked at the concepts of smart and comprehensive 
sanctions and analysed their attributes and facets. Then it moved on to analyse the usage of the 
smart sanctions by the United Nations across the world where it unpacked the modalities that are 
associated with the UN sanctions imposition system, and successes and failures by the UN in 
realising their intended objectives. The supporting clauses of the UN Charter that pave the way for 
sanctions to be imposed and the problems militating against the implementation of the smart 
sanctions were also delved through. In addition, the reasons behind the adoption and imposition 
of smart sanctions were also discussed, during which factors such as deterrence, compulsion, and 
coercion as well as the symbolic facet of economic sanctions were highlighted. Lastly, the chapter 
captured the scenarios of the usage of economic sanctions in the new dispensation. Where 
sanctions are used as a measure for facilitating the adoption of international humanitarian law, 
economic sanctions can also serve as a measure for combating terrorism as well as economic 
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sanctions as an ethical measure for conflict prevention. 
It was noted in this chapter that the end of the Cold War resulted in the increased propensity of 
the UNSC to impose sanctions. The rationale for the imposition of these sanctions varied. The 
traditional reasons behind the imposition of sanctions such as coercion, deterrence, and 
compulsion, among others, were highlighted. The end of the Cold War ushered in a new era 
whereby sanctions were used in three ways: sanctions as a mechanism of enforcing international 
humanitarian law, as an ethical tool of conflict prevention, and as being a measure of combating 
terrorism. It was noted that after the Cold War period, members of the international community 
realised the need to keep in check as well as come up with mechanisms for enforcement against 
those regimes and nation States which do not observe and practise the ethically acceptable 
principles of governance which include protection of human rights. It was argued that the Security 
Council’s main objective of maintaining and restoring international peace and security is in line 
with Article 42 of the UN Charter.  
The imposition of sanctions is aimed at achieving political ends while lessening and to some 
extent avoiding the unbearable repercussions of armed conflict. Thus, the aim of imposing 
sanctions after the Cold War period has been generally to modify the behaviour of the individual 
state rather than to punish the same. It was highlighted, however, that such sanctions become 
conflictual with other fundamental principles of international law such as the principles of non-
intervention and state sovereignty. The imposition of economic sanctions becomes immoral in 
the sense that they are targeted at the people at large rather than the given regime. It was noted in 
the first section of the chapter that economic sanctions are imposed as a mechanism for enforcing 
international humanitarian law. The end of the Cold War has witnessed the emergence of a 
modern version of humanitarian intervention in cases of gross human rights violations, 
particularly through economic sanctions. The General Assembly has often invited States to 
impose economic sanctions in situations where human rights are violated.  
Such developments have been as result of the growing assertion of power by the Security Council 
in the post-Cold War era and the expanding willingness of the international community to 
confront violations of human rights with economic sanctions or military force whenever it is 
deemed necessary. In the second section, the imposition of economic sanctions was discussed as 
an ethical tool of conflict prevention. It was noted that about 14 sanction regimes were applied to 
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address intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War era. Case studies were drawn in respect of the 
UN Resolutions on Somalia and Haiti. The third and last section analysed the rationale for the 
imposition of sanctions after the Cold War period with reference to economic sanctions as a 
measure of combating terrorism. Considering that terrorism is one of the emerging global threats 
to peace and security, it was noted that the Security Council has made efforts at coming up with 
various Resolutions on combating terrorism. The next chapter will discuss the application of 
economic sanctions with specific reference to Cuba, Iraq and Zimbabwe. 
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CHAPTER SIX: ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST CUBA, IRAQ AND ZIMBABWE  
6.1 Introduction 
After having provided a theoretical discussion on the various issues related to economic sanctions, 
my aim in this chapter is to reflect on some of the issues that have been discussed from a theoretical 
perspective, with specific reference to three selected case studies of Cuba, Iraq and Zimbabwe. 
Amid various issues about economic sanctions performance and evaluation that have been 
highlighted in previous chapters, this chapter is practical as it highlights the specific case studies 
of the countries affected by these sanctions. This chapter seeks to address the critical question of 
whether sanctions work by applying three distinct angles of vision, each broader than the preceding 
one. The conclusion will be drawn from critical evaluation of the application of sanctions in Cuba, 
Iraq and Zimbabwe. The first sections trace the origins of sanctions imposed by the Security 
Council against Iraq. The sanctions imposed against Iraq will be highlighted and discussed in this 
section. The section will demonstrate that Gulf War conflicts are the genesis of the measures that 
prompted the international community through the UNSC to impose sanctions against Iraq. The 
programmes that were adopted by the UNSC for humanitarian relief will be highlighted in this 
section.  
The chapter will also explore the roots of the economic sanctions in Cuba. This traces how the 
sanctions came to be imposed by the United States of America on the island nation of Cuba. The 
rationale behind the imposition of the sanctions on Cuba will also be discussed. In this scenario, 
issues relating to the need to compel Cuban leaders to depart from their Communist ideology as 
well as to cut ties with the Communist bloc will be captured, among other factors. This section 
will consider the domestic economic implications of economic sanctions imposed by the United 
States on Cuba and issues relating to economic strangulation, as these sanctions largely upset 
imports, exports, shipping, and international financial transactions. The US’s economic sanctions 
acted as an obstacle to trade, foreign investment, and the growth of Cuba’s financial sector as the 
Cuban products were prohibited from entering the US market. In addition, the socio-economic 
impact of these economic sanctions on Cuba will be explained fully. Furthermore, a distinction is 
drawn between the total cost and the net cost of economic sanctions to the Cuban economy. The 
US sanctions led to the decline in Cuba’s economic performance.  
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The final section will present the case of Western sanctions against Zimbabwe. It will also 
highlight the various forms of sanctions ranging from traditional comprehensive sanctions to the 
novel form of sanctions dubbed ‘smart’ or ‘targeted’ sanctions. In that case, this section will also 
discuss the game theory perspective of sanctions before it focuses on the argument for the shift 
towards targeted sanctions. Thereafter it will discuss the theory of smart sanctions before 
concluding with a critique thereof. The next section will cover sanctions that were imposed by the 
EU, the UK, New Zealand, Canada, and Australia against Zimbabwe. The raft of measures 
introduced includes arms embargoes, financial restrictions, asset freezes, and travel bans on the 
leaderships of Zimbabwe. This part discusses the nature and scope of these measures including the 
reasons for their imposition. It will begin with a brief political background on Zimbabwe and relate 
these to the norms and mores mentioned before examining the reaction of the West to the deficits 
thereof, specifically targeted sanctions. The next section will evaluate the effects and effectiveness 
of targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe on government institutions, industry and commerce, the 
elites and the general populace.  
6.2 The History of US Sanctions against Cuba 
The power of the Cuban American lobby (also known as the Cuban American National 
Foundation) on the Cuba sanctions issue reflects the more general phenomenon of the increased 
clout of domestic actors in shaping foreign policy in the post-Cold War era. Through the effective 
lobbying by the Cuban American National Foundation, the American government has enacted 
punitive legislations like the Cuban Democracy Act and the Helms-Burton Law.  The embargo 
against Cuba dated from 1962, with the culmination of unilateral US response to a series of 
developments in Cuba during the height of the Cold War (Purcel 1998). The US economic embargo 
has been in place for years. Yeiber (2013) observes:  
Although there are many, increasingly sophisticated economic war measures imposed by the US 
government on Cuba today, the rationale and purpose was set out shortly after the 1959 victory of 
the Cuban revolution. The memorandum written by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, Lester DeWitt Mallory, on April 6, 1960, and declassified 30 years later, states 
that the majority of Cubans support Castro […] An effective political opposition does not exist […]; 
the only foreseeable means of alienating internal support [to the government] is through 
disenchantment and disaffection based on economic dissatisfaction and hardship […] all possible 
means should be undertaken promptly to weaken the economic life of Cuba […] [by] denying money 
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and supplies to Cuba, to decrease monetary and real wages, to bring about hunger, desperation and 
overthrow of government. 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of Moscow’s substantial economic aid to the 
island, Washington has tried to take advantage of Cuba’s new economic vulnerability by tightening 
the embargo in a bid to prevent Castro’s government from replacing Soviet aid with foreign direct 
investment (FDI). The main goal of Washington has been to eliminate the Castro regime through 
enforcement or revolt on the island (Purcel 1998). According to Rodriguez (2016:1), sanctions 
imposed against Cuba are not at all targeted or smart; on the contrary, they broadly affect imports, 
exports, shipping, and international financial transactions. Consequently, they are traditional 
sanctions that are subject to some ethical objections. The imposition of Washington’s post-Cold 
War policy toward Cuba has been caught up in a large debate concerning the effectiveness of 
economic sanctions in general and of unilateral sanctions in particular as a way of driving change 
in the nature and behaviour of hostile regimes.  
Supporters of US policy in contrast argue that the embargo against Cuba could not work during 
the Cold-War, when Havana received billions of dollars from Moscow (Purcel 1998). 
Washington’s ability to influence Castro’s behaviour and topple him has increased in that period. 
The Cuban leader called off promised elections in April 1959 and further announced that Cuba did 
not want US economic assistance (Purcel 1998). Immediately after taking power in January 1959, 
the new Cuban Government took the first steps towards the implementation of the Moncada 
programme. Rodriguez (2016), citing Bell, Lopez and Caram (2008), asserts that the “Moncada 
Programme became the platform of the 26th of July Movement (Movimiento 26 de Julio, M-26–
7), named after the military garrison that was attacked on 26 July by a group led by Fidel Castro. 
The programme, which became basically the platform of the new government, was profoundly 
nationalistic. The 1940 Constitution was reinstated and amended; the telephone company was 
nationalised as early as March 1959; and on 17 May 1959, the Agrarian Reform Law was enacted” 
(Bell, Lopez & Caram 2008). The Moncada Programme involved a strong and swift structural 
transformation that began incorporating new property relations and class relations. These policies 
in turn limited the possibilities for private capital accumulation. In May, Cuba adopted an agrarian 
reform law that led to the expropriation of US-owned properties on the island (Purcel 1998). Later, 
Moscow and Havana signed a trade agreement under which the Soviet Union agreed to purchase 
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sugar from Cuba with crude oil. The Cuban government saw these actions as a means to achieve 
economic sovereignty and social justice.  
Rodriguez (2016:18) reports that by the end of 1959, “the United States government with the 
support of the Cuban propertied class gradually applied economic pressure in the form of economic 
sanctions, accompanied by political and diplomatic isolation, military threats, and covert actions 
aimed at overthrowing the government. In 1960, President Eisenhower ordered the Central 
Intelligence Agency to begin training Cuban exiles in a bid to invade Cuba. Castro’s government 
then ordered the foreign-owned oil refineries to process Soviet crude oil, and their refusal led to 
their being nationalised. In response, the US congress authorised the President to cut off the yearly 
quota of sugar imported from Cuba under the Sugar Act of 1948. Two days later, Cuba authorised 
the nationalisation of all US property in Cuba, which was valued at $1.8 billion. Later, Eisenhower 
did cut Cuba’s remaining sugar quota for 1960 by 95 percent. Beginning in the early 1960s, the 
economic sanctions evolved into a comprehensive blockade against the island, incorporating every 
major method available to a sender state: trade control, suspension of aid and technical assistance, 
freezing of the target’s financial assets, and blacklisting of companies outside the United States 
involved in bilateral business (Doxey 1980:14). The Cuban government nationalised US-owned 
banks, industrial and agrarian enterprises, and wholesale and retail enterprises. In response, 
Eisenhower fixed Cuba’s 1961 sugar quota at zero percent (Purcel 1998). In the same year, the 
Cuban government restricted the number of personnel in the US Embassy in Havana to a maximum 
of 11, and gave the remaining embassy staff two days to leave the country. The US then broke ties 
with Cuba and travel to Cuba by US citizens was forbidden. On 4 September, Congress passed a 
resolution of the foreign assistance Act 1961, prohibiting aid to Cuba and authorising the president 
to establish and maintain a total embargo upon all trade between US and Cuba.  
The Unilateral US embargo targeted Cuba and did not prevent third parties from trading with the 
island (Purcel 1998). It had extraterritorial aspects, however, in that it prohibited the re-exportation 
from third countries to Cuba of commodities of US origin. In early 1963, the National Security 
Action Memorandum 220 prohibited US aid to countries that failed to prevent aircraft or ship 
under their registry from engaging in trade with Cuba (Gorove & Krinsky 1993). Foreign 
subsidiaries of the US Corporation were not prohibited from trading with Cuba, although the 
Treasury Department pursued an informal policy of applying force to United States parent 
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companies to ensure that their foreign affiliates voluntarily refrained from involvement in Cuba’s 
transactions (Gorove & Krinsky 1993). Despite its unilateral nature, the embargo became 
multilateral in practice within the Western Hemisphere. The Organization of American States 
(OAS) met in Punta del Este in January 1962 and imposed limited sanctions on Cuba, and excluded 
its present government from participating in the inter-American system (Purcel 1998). Two years 
later, the OAS voted to require its members to break diplomatic relations with Havana, to impose 
a collective trade embargo on Cuba, and to suspend transportation to and from the island. However, 
Latin American governments also responded to Castro’s government’s efforts to spread the 
communist revolution to their countries. 
6.2.1 The Rationale Behind the Imposition of Sanctions on Cuba 
The main rationale for economic embargo was the threat to US national security posed by a 
Communist Cuba. The embargo was at the best a second-choice policy that implemented in the 
aftermath of the failure Bay of Pigs invasion. The embargo represented Washington’s efforts to 
make the best of a bad situation (Purcel 1990). In 1962, when the United States unilaterally 
imposed its embargo against Cuba, it was unclear on how much economic aid the Soviet Union 
would provide to the island in the long run. The objectives pursued by the United States in 
imposing sanctions on Cuba can be classified under two factors: overthrow and containment (Roca 
1987). In the early phase of the confrontation, the basic intent of US economic sanctions, in relation 
to military and diplomatic action was to overthrow Castro’s regime. After the administered cut of 
the sugar quota in July 1960, Eisenhower declared sanctions against Cuba. 
The former US ambassador Philip Bonsal concluded that the suspension of the sugar quota was a 
major element in the programme for the overthrow of Castro (Blasier 1971). In this comprehensive 
review of the event and attitudes of US to Cuba leading to formal break of their ties, Blasier 
assessed the sugar quota cut as an economic tool designed to eliminate Castro’s regime. According 
to Blasier, in addition to the ‘decisive motivation’ related to Washington’s perception that Castro 
was becoming conduit for Soviet political and military meddling in the continent and coupled with 
Cuban leader’s open and belligerent defiance of US political primacy in the hemisphere. US 
sanctions were influenced by private economic consideration. Whatever the mixture of ideology, 
the mixture of public, economic, diplomatic, and military and other personality consideration and 
motives, the early US economic sanctions were intended to eliminate Castro’s regime. From 1964 
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the US sanction became containment of the Castro revolution as an objective. According to Bander 
(1972), the nature of US sanctions was transformed from specific to indeterminate. The particular 
objectives pursued under the containment policy outlined by Under Secretary of state included the 
following aspects: 
• To reduce the will and ability of the present Cuban regime export revolution and violence 
to the American states. 
• To make plain to Cubans and to the elements of the power structure of the regime that the 
present regime cannot serve their interest. 
• To demonstrate to the American republics that Communism has no future in the Western 
Hemisphere 
• To increase the cost to the Soviet Union of maintaining a communist outpost in the Western 
Hemisphere. 
 
US policy towards Cuba remained virtually unchanged through 1980, with the key element being 
containment as an objective, the basic purpose was punitive and the ultimate goal was still to be 
clearly defined. US efforts were concentrated on limiting and reducing the effectiveness of Cuba 
aggressive policy in all its dimensions (Roca 1987). It is clear that at present US policy is designed 
to increase the economic cost of Cuba and to the Soviet Union of pursuing respective, coincidental 
comprehensive policy. According to Ritter (2010:2) the US economic sanctions had considerably 
less impact on Cuba’s development during the 1970s and 1980s due to preferential trade and aid 
from the Soviet Union and the Eastern European bloc. But when the Soviet Union dissolved, Cuba 
lost 75 to 80% of its trade and Cuba’s economy went into a free-fall and Cuba’s gross domestic 
product (GDP) contracted by a third. 
6.2.2 Sanctions Adopted on Cuba 
The first sanctions major economic sanctions imposed by the US was the cutting of Cuba’s sugar 
quota by 700,000 tonnes in July 1960 which resulted in nearly US $80 million loss in income to 
the Castro regime (Roca 1987). On 3 February 1962 the formal US embargo on Cuban trade was 
implemented by Presidential Proclamation 3447. The legal foundation of US embargo contained 
three statutes: the trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the 
Export Administration Act of 1969. The provisions of the US embargo resulted in the following 
developments: the ban of all trade with Cuba, with an exemption for humanitarian reasons, the 
requirement of US approval for export or reexports to Cuba of commodities originating in the US, 
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the restrictions of the use of US ports by foreign vessels trading with Cuba and the requirement of 
US Treasury Department authority for new imports allowed in Cuba (Ender 1981). In 1967, the 
US embargo was multilateralised through hemisphere approval and support at the Organization of 
American States (OAS).  
The following OAS sanctions were imposed on Cuba: the severing of diplomatic and commercial 
relations, suspension of all trade except food staffs, medicines and medical equipment, suspension 
of sea and air services to and from Cuba, establishment of passport restrictions on travel to and 
from Cuba, recommendation that government owned or financed cargoes not to be shipped on 
vessels sailing to Cuba, the general call to Western allies to restrict their trade and financial ties 
with the island (Bender 1975). Based on the OAS resolution, the US State Department announced 
a modification of aspects in the US policy which affected third country trade with Cuba (Roca 
1987). Under the revised regulations, foreign subsidiaries of US firms located in third countries, 
were granted licences for the export of non-strategic foreign made goods to Cuba. Moreover, the 
United States lifted the suspension of US aid to countries that traded with the island. The United 
States kept putting pressure on Castro’s government, in response to Cuba’s external financial 
crisis, the US tried to undermine the debt restructuring effort by pressuring other Western creditors 
to demand hard International Monetary Fund terms. United States raised financial cost to Cuba of 
any accommodation with its creditors.  
6.2.3 Effects of US Sanctions on Cuba 
United States economic sanctions were just one of the many factors which led to the downfall of 
Cuba’s economy. From the start, Cuban leaderss and economic officials readily acknowledged the 
relative insignificance of the embargo’s impact because there were many persuasive explanations 
for the mounting economic difficulties. Ernesto Guevera railed in 1961 against explaining away 
every problem by blaming the US blockade and the increase in domestic consumption levels. 
Castro disclose the problems that were encountered in Cuba as a result of the embargo on purchase 
of equipment and spare parts, which resulted in technical level of operation and mechanics and 
even the reputation hence leading to real tragedy. The embargo led to costs such as losses in export 
income; additional costs of imports and transportation; indirect negative effects, for example, 
difficulty in acquiring spare parts for machines; a need to expand warehouse capacity; and 
technological incompatibility with new suppliers. 
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Accordingly, Rodriguez (2016:19), in summarising the far-reaching effects that the sanctions had 
had on Cuba, noted the following: 
Cuban export products are still prevented from entering the US market, the largest in their region and 
the closest to Cuba; Cuban trade with companies located in the US territory or their subsidiaries 
abroad is forbidden. Cuba cannot use the US dollar in international business transactions, which in 
turn increases costs, [which] makes it necessary to turn to third markets or intermediaries, thereby 
perpetuating the so-called Cuba risk and discourag[ing] potential investors.  
The US economic sanctions continue to present a formidable barrier to trade, foreign investment, 
and the development of Cuba’s financial sector. The Cuban financial sector has been choked if not 
strangulated by the diabolical economic sanctions imposed upon Cuba by the US. The sanctions 
are being imposed in such a way that they block every leeway available for Cuba to emancipate 
itself. For example, Krauland, Rathbone, Heyes, Rapa, Early and Jeydel (2015:20) note that in the 
last few years, French, Dutch, German, British and other non-US banks have been heavily fined 
for conducting transactions with Cuba. Commerzbank of Germany paid fines totalling US$1.7 
billion for processing financial transactions involving Cuba, where, between September 2005 and 
December 2007, Commerzbank processed 56 transactions related to Cuba involving a total of 
US$2 283 456 (Krauland et al. 2015). For these transactions, which involved millions of dollars, 
Commerzbank was given a cumbersome penalty that was worth more than a billion dollars. This 
was a deterrent measure so that Commerzbank and other financial institutions would be wary of 
dealing with Cuba for fear of these unbearably heavy penalties. The US punitive stance has 
escalated to the extent of punishing individuals who and corporations which try to align themselves 
with Cuba.  
In addition to the above, there are other documented cases of parties, nations, corporations and 
individuals who received a whip from the US for the purported offence of doing business with 
Cuba. Whitefield (2016:14) had this to say: 
In March 2015, after the US and Cuba began normalizing their relations, the Treasury Department 
reported eight enforcement actions involving Cuban cases, with fines totaling US$ 5 278 901. The 
policy of actively pursuing prosecutions has continued in 2016 where two countries were fined in 
February 2016. These were a French geosciences company, CGG Services and Halliburton Atlantic 
and Halliburton Overseas, two foreign subsidiaries of Houston-based Halliburton Energy Services. 
In this scenario, the US chose to overlook her efforts to restore and normalise relations and went 
further in punishing companies that were conducting business with Cuba. In this scenario, it can 
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be noted that the US economic sanctions have certainly affected the economic and social rights of 
the Cuban population. The Cubans are continually having their socio-economic lives hampered by 
these economic sanctions. The embargo continues to affect specifically the Cuban population’s 
access to many basic rights including medical care, food, security, potable water, housing, and 
education. In highlighting the severity of the economic sanctions on Cuban social wellbeing, it can 
be noted that the Cuban education system has been crippled by these distressing economic 
sanctions. For example, Rodriguez (2016) notes the following hardships that are being 
countenanced in the Cuban education system as a result of the economic sanctions that were 
imposed on her by the United States of America: 
The sanctions limit Cuba’s access to information technology tools that are crucial to produce 
educational multimedia and these include Adobe Flash, Toolbook and Mediator. Sanctions also limit 
access of Cubans to bibliographic sources and software, such as those provided by Cisco systems or 
Oracle Symantec, Sun Microsystems, Procite and End Note. The licenses to access these tools have 
to be paid to US companies and such transactions are prohibited under current regulations (that is the 
United Nations Children’s Fund in Necessity of Ending Economic, Commercial and Financial 
Embargo imposed by the USA against Cuba). Thus despite having highly qualified teachers and 
researchers, Cuban educational institutions find it difficult to access the latest tools and information 
needed to maintain and improve education services. 
In addition to the education system, the health sector has been immensely affected as well. 
Rodriguez (2016) notes that one particular area of concern is healthcare; nearly 80% of the patents 
in the medical sector are issued to US pharmaceutical multinational companies and their 
subsidiaries, which gives them a monopoly on many of the most effective drugs available. 
According to Lamrani (2013), the embargo laws impose such extensive restrictions that Cuba 
cannot get access to these medications. All these actions by the US against Cuba are clear violation 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights. 
6.2.4 The Cuban Response to the US Sanctions Regime 
This section will consider the domestic economic implications on Cuba of the economic sanctions 
imposed by the US. A distinction is based on the total cost and the net cost of economic sanctions 
to the Cuban economy. The US sanctions led to the decline in the Cuba’s economic shortfall and 
Fidel Castro reacted to the imposition of US sanctions in 1960 with defiance. The US refineries 
refused to accept Soviet petroleum. Castro warned US that he would nationalise everything owned 
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by Americans in Cuba (Philips 1960). Castro nationalised $1.8 billion worth (Fisher 2014). Castro 
then turned to the Soviet Union, whose willingness to replace Washington as Cuba’s economic 
partner cushioned the embargo’s blow which might otherwise have been fatal for dependent Cuban 
economy. Castro later declared himself to be a Marxist-Leninist. By 1962 the Soviet Union had 
recognised Cuba as a member of the socialist bloc, thereby committing itself to the revolution’s 
survival (Levesque 1978). The embargo was more effective in 1960s when Cuba’s stock was still 
under control of US manufacture and the embargo prevented Cuba from acquiring spare parts for 
machinery.  
Due to pressure from Washington, the OAS adopted mandatory economic and diplomatic 
sanctions on Cuba. Washington’s NATO allies in Europe were more reluctant to sever trade 
relations, but most complied through cutting aid and credits to Havana (Morley 1987). The trade 
between US and Cuba fell from 68 percent to 0 percent in 1962, while the trade with the Soviet 
Union increased from 1 percent to 49 percent in 1962. Soviet economic assistance was worth $3 
billion (LeoGrande & Thomas 2002). Because of the Soviet assistance the US embargo became 
more in convenience than threat, since it forced Cuba to become increasingly integrated into the 
Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA). The severe depression of the 1990s left the 
Cuban economy vulnerable to US embargo, which slowed its recovery. In January 1999, President 
Clinton announced several additional measures to support the Cuban people. These included a 
broadening of cash remittances to Cuba, so that all US residents (not just those with close relatives 
in Cuba) could send remittances to Cuba; expansion of direct passenger charter flights to Cuba 
from additional US cities other than Miami; and a loosening of restrictions on travel to Cuba for 
certain categories, such as professional researchers and those involved in educational, religious, 
and sports activities.  
The Bush Administration took several measures in 2004 to tighten US sanctions against Cuba. In 
February, President Bush ordered the Department of Homeland Security to expand its policing of 
the waters between Florida and Cuba with the objective of stopping pleasure-boating traffic. In 
March, the State Department announced that it would deny visas to those Cubans who participated 
in the "show trials" of dissidents in March 2003, an action that will reportedly cover some 300 
Cubans. On May 6, 2004, President Bush endorsed the recommendations of a report issued by the 
interagency Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, chaired by then-Secretary of State Colin 
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Powell. The Commission made recommendations for immediate measures to "hasten the end of 
Cuba's dictatorship," as well as long-term recommendations to help plan for Cuba's transition from 
communism to democracy in various areas. The President directed that up to $59 million be 
committed to implement key recommendations of the Commission, including support for 
democracy-building activities for airborne broadcasts of Radio and TV Marti to Cuba. 
In 2005, the Administration continued to tighten US economic sanctions against Cuba by further 
restricting the process of how US agricultural exporters may be paid for their sales. On February 
22, 2005, the Treasury Department's OFACs amended the Cuba embargo regulations to clarify 
that the term of "payment of cash in advance" for US agricultural sales to Cuba means that the 
payment is to be received prior to the shipment of the goods. This differs from the practice of being 
paid before the actual delivery of the goods, a practice that had been utilised by most US 
agricultural exporters to Cuba since such sales were legalised in late 2001. In response to the crisis, 
the Cuban government initiated a series of measures to cushion herself from the adversities of the 
economic sanctions as well as to rebuild the economy by engaging in joint ventures with foreign 
companies and establishing relations with a broad array of new partners.  
6.3 Sanctions on Iraq 
This section traces the origin of the sanctions that were imposed by the United Nations on Iraq, 
the rationale behind the imposition of sanctions against Iraq, the nature of the sanctions that were 
imposed on Iraqi as well as the effects of the economic sanctions on Iraq. The United Nations 
mission in Iraq has been by far the largest in the history of the organisation. It has also been the 
most important, with significant implications for the future of sanctions policy. The sanctions that 
were imposed in Iraq were a response to Iraq’s invasion and occupation of Kuwait (United Nations 
Council Resolution 661, 1990), and were the most comprehensive economic measures ever 
devised by the UN. In tracing the origin of the sanctions against Iraq, Bahdi (2002:233) highlights 
the following: 
The story of Iraq’s crime and punishment is well known in its broad outline. On August 2, 1990, Iraq 
invaded Kuwait. That same day, the Security Council passed Resolution 660, calling for Iraq’s 
immediate withdrawal from Kuwait. On August 6, 1990, the Security Council passed Resolution 
661, an order for comprehensive trade, financial and military embargo of Iraq with the exception of 
certain limited humanitarian provisions. It also created the [Resolution] 661 Committee or the 
‘Sanctions Committee’ to oversee the resolution. A coalition of twenty-six countries under American 
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command went to war against Iraq in January 1991; this would prove to be the first of a series of 
military raids on Iraqi soil. Throughout the fighting, tons of bombs, including a reported 315 tons of 
depleted uranium, were dropped on Iraq; electrical stations and water purification stations were 
bombed as military targets, and thousands of civilians were killed. A United Nations investigation 
sent to Iraq shortly after the bombing called the situation ‘near apocalyptic’ and ‘concluded that life 
had been reduced to a ‘pre-industrial stage’. According to some accounts, as many as 1 600 women 
and children died on 13 February 1991 alone when they were burned alive during the bombing of the 
Amariyah Shelter (Cainkar 1991; Quigley 2000; Rokke 2002). 
This attracted the imposition of economic sanctions on Iraq by the United Nations. The sanctions 
remained permanent for more than nine years, making them the longest of the cases examined. 
The consequences of this prolonged economic meltdown, combined with the destruction resulting 
from the 1991 Gulf War, which then created the worst humanitarian crisis of the decade through 
its execution of the death of hundreds of thousands of Iraqis. In an attempt to ameliorate this crisis, 
the UN mounted the largest humanitarian relief operation in its history, the oil food programme 
(Cortright & Lopez 2000). By 1999 this programme had sent more than $4.5 billion worth of food 
and medicines to the Iraq people. After all the efforts, the political results of the UN sanctions 
seemed meagre. Resolution 661 failed to achieve its objective of forcing Iraq to withdraw from 
Kuwait, and they returned in January 1991 to war. Nor were sanctions forcing full compliance 
under the Gulf War Cease-fire Resolution 687 (1991), especially the disarmament mandate for the 
“destruction, removal or rendering harmless’’ of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction effective 
(Cortright & Lopez 2000). The political wars between Iraq and the United States and subsequent 
bombing raids prevented the developments of a bargaining dynamic and unnecessarily prolonged 
both the political crisis and the agony of the Iraqi people. When Iraqi forces illegally invaded 
Kuwait, the Security Council met to condemn the invasion and demanded that Iraq immediately 
and unconditionally withdraw its forces. Opposition to Iraq was nearly universal, coming from the 
Gulf Cooperation Council, the league of Arab States, the organisation, and individual nations 
(Cortright & Lopez 2000).  
6.3.1 The Reasons Behind the Imposition of Sanctions against Iraq 
With regard to the US, a number of objectives have been proposed as a rationale for their sanctions 
policy against Iraq. It has been argued that the primary purpose of the US’s imposing sanctions on 
Iraq was to put emphasis on neutralising Iraq, avoiding hostility against Kuwait, other Gulf states, 
and US allies generally. The United States created a solid military presence in the Gulf region to 
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prevent any Iraqi aggression. Furthermore, the United States increased its forces in the region in 
times of crisis and sometimes undertook military strikes to prove its commitment. Byman (2001) 
postulates that another crucial component of suppression was keeping Iraq’s military forces weak. 
In order to achieve this objective, the United States and its allies, through the United Nations, set 
restrictions on Iraqi oil sales and oversaw the revenues from oil sales to ensure that they were not 
diverted to rejuvenation of Iraqi forces (Byman 2001).Furthermore, the focus or the emphasis by 
the United States was mainly directed to Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction (hereafter referred 
to as WMDs) programme. Evidence uncovered after the Gulf War, however, showed that Iraq’s 
project of producing a nuclear weapon was virtually non-existent and that its once massive 
chemical weapons reserves had been degraded.  
Washington was startled by the unrelenting antagonism that Saddam Hussein had towards the 
United State and its allies as well as his ownership of WMDs, which could kill hundreds of 
thousands of people if launched properly (Byman 2001). The main goal of the United States was 
to maintain regional stability even as it pursued its own ambitious agendas in Iraq. Moreover, the 
United States feared that the presence of the US in the region and undertaking any actions required 
to neutralise Iraq or overthrow Hussein might have the negative effect of destabilising its regional 
allies. Like military strikes, sanctions were shunned. As a reaction, regional governments have 
usually condemned US policy, refused to give the required backing, or else have dissociated 
themselves from Washington. US policy makers have gradually identified a conflict between the 
use of force and the stability of US allies. Numerous extremists in the region have been infuriated 
by the increase in US military personnel and the continued use of force against the Iraqi regime, 
and this has threatened the stability of US allies and the lives of US personnel (Byman 2001). 
Advocates of the Security Council’s actions against Iraq evaluate the usefulness of the sanctions 
regime to a large extent in terms of their capability to neutralise Saddam Hussein’s ability to 
produce weapons of mass destruction. The purported reason for imposing sanctions against Iraq 
was to control Iraq’s leaders. 
6.3.2 Sanctions Imposed on Iraq by the United Nations 
The Security Council later adopted Resolution 661, 1990 under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
imposing comprehensive mandatory sanctions on Iraq and creating a sanctions committee to 
monitor implementation of the sanctions. These sanctions were the most universally 
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comprehensive sanctions in modern history, and focused significantly on Iraq’s export of oil (its 
largest money-generating commodity). Accordingly, Picture (1997) opines that the sanctions were, 
however, so broad as to target the entire economy of Iraq and its extensive weapons maintenance, 
development, production and delivery systems and capabilities. The sanctions that were imposed 
through Resolution 661 included a ban on all trade, an oil embargo, suspension of flights, an arms 
embargo, and a freezing of Iraq government financial assets, as well as a prohibition on financial 
transactions (Picture 1997).  
They were given exemptions on “supplies intended strictly for medical purposes and in 
humanitarian circumstances, and foodstuffs” (Picture 1997). Furthermore, strong measures were 
quickly taken to enforce the sanctions. On 25 August 1990 the Council called upon member states 
to impose a sea blockade, urging action to “halt all inward and outward maritime shipping” 
(Resolution 665, 1990). All shipping on the Shatt-al-Arab waterway in the south of Iraq was 
intercepted and all vessels approaching the Jordanian port of Aqaba were boarded and inspected. 
Enforcement of the oil embargo was facilitated by the cooperation of neighbouring states. Pipeline 
shipments through Turkey and Saudi Arabia were cut off after the imposition of sanctions. The 
imposition of trade sanctions and the oil embargo benefited greatly from the cooperation of 
neighbouring countries, especially Iran and Turkey. Some sanctions violations inevitably 
occurred, through modest traffic of overloaded trucks and smaller ships along the southern 
waterway, but Iraqi revenues from these shipments declined in comparison with previous earnings. 
The Security Council tightened the sanctions, and the United States and UN members deployed 
substantial military forces to the region. Some argued that sanctions were economically effective 
and should have been given more time to produce political compliance, while others, particularly 
the US and British government, dismissed the prospects for sanctions success and pressed for 
prompt military action (Cortright & Lopez 2000). On 29 November 1990 the Security Council 
adopted Resolution 678 authorising member states to use “all necessary means” in order to liberate 
Kuwait and giving Iraq “a pause of goodwill” until January 1991 to comply with the UN demands. 
On 16 January 1991, the United States and its coalition partners launched a massive air campaign 
which was followed by a ground war that led to Iraqi forces moving out of Kuwait and effectively 
achieving the UN’s principal objective of reversing Baghdad’s aggression. After the end of the 
Gulf War, the Security Council adopted Resolution 687, establishing the terms of the cease-fire 
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and laying out an extensive set of conditions for the lifting of sanctions. Resolution 687 became 
the most complicated resolution since it was the longest one, and contained twenty-six paragraphs 
and thirty-four operative paragraphs. The resolution also set out eight specific conditions to which 
the Iraqi nation had to adhere for sanctions to be lifted (Resolution 678, 1991).  
The resolutions included the recognition of Kuwait’s territorial integrity and newly demarcated 
international borders with Kuwait; acceptance of a demilitarised zone with UN peace keepers 
along the Iraq-Kuwait border; monitoring and destruction of all chemical, biological and ballistic 
missile weapons; and acceptance of a permanent ongoing oversight programme managed by the 
United Nations, monitoring elimination of nuclear weapons materials and capabilities, and 
supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The UN also monitored the return 
of all the property taken from Kuwait and the acceptance of war damages liability. A compensation 
fund was managed by the UN, as well as repatriation of all Kuwait and third-party nationals, and 
a promise not to commit or support any act of international terrorism. The government of Iraq later 
announced its acceptance of Resolution 687 but Baghdad harshly criticised the resolution, labelling 
it an unjust assault on Iraq sovereignty. Although Iraq pledged to comply with the Resolution, its 
actions told different stories and reflected a deep reluctance actually to implement the stated terms. 
This launched a gruelling contest of wills between Iraq leader Saddam Hussein and Western 
leaders over the implementation of Resolution 687 that continued for more than nine years. The 
greatest controversy lay in the confrontation between Iraq and the UN which centred around the 
disarmament provision of Resolution 687. According to Eland (1993), the Security Council 
imposed sanctions to compel Saddam Hussein to withdraw forces from Kuwait and impede the 
Iraqi army’s readiness for war. 
6.3.3 The Effects of the Economic Sanctions on Iraq 
The sanctions imposed under this resolution led to humanitarian hardships through a high death 
toll of both soldiers and civilians in Iraq; and the bombing of targeted vital electrical, water, and 
sanitation systems greatly magnified the destructive consequences of the war and increased the 
civilian death toll. The imposition of comprehensive sanctions compounded and exacerbated the 
impacts, making it extremely difficult to rebuild economic infrastructure and repair war-related 
damage. United Nations officials later developed a plan for using Iraqi oil revenues to finance 
humanitarian relief. On 15 August 1991, the Security Council adopted Resolution 706 which 
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spelled procedure for the proposed oil for food programme. The Resolution was very chaotic since 
it permitted the sale of up to $1.6 billion worth of oil over a six-month period, with the proceeds 
to be deposited in the UN escrow account and to be used to finance humanitarian imports. Thirty 
percent of the oil revenues would be deposited in a war reparations fund, with the additional sums 
set aside for compensational costs for UN operations in Iraq. Resolution 706 violated the 
sovereignty of Iraq since the oil revenues were to be used to finance war reparation and other UN 
activities. Later, Resolution 712 was passed, the main aim of which was to establish a basic 
structure for the implementation of the oil revenues for food programme.  
Iraq, however, refused to accept Resolutions 706 and 712, asserting that the proposals made in the 
resolutions were very harsh, since the procedures for providing humanitarian relief were a 
violation to Iraq sovereignty. In the light of Iraq’s refusal to cooperate in the provision of 
humanitarian aid confronted with continuing reports of the humanitarian situation in Iraq, the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 778 in October 1992, calling on all member states in which 
there were funds from the sale of Iraqi oil prior to the Gulf crisis to transfer the funds to the UN 
escrow account established under Resolutions 706 and 712. The humanitarian relief fund failed, 
with only two countries indicating that they held assets that could be transferred to the escrow 
account. The UN later on adopted Resolution 986, establishing a new formula for the oil for food 
programme. The Resolution permitted the sale of $1 billion of Iraq oil every three months and led 
to concessions to Iraq’s concerns about sovereignty by giving Baghdad the responsibility of 
distributing the humanitarian goods. The UN extended the programme in June 1997 by passing 
Resolution 1111; however, Baghdad failed to submit the required distribution plan for 
humanitarian goods and withheld oil sales.  
The refusal to sell oil led to a substantial shortfall in revenues for humanitarian relief, causing 
delays and difficulty in the purchase and delivery of supplies. In response to continuing 
malnutrition and the evident inability of the oil for food programme to stem health emergencies in 
Iraq, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1153 in February 1998, extending the programme 
and raising the level of authorised oil sales to $5.25 billion every six months. The resolution once 
passed led to Iraq’s official and independent experts raising concerns on the incapacity of the 
country in pumping enough oil in order to meet the target as a result of disrepair and a lack of 
spare parts in the oil industry. In response to the concerns, the Security Council adopted Resolution 
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1210 in order to allow Iraq to purchase the spare parts and pumping equipment for the oil industry 
as part of humanitarian relief. Despite the difficulties involved in the implementation of the 
resolutions, the oil for food programme can be rated as successful. The official purpose of 
continuous UN sanctions was to achieve Iraqi compliance with Resolution 687. Sanctions also 
contributed to the considerable progress achieved in the UN weapons inspection and 
dismantlement effort. Although Baghdad impeded UNSCOM’s effort and expelled the weapons 
inspector following the US bombing raids of December 1998, substantial progress was achieved 
towards eliminating Iraq’s chemical, biological, ballistic missile and nuclear weapons 
programmes. 
In summarising the impact of economic sanctions on the Iraqis, Boris Kondoch (n.d.:1) noted the 
following: 
The humanitarian problems caused by economic sanctions are illustrated best by the example of Iraq, 
as the regime imposed on Iraq is the most comprehensive in UN history. From 1991 on, an increasing 
number of reports documenting the adverse impact on the impact of sanctions began to circulate. 
Humanitarian agencies agree that conditions in Iraq have continued to deteriorate even after the 
initiation of the ‘oil-for-food’ programme. Several UN agencies and human rights organizations have 
produced reports on malnutrition due to the food blockade and on severe health problems due to the 
absence of medicines and water purification systems. A 1996 study estimated a ten per cent drop in 
Iraq’s GDP since the imposition of the UN sanctions. A joint UNICEF and Iraqi government survey 
pointed to a deterioration since the Gulf War and the imposition of sanctions. The mortality rate 
among children under the age of five doubled from 56 per 1 000 live births between 1984-1989 to 
131 between 1994-1999. The survey’s principal conclusion is that Iraq should be allowed to raise 
additional proceeds and to spend the proceeds more freely. Various UN agencies have estimated that 
the sanctions have contributed to hundreds of thousands of deaths. 
The sanctions imposed on Iraq have caused massive deaths and untold suffering among the Iraqis. 
The economic sanctions have not only affected the economic facets of the people’s lives; they have 
also affected the social wellbeing of innocent lives and helpless children. There is an appalling and 
ongoing human tragedy in Iraq as young children are dying from lack of clean water, basic medical 
care, and food. Das Ramos (n.d.) contends that estimates of the excessive number of deaths of 
children during these 12 years range from around 250 000 to well over 1 000 000, with some 
500 000 Iraqi children suffering from acute malnutrition. Additionally, 1 000 000 children are 
suffering from chronic malnutrition.  
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Intended as a humane alternative to war, the sanctions have nonetheless led to such high levels of 
death and suffering, particularly among women and children, that commentators have labelled 
them “genocide”, a “medieval military siege”, and “a humanitarian disaster comparable to the 
worst catastrophes of the past decades” (Bahdi 2002; Clark 1998; Koechler 1995). These economic 
sanctions against Iraq have caused untold suffering and tribulation among the Iraqis. The sanctions 
have claimed more lives in a ruthless manner that surpasses violent or militarised conflict where 
at times children and women are salvaged and protected. But the economic sanctions have 
unsparingly and indiscriminately affected innocent souls. In this vein, it can be noted that there is 
no doubt that life under “the embargo” has visited destruction upon the Iraqi people. To date the 
actual death toll remains contested. Yet it is clear that few have been spared the negative 
consequences of sanctions. At least some commentators observes that “sanctions against Iraq have 
killed more people than the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan” (Bahdi 2002; Cainkar 1991; 
Norman 1999). 
On the economic front, the effect of sanctions was to bring to an immediate end revenue from oil 
export as well as to isolate Iraq from other sources of income such as foreign borrowing. As a 
result, Iraqi imports decreased drastically from “$10.3 billion in 1988 to just $0.4 billion by 1991” 
(Boone, Gazdar & Hussain 1997:8). There was also a significant effect on earnings and 
livelihoods. Boone et al. opine that “real earnings fell by around 90 per cent in the first year of the 
sanctions, and then fell by around 40 per cent more between 1991 and 1996 (Boone et al. 1997:2). 
There has been a steady shift of people into casual labour. Wages in this form of employment are 
now much lower in Iraq than wages for casual workers in some of the poorest parts of the world. 
Qualitative observations on the type of survival strategies to which Iraqis are resorting confirms 
the impression that in many ways Iraq is now very much like some of the poorest countries in the 
world, whereas before the sanctions it could be placed on a par with the Upper-Middle income 
countries”. Over and above these considerations, it can be noted that the human and economic cost 
of the sanctions has, indeed, been enormous, and it has largely been borne by the civilian 
population of Iraq (Boone et al. 1997:3). 
Despite the adverse effects, some achievements can be noted in light of the sanctions imposed in 
Iraq, and Boone et al. (1997) gave the following summary of some of the achievements to the 
United Nations that were gleaned in the process: 
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The main achievement of the sanctions regime is that the Iraqi regime has been forced to compromise, 
albeit grudgingly, on a number of issues relating to regional security, and Iraq's military power has 
been contained. The compromises include the unconditional acceptance by Iraq of its boundary with 
Kuwait, as demarcated by the UN Iraq-Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission, the (partial) 
destruction of the stockpiles of long-range missiles, biological weapons and fissile material, and the 
dismantling of the facilities for their production. The sanctions have also severely weakened the Iraqi 
economy, and hence reduced the power of Saddam Hussein's regime to conduct belligerent activities 
in the future. But given that six years later the regime remains in power, it is clear that sanctions have 
failed to topple the regime as some observers had hoped. Further, the regime remains as brutal and 
uncompromising in its treatment of political opponents as it was prior to sanctions. If one goal of 
sanctions was to improve human rights in Iraq, then to date sanctions have clearly failed in this 
regard. Hence the main achievement of sanctions is a reduction in Iraq's offensive capability. But 
this has come at great cost in terms of increased poverty, and large dislocation in a country of 
20 million people. 
The Iraqis’ military power was contained as well as its offensive capability by weakening Saddam 
Hussein’s regime and incapacitating it from conducting belligerent activities in the future. 
However, it can be noted that the UN strove to safeguard and uphold myopic and selfish interests 
of controlling and containing the leaders as well as debilitating the Iraqi army, but at the expense 
of the general livelihoods of the citizenry. Over and above, it is imperative to look at another 
striking case of a country (Zimbabwe) that also fell victim to the United States economic sanctions. 
6.4 Sanctions against Zimbabwe 
Following condemnation and thorough denigration on a number of disputes, Zimbabwe has been 
under sanctions for close to two decades. Between 2000 and 2003 many sanctions were imposed 
on Zimbabwe by the United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, and the 
European Union. Issues that led to the imposition of sanctions by these states included widespread 
reports of political and election violence, alleged human rights, violation of property ownership 
rights, and disrespect of the rule of law. Regarding all the issues by the Western regimes, consensus 
prevails among the Western States that the main objective of the sanctions imposed on Zimbabwe 
is to restore democracy according to the Western modern standards of democracy. In contrast with 
the Zimbabwe government, the use of sanctions is perceived as an illegal tool meant to destabilise 
the internal political affairs of the country and a serious contravention of the principle of non-
interference in political internal issues as they led to a challenge in Zimbabwe’s sovereignty  
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6.4.1 Genesis of Zimbabwe crisis 
The genesis of the Zimbabwe crisis is generally argued to have started with the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) which supported the Economic Structural Adjustment 
Programme (ESAP). The ESAP drafted the economic framework which later led to the economic 
crisis in Zimbabwe. Up to the introduction of the ESAP in 1991, Zimbabwe had a fairly diversified 
economy in which the manufacturing sector played a pivotal role in other African countries 
through trading (Chimhowu 2009). With the adoption of ESAP, the average GDP declined together 
with the growth which averaged 1.7 percent between 1991 and 1996, while the per capita income 
dropped by –1.9 percent (Chimhowu 2009). Furthermore Chimhowu (2009) cited Moore (2003), 
who observes that inflation rose from 15 per cent to 25 per cent while interest rates trebled. 
Carmody (1998) observes that “from 1994. Zimbabwe’s textile industries began to collapse, with 
a loss of over 6000 jobs”. However, de-industrialisation accelerated thereafter, as evidenced by 
large-scale closures in 1996. The ESAP reforms culminated in deteriorating social and economic 
conditions which led to the riot of IMF within Zimbabwe’s urban centres in 1994-1995. Persistent 
increases in inflation rates became a norm under the ESAP. Dansereau and Zimboni (2005) 
observes that food prices rose by 516 per cent, medical care, transport and education by 300 per 
cent, between 1990 and 1995, at which point households could no longer afford the basic 
necessities.  
From the time of the ESAP adoption and with the suspension of the aid and support from the 
Breton Woods institutions, Zimbabwe experienced social and economic decline. The World Bank 
observes that implementing of the ESAP reforms was costly since it required US$3.5 billion in 
new foreign loans over five years, which added to the existing US$2.5 billion. Even worse, during 
the 1992-1993 fiscal year, interest on both domestic and foreign debt increased by 15 percent more 
than the projected level owing to high interest and volatility of exchange rates. This meant that 
Zimbabwe was heavily exposed to international financial institutions and their withdrawal of aid, 
which led to the inability to meet the balance of payment support, thereby fuelling the economic 
crisis. The adoption of the ESAP and its subsequent negative social and economic effects on 
Zimbabwe are seen as the foundation of the crisis (Bond & Manyanya 2002). After the economic 
meltdown, Zimbabwe imposed price controls on staple goods and increased tariffs on luxury 
goods. This led to a standoff with the IMF and stalled a bailout plan, which resulted in a shortage 
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of foreign currency and fuel (Bond & Manyanya 2002). The government faced a discontented 
coalition of labour, churches, student and civil society organisations demanding reforms from the 
state. This coalition culminated in the formation of the National Constitutional Assembly and 
eventually the Movement of Democratic Change (MDC) in 1999, and henceforth to change to 
Zimbabwe’s political terrain. 
6.4.2 The Zimbabwean Crisis and the Sanctions 
The genesis of Western-backed sanctions on Zimbabwe by Britain and its allies are a contested 
question. Two contending schools emerge: the Western world, domestic civil society and 
opposition parties argued that sanctions were imposed on Zimbabwe owing to a deteriorating 
human rights records and poor governance, while ZANU PF and allies argued that sanctions were 
a neo-colonialist agenda by Britain and her allies conspiring with the MDC to effect a regime 
change in Zimbabwe in an attempt to reverse the land reform. Chingono (2010) argues on the 
rationale behind the imposition of sanctions against Zimbabwe as marred with controversy from 
the perspective of both the sanctioners and the sanctimonious. The embargoes against Zimbabwe 
are either targeted or restrictive sanctions in nature, destined to oppose ZANU PF rule directly, 
while the Zimbabwean government argues that that they are economic in nature since the impact 
of these sanctions has stretched to infinite hurting unintended civilians (Chingono 2010).  
The entrenched positions on the genesis of sanctions reduce the Zimbabwe crisis to the land 
reallocation versus governance disclosure. The Zimbabwean crisis lies in the land, which explains 
why Zimbabwe was under Western sanctions and not governance issues. Chingono (2010) 
observes that, on the contrary, the Zimbabwean government perceives the use of economic 
sanctions as an illegal toll meant to destabilise the internal political affairs of the country. Smith-
Hohn (2010) observes that “the MDC insisted that the responsibility of sanctions rested upon the 
ruling party (ZANU PF) who’s [sic] continued refusal to act in a democratic and accountable 
manner is to blame for the persistence of the sanctions regime”. According to the US Embassy 
spokesperson, “The US welcomes the opportunity to modify the targeted sanctions regime when 
blocked Zimbabwean officials demonstrate a clear commitment to respect the rule of law.” 
Following the land repossession from white farmers, the EU condemned the ZANU PF 
government by imposing sanctions on the regime in February 2002. The Commonwealth expelled 
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Zimbabwe for one year, and the World Bank cut off its funding on Zimbabwe’s debt arrears, which 
had risen to over $380 million (Lowe 2010).  
6.4.3 Sanctions Imposed by Western allies on Zimbabwe 
The US and the EU imposed targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe following reports against 
violation of international norms and mores including human rights, rule of law, media freedom, 
and free and fair elections consistent with liberal democracy. The raft of measures imposed on 
Zimbabwe by the Western allies includes an arms embargo, financial restrictions, asset freezes, 
and travel bans on the leadership in both countries. A brief political background of Zimbabwe will 
be given and related to the above norm and mores mentioned before examining the reaction of the 
West to the deficits thereof, specifically targeted sanctions. Soon after independence, which came 
after the culmination of a liberation war spanning almost two decades, the ZANU PF party has 
dominated the country’s political playing field. 
However, to appreciate contemporary Zimbabwe politics better, it is prudent to appreciate that at 
the heart of the history of Zimbabwe lies the all-too-emotive issue of land ownership. After forced 
dispossession, land ownership became a rallying point among black Africans in Rhodesia, leading 
to the 1960s and 1970s war of independence. In 1990 the government amended the Constitution 
and in 1992 passed the Land Acquisition Act (Taylor & Williams 2002). A 1998 International 
Donors Conference on Land acknowledged the need to address the imbalances in the country’s 
land ownership after it learnt that almost 4 500 white farmers owned 70 percent of the country’s 
agricultural land (Taylor & Williams 2002). The government curtailed the attendant unpalatable 
political consequences through embarking on a fast-tracked land reform programme (Raftopolous 
2009). Britain reacted to this move, accusing the government of violating the country’s property 
laws, and mobilised the US, the EU, Australia, Canada and New Zealand to impose sanctions 
against Zimbabwe (Chingono 2010). Consequently, the land reform programme was discredited 
in the West as a violation of human rights based on the fact that the white farmers had been driven 
off their land and forced to abandon their homes (Chingono 2010). The Western allies maintained 
that the land reforms constituted gross economic mismanagement (Maclean 2002).  
The EU has been described as a ‘normative power’ (Camroux & Egreteau 2010). It used power to 
impose its normative preferences on other international actors (Camroux & Egreteau 2010). In 
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declaring unilateral sanctions against Zimbabwe, the US separately declared the government as 
hostile to US interests and continuing unusual and extraordinary threat to the national security and 
foreign policy of the United States (Weatherbee 2010). The EU has been a leading critic of the 
regime through support of the Movement of Democratic Change (MDC) (Maclean 2002). The US, 
the UK, the EU, Canada, and New Zealand accused the government of condoning political 
violence, of human rights violations, emasculation of the judiciary, and failure to respect the rule 
of law, all of which were combined as undermining democracy. As argued, of all the mentioned 
issues of concern to the West, it was perhaps the government’s land reform programme that raised 
the former’s hackles. Following the fallout of Zimbabwe, the British authorities later cut aid by 
one third in 2000 (Taylor & Williams 2002). In 2002 the UK pressurised the Commonwealth to 
act on the report that Zimbabwean elections held earlier were regarded by the West as not free and 
fair (Smith-Hohn 2010). About 400 families were banned from travelling to Europe while financial 
assets were frozen (Camroux & Egreteau 2010).  
The regional grouping then decided to suspend Zimbabwe for a year, but President Mugabe pre-
empted them by withdrawing the county’s membership (Camroux & Egreteau 2010). In 2008, the 
UK and the US sought to have Zimbabwe censured by the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC), but China and Russia and other non-permanent members of the UNSC blocked the move. 
International aid organisations opted to deal directly with the beneficiary audience rather than 
channel their aid through the government; some scholars suggested that the best way was to go, 
under the circumstances (Maclean 2002). The development has resulted in a shut-down between 
the international non-governmental organisations and the government of Zimbabwe. Zimbabwe 
was also excluded from the list of beneficiaries under the 2001 US-sponsored Africa Growth 
Opportunities Act (AGOA), which disbursed US$200 million for US companies in the textile 
industry in sub-Saharan Africa in 2002.  
The UK also influenced the SADC chairperson, by withholding US$18 million in budgetary 
support unless the latter permitted the regional grouping to impose sanctions on Zimbabwe (Elich 
2002). Western targeted sanctions were imposed in Zimbabwe in 1997 when the government of 
Britain Prime Minister, Tony Blair, refused to deliver Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) vehicles 
after an advertisement by the government authorities to acquire 1 500 white-owned farms for 
resettlement (Taylor & Williams 2002). This became a precursor to the imposition of an arms 
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embargo. In 2000 the UK imposed a full arms embargo beginning with the withdrawal of its British 
Military Advisory and Training Team (BMATT) (Taylor & Williams 2002). In 2002, the other 
Western countries imposed an arms embargo against Zimbabwe. Members of the leadership of 
Zimbabwe were also subjected to a travelling ban to the UK, the US, and the rest of the EU 
countries. New Zealand banned the adult children of the targeted persons from studying in their 
institutions. President George Bush signed the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery 
Act (ZDERA) in December 2001. The law directs the US treasury and directors in any multilateral 
financial institutions to oppose and vote for loans extension, credit or guarantee to the government 
of Zimbabwe, to oppose debt reduction or cancellation in respect of Zimbabwe and further 
authorised the US president to fund the private media (Elich 2002). As of 2008 ZDERA had 
targeted more than 200 ZANU PF functionaries and businesses. 
6.4.4 Effects and Effectiveness of Targeted Sanctions against Zimbabwe 
The targeted sanctions against authorities in Zimbabwe have managed to hamstring the integration 
of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region by ensuring and monitoring that 
Zimbabwe does not benefit under the EU Common Market for Eastern and South Africa 
(COMESA) tariff reduction scheme like the other regional members. In addition, the sustained US 
and EU efforts also threatened to create crevices within the SADC, as demonstrated by the political 
vituperation between Zimbabwe and Botswana over political developments in the former. From 
the Western view, they concluded that the targeted sanctions had managed to isolate the leadership 
of ZANU PF (Chingono 2009). The Southern African Development Community (SADC) stood its 
ground in defence of Zimbabwe, with every chair of the former calling for the lifting of the targeted 
measures because firstly, they felt they were not justified; and secondly, they were harming 
ordinary citizens (Eriksson 2007; Smith-Hohn 2010). This concerted effort was highlighted with 
regional delegations, including a three-member SADC presidential team sent to Western capitals 
to ask for the removal of smart sanctions (Zhangazha 2010). In support with Zimbabwe, the 
African leaders threatened to boycott the February 2003 France-Africa Summit in Paris if 
Zimbabwe was not allowed to take part. In contrast to the isolation of Zimbabwe by the Western 
countries, the targeted sanctions have, instead, apotheosised President Robert Mugabe as a pan-
Africanist owing to his influence in Africa. Despite the relations between Zimbabwe and the West, 
there were two fundamental developments that occurred. Zimbabwe recalibrated its diplomatic 
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focus towards the East in a development that is known as the “Look East Policy” (Smith-Hohn 
2010). 
 The standoff of Western capitals provided countries in the East with a window of investment 
opportunities without the usual competition from capitalist economies. The targeted sanctions 
against Zimbabwe, especially those imposed by the EU, were also undermined by the fact that the 
EU is of paramount importance to South Africa as a trade partner (Smith-Hohn 2010). Despite the 
arms embargo by the EU, the UK, Canada, New Zealand and Australia, the country has continued 
to access military equipment from China. In 2005, Zimbabwe received light arms, riot control gear, 
100 military trucks and 18 jet fighter planes from China worth US$240m (Brown & Sriram 2008). 
The EU sanctions against Zimbabwe admittedly succeeded in inconveniencing travel by 
government officials, thereby affecting the country’s participation in multilateral diplomacy. 
Blacklisting of government officials has the net effect of bringing them closer to each other through 
creating a group feeling which strengthens relations between states (Eriksson 2007). The targeted 
sanctions eroded salaries and pensions as big companies in Zimbabwe downscaled business and 
others closed down in a move by the government in solidarity with the regime change agenda. 
Local companies faced viability problems because sanctions blocked access to importation of 
equipment and spare parts. The result was that thousands of workers were offloaded into the 
streets. Basic commodities were also priced beyond the reach of many. Therefore, the sanctions 
were more harmful to the innocent citizens than the intended targets.  
A closer examination of the Zimbabwe Democracy and Economic Recovery Act (ZIDERA) shows 
the punitive nature of the US sanctions regime against Zimbabwe. In essence, the economic 
sanctions contained in ZIDERA are designed in a manner aimed at masking their true heinous 
nature. In an endeavor to refine the effectiveness of sanctions through disguised means, there has 
been a shift towards the so-called targeted sanctions, which impose travel bans and freezing of 
foreign bank accounts of targeted individuals or entities. As a result, in Zimbabwe, today, trade 
sanctions have taken the form of denied access to foreign lines of credit, which ordinarily finance 
external trade. Furthermore, the market for the country’s exports is also shrinking, as export 
competitiveness crumbles under adverse perceptions. These undeclared sanctions which are 
sometimes packaged as ‘restrictive measures” have harmed Zimbabwe’s economic activity. For 
instance, since the enactment of ZIDERA, trade sanctions, financial sanctions, particularly 
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involving trade finance, interrupt trade, and ultimately constrain the economy’s foreign currency 
generating capacity, as well as economic activity in general.  
6.5 Conclusion 
The chapter focused on the deployment of economic sanctions on Iraq, Cuba and Zimbabwe. In 
the process it traced the origins or factors that contributed or led to the imposition or adoption of 
economic sanctions in these three countries respectively. The Iraqi scenario saw the economic 
sanctions being imposed as a result of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The United Nations Security 
Council really wanted to curtail the Iraqi army’s readiness for war as well as to compel Saddam 
Hussein to withdraw forces from Kuwait. This saw the UNSC coming up with resolutions to this 
effect. The Cuban case witnessed the US government imposing an embargo on Cuba in 1959 as a 
strategy to oust the Castro-led Communist revolutionary government. The economic sanctions 
evolved into a comprehensive blockade in the early 1960s. The Zimbabwean case is punctuated 
by the imposition of sanctions that came as a result of Zimbabwe’s policy to grab its land back 
from its erstwhile colonial masters. This attracted hostility and hatred from the losers of the land,  
who in this case were mainly the colonial farmers of British and American origin. This led to the 
imposition of sanctions against Zimbabwe. The chapter highlighted the rationale behind the 
imposition of these economic sanctions on these respective countries as well as the nature of these 
sanctions in these countries. 
Lastly, the far-reaching effects of these sanctions on Cuba, Iraq and Zimbabwe were also 
discussed. It was noted that these sanctions had economic and social impacts. The countries 
suffered from economic strangulation, where trade and general businesses were affected. The 
general economic performance of these nations was weakened. In addition, the social rights of the 
populace were also hampered; for instance, general access to many basic rights including medical 
care, food, security, potable water, housing and education was immensely hindered by these 
economic sanctions. 
With regard to Zimbabwe, it was the SADC’s engagement efforts that saw the birth of the inclusive 
government after the 2008 plebiscite failed to produce a winner and political violence erupted in 
the countdown to the presidential run-off (Raftopolous & Mlambo 2009:229). Prominent British 
scholar, Stephen Chan (2011, online) observes that the targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe have 
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not worked and has enjoined the main advocate for the targeted sanctions, Britain, to consider 
engagement as an option now. His prediction that the US and the whole of EU, currently faced 
with a serious recession, would need Zimbabwe for trade in 2011 resonates with Rennie Atterbury 
III’s (1997:338) observation that sanctions also do harm to business in the sender states. 
In view of the above examples, it is evident that comprehensive economic sanctions need to be 
revised in order to spare the innocent people who more often than not get caught up in the crossfire. 
However, as has been argued in this study, targeted or smart sanctions are not the solution because 
of the harm they bring to bear on innocent victims. The selected case of Zimbabwe presents 
poignant accounts of how targeted sanctions have caused untold suffering to be visited on the 
ordinary people, who ironically are the intended beneficiaries. The paper also illustrated how the 
targeted sanctions are evaded by the targeted individuals who remain entrenched in the corridors 
of power. Therefore, the sooner diplomatic engagement becomes the alternative policy instrument 
of the day, the more innocent lives are likely to be saved, and the better the prospects for 
international peace and stability. The observation by Hufbauer et al. (2007:139) that it is practically 
impossible to choreograph measures “with the accuracy of a cruise missile” therefore holds true 
with regard to targeted sanctions. In the cases of Cuba, Zimbabwe and Iraq, the sanctions failed 
their intended goals of removing the regime or changing the behaviour of the leadership in these 
countries, but led instead to innocent civilians suffering through the high cost of living and the 
death tolls, especially in Iraq. From the case studies of economic sanctions in Cuba, Iraq and 
Zimbabwe, it can be deduced that economic sanctions do raise many ethical issues, which will be 
the focus of the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: AN ETHICAL CRITIQUE OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS 
7.1 Introduction 
All things considered as indicated in the preceding discussion on economic sanctions, it can be 
deduced that economic sanctions raise lots of ethical questions from an array of ethical 
perspectives. The main ethical critique against economic sanctions that can be discerned from 
many of the ethical traditions which will be discussed in this chapter is that economic sanctions 
remain unethical in the sense that they inflict untold suffering upon the majority of the citizens of 
the target country who in most cases are usually innocent with regard to the policies that are 
espoused by their governments which later become target countries for economic sanctions. Upon 
a critical analysis it can be deduced that economic sanctions are anti-humanitarian. In the light of 
the examples that have been provided in this study, it can also be deduced that whether economic 
sanctions are comprehensive or smart, their end result has not yielded any policy change from the 
target country. Rather, the end result has been indiscriminate human suffering within the target 
country. The ethical critique of economic sanctions that is advocated in this study is therefore two 
pronged. 
In the first section I will argue that economic sanctions remain unethical from the viewpoint of 
both Western and African ethical traditions. In the light of the scope of this section it is argued that 
if sanctions are ethically unjustifiable, this obviously raises the question of whether nations take 
into account ethical considerations when they impose sanctions on the target state. This question 
will be discussed in the light of the theory of sceptical ethical and political realism. When sanctions 
are imposed on the target state for the pursuit of the national interests of the sanctioning countries, 
such a practice discounts the interests of the citizens of the target state whom the supporters of 
economic sanctions purport to be helping. The pursuit of national interests in the imposition of 
economic sanctions against the target state becomes another convincing argument against the 
ethical justifiability of sanctions. 
The third section will give an ethical critique of economic sanctions based on the problem of 
structural evil within organisations and international relations. The argument in this section is that 
sanctions are in the final analysis a manifestation of evil within the generality of our human 
existence. What makes economic sanctions a manifestation of evil can be discerned from the fact 
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that they create a situation of rapid deterioration of the general social and economic wellbeing of 
the whole populace of the target state. What also enables us see sanctions as part and parcel of the 
nature of evil is the inherent propensity to inflict suffering on the innocent while promoting 
prosperity among the supporters of the regime of the target state as well as interest groups of a 
minority of the affluent from the sender countries. As we have seen previously, there is no evidence 
that economic sanctions are successful in bringing about positive results in respect of foreign and 
domestic policy change in the target state. There is strong empirical evidence that economic 
sanctions have been very successful in creating rapid deterioration in the living standards in the 
target state in a way that defies any rationality. Finally, it will be argued in this section that 
sanctions are inherently evil because ethical goodness implies that we should be in a position to 
take into account the interests of others as if they are our own interests. 
7.2 An Ethical Critique of Economic Sanctions 
Some scholars such as Joy Gordon have argued against sanctions on the basis that they target the 
innocent. Gordon’s main argument is that economic sanctions are a deadly solution that defies any 
ethical justifiability. As he puts it: 
In many regards, sanctions are the modern version of siege warfare: each involves the systematic 
deprivation of a whole city or nation of economic resources. Although in siege warfare this is 
accomplished by surrounding the city with an army, the same effect can be achieved by using 
international institutions and international pressure to prevent the sale or purchase of goods, as well 
as to stop migration (Gordon 1999:124). 
The imagery of sanctions as analogous to a military siege of a city is strong and vivid enough to 
make them appear unethical. Gordon’s critique of sanctions is based on the ethical theories of 
utilitarianism and Kant’s deontological ethics. Here, his main argument is that sanctions violate 
the principle of discrimination which is central to just war theory. From the Kantian ethical 
perspective, Gordon maintains that 
[s]anctions are inconsistent with the principle of discrimination from just war doctrine; sanctions 
reduce individuals to nothing more than means to an end by using the suffering of innocents as a 
means of persuasion, thereby violating the Kantian principle that human beings are ‘ends in 
themselves’; and sanctions are unacceptable from a utilitarian perspective because their economic 
effectiveness necessarily entails considerable human damage, while their likelihood of achieving 
political objectives is low (Gordon 1999:124). 
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From the Kantian perspective, human beings are used as means for something else – forcing the 
target state to change its policies by imposing economic sanctions. Kant (1964) referred to our 
ability to treat people as ends in themselves as a “categorical imperative” – implying a duty which 
we owe to each other. A categorical imperative is a moral command in the sense that it is qualified 
by the use of the verb ‘ought’ (Solomon 1985:504). Kant formulated this categorical imperative 
as follows: “There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely this: Act only on that maxim 
whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law” [Kant’s italics] 
(Solomon 1985:504). A categorical principle is sometimes referred to by many scholars as an a 
priori principle in the sense that it remains relevant “independent of any particular circumstances”. 
Kant went on to provide a general categorical imperative as follows: “Now I say: man and 
generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily 
used by this or that will, but in all his actions whether they concern himself or other rational being 
beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end” (Kant 1964, cited in Solomon 
1985:508). Here it is eminently clear that economic sanctions for whatever reason are from the 
Kantian categorical imperative, and are a blatant violation of ethics. As we have seen in the 
previous discussion, economic sanctions are usually used to serve the national interests of the 
sender state(s) and not the national interest of the target state. Economic sanctions are imbued in 
barbarism that defies any ethical reasoning mainly for the reason that their punitive effects are 
non-discriminatory. Gordon expresses it well when he says that “sanctions are simply a device of 
cruelty garbed in self-righteousness” (Gordon 1999:128). 
I should like to echo the point that is being made by Gordon above by saying that economic 
sanctions are the utmost expression of human cruelty of an abhorrent nature which in most cases 
is not found in the wild. It is common knowledge that the economic sanctions that were imposed 
on Iraq set in motion human suffering which had never been experienced during Saddam Hussein’s 
rule. In a similar way, the economic sanctions that have been imposed on Zimbabwe have been 
extremely cruel to ordinary Zimbabweans despite the usual media rhetoric that they are “smart 
sanctions that are solely aimed at correcting the Zimbabwean political elites”. In this regard, the 
so-called smart sanctions have been designed to inflict economic harm to ordinary Zimbabweans 
on the belief from the senders of those economic sanctions that the Zimbabweans will revolt 
against the ruling government. Some third world countries that have been adherents of nuclear 
weapons, such as Iran and North Korea, have been made targets of economic sanctions by the USA 
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and her allies. The most glaring hypocrisy of such actions is that the USA and her allies are known 
to be highly advanced in the manufacture of all sorts of nuclear and biological weapons, yet they 
are in the forefront in prohibiting other countries from developing these weapons. Economic 
sanctions are aimed at harming innocent people of the target country and it is for this reason that 
they cannot be ethically justified, .Here again, I would like to quote Gordon who said that “to use 
Kantian language, [through the use of economic sanctions] human beings are reduced to nothing 
more than a means to an end, where that end is something less than the lives of other human 
beings” (Gordon 1999:129). Such a deduction implies that sanctions are ethically indefensible 
from a Kantian perspective. Gordon went on to argue: 
With sanctions, the risks include malnutrition, lack of emergency medical care, lack of fuel, and 
deprivation of the necessities of survival, as well as the less visible harms of psychological trauma, 
lost education, lost job opportunities, the social disintegration. … Sanctions are simply the 
imposition of suffering upon the innocent, against their will (Gordon 1999:130). 
In Chapter Two as well as in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, there has been an 
overwhelming presumption that economic sanctions are usually imposed on the target state with 
the explicit aim of promoting the greater good of world peace and security. This was the 
predominant rationale behind the justification of economic sanctions, which are deemed to cause 
less human suffering compared to military action. This rationale is considered to be an echo of 
utilitarianism. The ethical theory of utilitarianism “is concerned with pleasure in general; that is, 
with one’s pleasure, the pleasure of other people involved, and even the pleasure of other people 
who are not directly involved”; and when deciding on the right action to take in any situation is to 
determine what would be the greatest good for the greatest number of people, this has become 
known by scholars as the ‘happiness calculus’. Making a pleasurable decision and ensuring the 
avoidance of pain “are the ends which the legislator has in view”. The procedure in making an 
ethical decision is basically to determine whether the action to be taken promotes the greatest 
happiness to the greatest number of people (Solomon 1985:514–515). 
The rationale behind utilitarianism is often referred to as consequentialism. This implies that an 
action can be justified only on the grounds of the consequences it produces. As we have seen in 
the case studies that have been presented in this study, economic sanctions do the greatest injury 
to those very people of the target state which those economic sanctions purport to help. Here the 
reason is that the economic sanctions are intended to benefit the interest groups and not the 
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majority of the citizens of the target state. From a utilitarian perspective, economic sanctions 
cannot be justified. As Charles Radrick (2006:60–63) put it: “Economic sanctions have proven to 
be ineffective in the majority of cases, and generally inflict the greatest suffering on the people the 
sanctions seek to protect. … Economic sanctions represent an application of unethical public 
policy.” Radrick went on to argue: “[B]y analysing sanctions from a consequentialism perspective, 
we find sanctions lacking an ethical quality. Consequentialism contends that an act is right or 
wrong depending on its actual consequences.” Since sanctions are usually imposed in the pursuit 
of national interests by the sender state(s), no ethical considerations are taken into account.  
However, there are some scholars who argue that utilitarianism overlooks the issue of human 
rights, which is usually a central issue about economic sanctions. Robert McGee (2003:43) argues 
that “the problem with applying utilitarian ethics is that utilitarians ignore rights violations. All 
that matters to a utilitarian is whether the gains exceed the losses. That is one of the major problems 
with utilitarian ethics and it is one of the major strengths of rights-based ethics”. McGee went on 
to say: 
A rights-based ethic takes the position that an action is bad if someone’s rights are violated, 
regardless of whether the good outweighs the bad. What is wrong prima facie does not become right 
just because some majority ultimately benefits. A major advantage of a rights-based ethic is that there 
is no need to calculate total gains and compare them with total losses. … The only thing that needs 
to be determined is whether someone’s rights would be violated (McGee 2003:43). 
Before one endorses the rights approach to sanctions as preferable to utilitarianism, I think one 
needs to unpack some of the philosophical underpinnings of the rights-based ethic. One of the 
most renowned philosophers of the rights-based ethic is Ayn Rand. According to Rand: 
‘Rights’ are a moral concept – the concept that provides a logical transition from the principles 
guiding an individual’s actions to the principles guiding his relationship with others – the concept 
that preserves and protects individual morality in a social context – the link between the moral code 
of a man and the legal code of a society, between ethics and politics. Individual rights are the means 
of subordinating society to moral law [her italics] (Rand 1963:92). 
In the light of the above observation, it is eminently clear that rights-based ethics subordinates 
society to the individual. Individual rights are thus postulated by Rand as the summation of moral 
law that should regulate the functioning of society. The only sphere in which we can talk of 
morality is solely in the realm of individual rights. Society as a whole is an abstract, but what is 
concrete is individuals who are bearers of rights. As she put it: “… that a right is the property of 
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an individual, that society as such has no rights, and that the only moral purpose of a government 
is the protection of individual rights” (Rand 1963:93). 
Other scholars who are critics of rights-based ethics argue that the language of rights is based on 
the Western philosophy of atomic individualism which it is not possible to universalise within the 
global context of multiculturalism. The root of their argument is that rights-based ethics is based 
on liberal capitalism, whose modus operandi is based on an understanding that individuals are 
egoists. Some African scholars critiqued the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights as a 
declaration of Western philosophical individualism (Zvobgo 1979:93). This Western philosophical 
individualism also does not have universal cultural application. Thus one finds the Organisation 
of African Unity (OAU) came up with its own Charter entitled African Charter on Human and 
People’s Rights of 1981 in which the focus is on the family and the community as the objects of 
these rights (Murove 2016:87). This was an attempt by African leaders to demonstrate that Western 
rights-based ethics is not relevant to all cultures. Obina Okere critiqued the Western rights-based 
ethics on the grounds that “[t]he African conception is not that of an isolated and abstract 
individual, but an integral member of a group animated by a spirit of solidarity” (Okere 1985:90). 
The Western and USA idea of justifying economic sanctions on the premise of a rights-based 
argument becomes an imposition of the USA and Western countries’ own values on other people. 
Economic sanctions are ultimately aimed at making sure that non-Western countries comply with 
the political and economic policies that are favoured by the USA and her NATO allies. In other 
words, all talk about respect for human rights is in the final analysis another way of promoting the 
national interests of the USA and her allies. In many instances when sanctions have been imposed 
on those who are considered by the USA and her allies as violators of human rights, the human 
rights situation has actually deteriorated.  
From an African ethical perspective, economic sanctions are unethical from two perspectives, the 
first being that African ethics puts emphasis on the promotion of life of the community. The second 
presumption of African ethics is that human beings are beings by virtue of relationality. From an 
African ethical perspective, an action is deemed ethical when it promotes life. In this regard, as 
Munyaradzi Murove put it: “The telos of human existence is to maximise life in all its 
manifestations. … In African traditional categories of thought, the perpetuation and preservation 
of life remains the main goal of human existence” (Murove 2016:165–166). In other words, an 
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authentic or humane existence should be one that promotes the perpetuation of life to such an 
extent that no life is endangered for whatever reason. For this reason, the idea that economic 
sanctions do decimate life indiscriminately makes them ethically indefensible. Economic sanctions 
are not aimed at promoting life; rather, the telos (ultimate aim) of their sender is to make life 
unbearable to the majority of the citizens of the target state. The rationale of economic sanctions 
has never been aimed at promoting the flourishing of life. Susan Allen and David Lektzian argued 
that economic sanctions are a hazard to public health because they usually give rise to a decrease 
in the target state’s gross domestic product (GDP). This decrease in the GDP has a negative impact 
on health. Four causal factors that are identified by these two authors are exposure to risk, level of 
resources, allocation of resources, and efficiency of allocation. As these two authors put it, 
“…sanctions are only expected to directly affect the level and allocation of resources to health 
outcomes ... such as restriction on the availability of food that can lead to nutritional deficiencies” 
(Allen & Lektzian 2012:123–124). It is beyond doubt that economic sanctions do not promote the 
flourishing of life. Instead, they actually lead to a situation of unprecedented diminishing of life in 
the target state. The African emphasis on the preservation and perpetuation of life can be discerned 
from the way Africans greet each other. As Murove puts it: 
Whenever African people greet each other they always inquire about the wellbeing of another person 
by asking whether life was going on well with them. Thus the usual [Shona] greeting – Upenyu 
hwakadii? (how is life?) is a common greeting whenever you meet someone. In Zulu they greet by 
saying Injani impilo (how is life?). The life of another person becomes a concern for everybody, 
hence everything is done to preserve and perpetuate life in existence (Murove 2016:164). 
It is partly for this reason that sanctions are deemed unethical from an African perspective. 
Another African ethical perspective which makes economic sanctions unethical arises from the 
fact that human beings and reality in general are conceived as related and interrelated with 
everybody else. When our human existence is understood as relationally constituted, it implies that 
we should see our wellbeing as indispensable to the wellbeing of others. Among the Nguni-
speaking people of Southern Africa they have an adage which says Umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu 
– a person is a person because of other persons. In this regard, relatedness is what ultimately makes 
us human. Mike Boon described the principles of Ubuntu (as this adage is known) as follows, “The 
heritage of the philosophy that comes to us through our traditional African roots is Ubuntu: 
morality, humanness, compassion, care, understanding and compassion. It is one of sharing and 
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hospitality, of honesty and humility” (Boon 1998:31). In this regard, what it means to be a person 
is to belong to the community. Belonging is paramount to what it means to be human and to our 
humanness or Ubuntu. One of the ethical requirements enshrined in Ubuntu is to be inclusive in 
our relationships with other people, in such a way that one always enhances the wellbeing of others 
in whatever they do instead of pursuing one’s personal or national interests to the exclusion of the 
interests of others.  
One finds that in applying the concept of Ubuntu, we treat other people with respect in such a way 
that we accord them the dignity that demonstrates that they are related to us, that the other people’s 
wellbeing is intertwined with our own. Nhlanhla Mkhize observes that “Ubu-ntu … calls for a 
particular mode of being in the world. This mode of being requires each person to maintain social 
justice, to be empathetic to others, to be respectful to him/herself, and towards others and the 
cosmos at large …” (Mkhize 2008:41). Thus, to be fully human or to have a sense of Ubuntu, 
requires mutual recognition of the humanity of others in such a way that we give others space or 
create space for them to maximise their own flourishing without being intrusive or paternalistic 
towards them. Barbara Nussbaum echoed the above insight when she said that in the ethic of 
Ubuntu, “[p]eople are distinctive beings, able to recognise and acknowledge one another through 
mutual encounter and cultural integration” (Nussbaum 2009:102). The implication of Nussbaum’s 
insight is that in Ubuntu there a strong existential presumption that mutual recognition is enabled 
by our encounter with each other in a way that affirms the reality of cultural integration. One can 
also say that Ubuntu is also based on inherent optimism in human goodness. Nelson Mandela 
stated it more succinctly and eloquently when he said, “I have always known that deep down in 
every human heart, there is mercy and generosity. No one is born hating another person because 
of the colour of his skin, or his background, or his religion” (Mandela 1994:542). 
From the perspective of Ubuntu, it can be deduced that there is no way in which one can support 
economic sanctions with their propensity towards being destructive to all human life 
indiscriminately. What also makes economic sanctions inhumane is that in most instances, as we 
have seen previously, they are imposed on the target state with the aim of serving the national 
interests of the sender states. Other scholars such as Adeno Addis maintained that instead of our 
condemning economic sanctions as indefensible, these problems of economic sanctions and ethics 
can be resolved if we see economic sanctions as mainly about guarding against the erosion of 
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identity. He writes “[s]anctions serve an identitarian function – they often perform the role of 
giving shape to the nature and boundary of the sanctioning community” (Addis 2003:586). Here 
the presumption is that there is an internationally accepted standard behaviour in the international 
community. This shared ‘standard of behaviour’ provides the identity of the international 
community. He avers (2003:593–594): “Thus, when the Security Council authorises economic 
sanctions against a particular regime it often has dual goals. It attempts to pressure the regime to 
alter its policies while at the same time signalling what the boundaries of the community are. It 
does this by declaring who is an ‘outlaw’ and what actions and values are deemed inconsistent 
with the image and nature of the community”. Adeno goes on to argue: 
Put simply, the point is that when the Council imposes economic sanctions it has two audiences. The 
first and most obvious, of course, is the regime of the target state, but the second, and just as important 
is the international community itself. The signal that is sent to the latter is what values and principles 
are centrally constitutive to that community and who and what are threats to it. 
Addis’s identitarian instrumental justification of economic sanctions is problematic because, as 
stated previously, economic sanctions are not imposed by senders with the aim of protecting the 
identity of the international community or in defence of shared values among members of the 
international community. Rather, national interests and the interests of pressure groups play a 
dominant role in the imposition of sanctions against the target state. Sanctions that were imposed 
against Cuba, Iraq and Zimbabwe did not serve identitarian purposes but instead were imposed 
with the aim of promoting the interests of the USA and her NATO allies – not the identity of the 
whole international community. But Addis acknowledges that 
[t]he big powers [permanent members of the UNSC] often pursue their agenda and interests outside 
the United Nations system … And often those weak and vulnerable states are offered as the sacrifice 
for implicit and, at times, explicit deals and understandings reached among the major powers on 
many issues related or unrelated to the issue or the target country in question (Addis 2003:613).  
There are many scholars who argue that economic sanctions should never be used as a tool for the 
promotion of foreign policy. Their main argument against economic sanctions is that they have 
ghastly unintended consequences on the target that are not usually considered by the senders. As 
we have seen previously, some have critiqued economic sanctions on the grounds that they are 
used by powerful countries to impose their national interests upon the weakest members of the 
international community. As stated previously, the main or central hypothesis of this study is that 
since economic sanctions are imposed by sender state(s) as a way of pursuing their own national 
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interests with regard to the target state, in the following section I intend to argue that economic 
sanctions, regardless of the justification that is sometimes proffered by supporters of economic 
sanctions, remain entangled with the problems of evil and human nature. 
7.3 Economic Sanctions and Human Evil 
In the light of the preceding discussion, it can be deduced that sanctions are related to the problem 
of evil in human existence. It has been a common practice among philosophers, theologians and 
ethicists to discuss evil in metaphysical categories of thought. For example, the question that has 
occupied these thinkers a great deal when it comes to the problem of evil in human existence is: if 
God was good and perfect, why is there evil in the world? On a critical analysis, this way of 
thinking absolves human beings as responsible agents for the evil that occurs in the world by their 
hands. Some scholars have maintained that evil has been described in a variety of metaphors 
among scholars from different disciplines. Amelie Rorty (2001) argues that “[t]he varieties of evil 
are semantically marked. The richness of the vocabulary – ‘abominations’, ‘disobedience’, ‘vice’, 
‘malevolence’, ‘sin’, ‘wanton cruelty’, ‘immorality’, ‘corruption’, ‘criminality’, ‘sociopathology’ 
– indicates distinctive conceptual domains. Each has its primary place in a specific outlook, with 
a particular set of preoccupations and questions, a theory of agency and responsibility” (Rorty 
2001: xii). Here it appears that the idea of evil has permeated each discipline in the humanities and 
has been expressed in different metaphors. While it is outside the scope of this study to discuss all 
these metaphors of evil as entrenched in different disciplines, in the light of the main thrust of this 
study, I shall discuss some of the metaphors that have been used by critics of economic sanctions 
with specific reference to evil as it pertains to economic sanctions. 
Other Christian theologians such as Edmund Hill observe that 
Evil as a noun is much wider term than sin. All sorts of things are evils that are certainly not sins: 
death, suffering, famines, droughts, floods, earthquakes, disasters of all sorts. Evil, in fact, is the most 
readily available noun to correspond to the adjective ‘bad’, though it has much stronger and more 
vivid overtones. But everything which is bad, from bad weather to bad breath and bad grammar and 
bad government can be called, if you forget those overtones, an evil, a very little evil, perhaps, but 
still an evil (Hill 1984:54). 
In other words, ‘evil’ implies all the negative things that happen in human existence, while ‘sin’ 
refers to the existential state of being, thus implying being static. Hill goes on to say that “[e]vil is 
classified in under two headings: (a) the evils people suffer, and (b) the evils people do; one form 
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of doing in this moral context is also failing to do, so you can do evil simply by failing to do good. 
It is the second kind of evil we refer to as ‘sin’” (Hill 1984:54. Hill continues: “Sin, on the other 
hand, or moral evil or the evil we do or the evil we are to blame for, all this is evil pure and simple. 
It cannot be reduced to being either part of the natural order or of the moral order. On the contrary, 
it is moral disorder, and hence a disorder of the human intelligent nature, to which it belongs by 
nature to perceive and respect the moral order” (Hill 1984:55). Hill has thus conflated sin with evil 
in the sense that evil manifests itself in our actions which are not in harmony with the moral order. 
To sin is thus defined by Hill as a matter of turning away from God “who is our ultimate end, at 
whom the genuine human life has to be aimed. So to sin, essentially, is to miss God, but to miss 
him on purpose, and thus to turn away from God”. It is for this reason that Hill goes on to say that 
“sin or moral evil, is absolute evil or evil pure and simple …” (Hill 1983:57). However, for other 
scholars, human beings are evil by their very nature and this evil nature is an explanatory reason 
behind what they do.  
From the outset of this study it was argued that the rationale behind the imposition of economic 
sanctions is based on the theory of political realism. The imposition of economic sanctions on the 
target state is done in a way that punishes the population of the target state indiscriminately – thus 
forcing the target state to exist in a state of economic and political turmoil to the devastation of 
many innocent lives. The idea that human beings are evil, which partly relates to Thomas Hobbes’s 
theory of human nature, is well articulated in his book, Leviathan. The main reason that there are 
governments and rulers is to avert a universal war. Human beings have been created in such a way 
that when they are left on their own, their existence will be unbearable. The reason for this is that 
each person is solely self-interested. As Hobbes put it, “[f]or there is not ordinarily a greater sign 
of the equal distribution of anything, than that every man is contented with his share. From equality 
proceeds diffidence. From this equality of ability, arise the equality of hope in the attaining of our 
ends. Therefore, if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both enjoy, 
they become enemies; and in the way to their end, which is principally their own conservation, 
and sometimes their delectation only, endeavour to destroy, or subdue one another” [his italics] 
(Hobbes 1967:98–99). For Hobbes, the natural predisposition of human beings lies in pursuing 
their self-interests, and when they fail to attain that which they deem to be to their self-interest, 
they resort to war or animosity. The existence of government is something that was necessitated 
by the reality of evil human nature, and without a civil authority, the whole of human existence 
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will ultimately be enmeshed in a universal war. He avers: “Out of civil states, there is always war 
of every one against everyone. Hereby it is manifest that during the time men live without a 
common power to keep them all in awe, they are in that condition which is called war; and such a 
war is of every man, against every man” [his italics] (Hobbes 1967:100). 
In this regard, human existence is based on mutual distrust of each other’s motives. In this 
Hobbesian society, everybody aims to exterminate the existence of everybody else. F. C. Hood 
caricatured this Hobbesian society as follows: “No man need be held back from the struggle for 
existence by the thought that he has no chance; given a favourable opportunity, the weakest can 
kill the strongest. Equality of hope leads to competition and aggression. This gives rise to 
diffidence, or distrust of others” (Hood 1964:75). Competition and/or the ability to overtake the 
other competitor guarantees one’s survival. Hood went on to say that this Hobbesian society is 
chiefly characterised by war and strife. Thus “[f]rom diffidence proceeds defensive war. Though 
man’s chief natural end is conservation, it is sometimes ‘delectation duty’. There are men who 
take ‘pleasure in contemplating their own power in the acts of conquest’. Hence men who would 
be glad to be at ease within modest bounds can hope to preserve themselves only if they increase 
their power; anticipation that is getting in the first blow is the best means of defence” (Hood 
1967:75–76). In other words, one should never trust the intentions of another human being. One 
can only ensure one’s own survival by making sure that one is prepared to inflict a pre-emptive 
strike on the suspected enemies. The question that arises in this Hobbesian anarchic society is if 
human beings cannot trust each other when they inhabit the same society, what trust can there be 
when they do not belong to the same society?  
Of most interest in Hobbes’s theory of human nature is his postulation of the idea that foreign 
relations are based on amoralism – meaning that states do not relate to each other on the basis of 
moral considerations; rather, their relations are purely based on the pursuit of that which each 
believes to be to their country’s national interest. When human beings are left on their own without 
an all-controlling power or authority, their existence will be enmeshed into a universal war where 
everybody sees him- or herself as an enemy of everybody else. Foreign relations were not 
necessarily contracted in a moral manner because of the existence of mistrust that exists among 
nations towards each other’s intentions (Hobbes 1967:65; Morgenthau 1948:3). In other words, 
from this sceptical realist perspective, the international political scene was based on anarchy and 
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mutual distrust of each country’s intentions in its foreign policy. While states are sometimes 
described as enjoying sovereignty with regard to their domestic policies, this sovereignty is mainly 
enjoyed by the most powerful countries as compared to those states that are weak.  
From a political realist perspective, foreign relations are mainly based on the exercise of power or 
the struggle to attain world economic and political dominance over other nations. The more 
economically powerful a country is, the greater its chances of dominating the world economic and 
political scene. While there is a global commitment to respecting each country’s sovereignty 
without interfering in each other’s domestic affairs, this commitment to sovereignty is undermined 
when a sovereign state is subjected to economic sanctions in such a way that that country is 
subjected to the reality that its sovereignty is relative to the wishes of those countries that are 
economically and militarily powerful. This practice is regarded by other scholars as another form 
of imperialism, just as the 20th century “cry for a ‘Greater Britain’ and a ‘Greater Germany’ is 
seen on closer analysis to be an empty formula concealing a wide spectrum of imperialist 
motivations” (Mommsen 1981:73). In our contemporary era, world imperialism has come in the 
form of the United States of America imposing economic and other forms of sanctions against 
those countries that are deemed to be hostile to American interests in their foreign policies. For 
example, recently Donald Trump’s election manifesto was based on the promise that his foreign 
policy will be based on what he called ‘America First’. In other words, under the Presidency of 
Trump, the USA will act or cooperate only with those countries that it deems to be promoting 
American national interests in their foreign policies. This pursuit of national interests in foreign 
policies undermines the sovereignty of target states when they are sanctioned on the basis of the 
pursuit of American national interests.  
From a realist perspective, morality or ethics is relevant only in so far as it promotes the wellbeing 
of the nation, thus implying that this does not apply when entering into relations with foreign 
nations. Mary Maxwell argued that the idea of nationalism is an offshoot of the thinking behind 
nationalism. She avers that “[t]he position of nationalism as a ‘negative argument’ concerning 
international morality obviously has to do with the fact that the protection of ‘one’s own people’ 
can mean utterly callous treatment of anyone else” (Maxwell 1990:22). When Donald Trump 
talked about ‘America First’ as his priority in foreign policy, he was undoubtedly arousing the 
spirit of American nationalism. This also implies that America will not bring into account any 
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moral considerations in its relations with other nations. In this regard, the presumption is that ethics 
makes sense or is intelligible only within a group or among people who share the same existential 
memory as those who exist in distant lands. It is for this reason that sanctions are not usually 
imposed on the target state by powerful countries on the basis of the national interests of these 
sender countries without a concern for the wellbeing of those who will suffer the negative effects 
of those economic sanctions. To go beyond national interest thinking, other scholars have argued 
that national interest must be made relative in order to embrace the national interests of all those 
who will be affected by our actions even though they stay in distant lands. As Peter Singer puts it: 
“In accepting that ethical judgements must be made from a universal point of view, I am accepting 
that my own interests cannot, simply because they are my interests, count more than the interests 
of anyone else. Thus my every natural concern that my own interests be looked after must, when 
I think ethically, be extended to the interests of others” (Singer 1999:12–13). In the light of 
Singer’s observation, it can be deduced that political realism does not fulfil the all-embracing 
requirement of what it means to be ethical. National interest should be seen in the light of the 
national interests of others. As we have seen previously in the case of Cuba, Iraq and Zimbabwe, 
economic sanctions that were imposed on these sovereign countries were imposed with the aim of 
inflicting harm on the citizens of those respective countries. Economic sanctions are also an 
exercise of power.  
We have seen in the preceding discussions that the imposition of economic sanctions is always 
made on economically weak members of the international community. The ability to impose 
economic sanctions on another state is in itself the utmost expression of exercise of economic 
power. By virtue of its world economic hegemony, the USA has always imposed economic 
sanctions for reasons that are usually based on its national interests. Michael Mann observes that 
in the exercise of its global imperial power, “[t]he US would effect regime change and then leave 
with a more friendly regime in place. … For the moment only two regions were in its sights, the 
central core of the Muslim world, in the Middle East plus Western Asia, and Northeast Asia. This 
was where this temporary territorial imperialism focused, especially at first on the ‘axis of evil’, 
‘rogue states’ North Korea, Iraq, and Iran, though with Syria sometimes also informally added” 
(Mann 2004:56). It is important to note that most of those countries that were labelled by the USA 
as ‘rogue states’ or an ‘axis of evil’ are actually target states of the USA and her European allies’ 
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economic sanctions. Economic sanctions are used as an instrument for promoting American 
foreign policy.  
Along with other scholars, Addis (2003:578–586) argues through his theory of sanctions as based 
on identitarian justification that the “virtuous self” of the sender of sanctions does this in order to 
dissociate itself from the target state which is deemed the “evil other”. In this process, as he 
expresses it: “The target regimes rarely change their policies and practices as a result of economic 
sanctions. And in the name of minimising [their] participation with evil, the sanctioning 
community creates an even greater evil and consequently presents an image of itself that is contrary 
to what it seeks to project”. Addis goes on to say that sanctions are usually imposed on a target 
state with the specific aim of promoting behaviour modification in the target state. The assumption 
of the identitarian justification of economic sanctions relies on the presumption that the relations 
of states are based on some shared purpose for their association. Terry Nardin observes: “In 
purposive association the authority of the rules governing the relations among the associates is 
derived from the shared purposes that the association exists to promote. It is the pursuit of these 
shared purposes that provides the rationale for the rules through which the associates seek to 
promote the common end” (Nardin 1983:10). Nardin’s assumption is that those who enter into an 
association, for example, the United Nations or European Union, pledge themselves to some 
shared purpose. It is these shared purposes that provide the members with a common identity. 
Within that way of reasoning, we can say that members of the United Nations impose economic 
sanctions because the target state will have behaved in a way that does not show the prior existence 
of shared purposes with the membership of the association at large. But strangely enough, as we 
have seen in the previous example about sanctions against Iraq, the issue of behaviour modification 
was not the objective of those sanctions because economic sanctions were maintained even though 
Iraq had pulled out of Kuwait. 
Addis goes on to say that sometimes economic sanctions are used for retribution purposes or for 
settling old grudges against the target state. What economic sanctions have achieved more 
efficiently is not behaviour modification of the target state, but destruction of the general wellbeing 
of the innocent and weak members of the target state. Subjecting the poor and ordinary citizens to 
life-devastating conditions of economic sanctions degenerates into a practice of evil taken to 
extremes. In the light of these summarised observations, Addis aptly deduces that “evidence shows 
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that economic sanctions do not often achieve the objectives for which they are adopted. Even when 
they do achieve the objective, the cost in human life and infrastructural damage in the target state 
is intolerably high. It is not just the economic cost that is intolerable, but also the moral cost of 
using innocent individuals as a means to an end” (Addis 2003:586). Addis’s critique of economic 
sanctions does not leave any grain of doubt in the mind of any conscientious person that it is an 
evil system that is aimed at inflicting immense suffering on the innocent citizens of a target 
country. What also makes economic sanctions intrinsically evil is that they inflict suffering among 
the innocent while failing to achieve their stated objectives in the target country. 
Another aspect in the imposition of economic sanctions which has been observes by other scholars 
such as Charles Radrick (2006:61–63) is that economic sanctions are usually selectively applied. 
For example, Radrick observes that the USA does not impose economic sanctions against certain 
rogue states “due to their economic and/or political importance”. Moreover, economic sanctions 
have been critiqued by many scholars on the basis of their ineffectiveness, yet the sender countries 
have continued to use them. In most cases sanctions are inflicted on “small countries with less 
diversification and global integration” and those that are “more vulnerable to sanctions”. Radrick 
(2006) sums up his arguments against economic sanctions by saying that “[e]conomic sanctions 
by the United States are working [in Myanmar], working to destroy a country in order to save it. 
It is time to reconsider this ineffective, inhumane and unethical form of foreign policy”. It is 
important to take note of Radrick’s final remark about economic sanctions as an ‘inhumane and 
unethical for of foreign policy’ as implying that economic sanctions are based on a foreign policy 
that dehumanises the peoples of the target state. An inhumane policy implies advocacy of evil in 
one’s relations with other nations. During the days of apartheid in South Africa, the apartheid 
government’s political policies were described as inhumane because of their diabolical nature 
whereby the majority of the South African non-white citizens were treated as inferior human 
beings. It is the inhumane treatment of people within the target state as a result of economic 
sanctions which makes sanctions an evil foreign policy. 
Another analysis of economic sanctions that makes them a vehicle of evil was provided by Joy 
Gordon (1999:124–128), who described them as analogous to “the siege warfare” whereby “each 
involves the systematic deprivation of a whole city or nation of economic resources”. In a situation 
of siege warfare, the exercise “is accomplished by surrounding the city with an army”; and through 
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economic sanctions “the same effect can be achieved by using international institutions and 
international pressure to prevent the sale or purchase of goods, as well as to stop migration”. The 
metaphor of economic sanctions as analogous to siege warfare implies indiscriminate killing of 
the inhabitants of the country or city under siege. As Gordon put it, “the unit under embargo or 
siege is a mixed population rather than a military installation, or is entirely civilian. In both cases, 
the effect is the same: the disruption or strangulation of the economy as a whole”. The metaphor 
of economic sanctions as similar to siege warfare vividly demonstrates that economic sanctions 
cannot be differentiated from evil. The practice of imposing economic sanctions is the evil which 
human beings inflict on other human beings The aim of a siege is to cause paralysis or strangulation 
of the victim in such a way that the victim is left without any alternatives except to accept his or 
her fate under those deplorably imposed conditions The most badly affected population of the 
target state are usually those who are extremely vulnerable members of society. As Gordon put it 
“… the direct consequence of siege is that harm is done to those who are least able to defend 
themselves, who present the least military threat, who have the least input into policy or military 
decisions, and who are the most vulnerable”. In the light of Gordon’s analysis of the consequences 
of economic sanctions, there is no room for any rational justification for such a devious foreign 
policy system that is designed to harm the most vulnerable and innocent members of the target 
state.  
With economic sanctions we are confronted with the reality of evil whereby the impoverishment 
and murder of the innocent is rationalised in a systematic manner. Thus policy makers of the 
senders of sanctions construct foreign policies basing them on those rationalisations that are meant 
to perpetuate evil through economic sanctions against target countries. It is eminently clear that 
economic sanctions belong to the genre of evil in human existence. Many authors in the Western 
world have reflected about evil and the incomprehensible suffering it brings into human existence. 
In his book, The Brothers Karamazov, Fyodor Dostoevsky has a character, Ivan Karamazov, who 
says, “If the suffering of children is necessary to pay for the truth, then I protest that truth is not 
worth such a price …” (Dostoevsky 1880, cited in Solomon 1985:281–284). Dostoevsky wove his 
novel around the motif of human cruelty inflicted on the innocent as the main thrust of the novel. 
The problem of human evil which Dostoevsky wrestled with in his novel The Brothers Karamazov 
is extremely relevant today in the light of the impact of economic sanctions on the target states, as 
we have demonstrated in the preceding chapters. However, the inflicting of evil upon the weak 
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members of the international community is another way whereby the powerful exert their power 
to gain world dominance. This is usually known as political realism in international relations. For 
Hans Morgenthau, politics was about the struggle for power as a means towards the realisation of 
national interests. In this struggle for power or dominance, morality is not taken into consideration 
at all (Kung 1997:32–39). 
Meanwhile, many scholars who are ardent critics of economic sanctions are currently arguing that 
other modes of promoting peace and security in the world which do not involve the use of 
economic sanctions should be explored so as to do away with the reality of evil that has always 
dovetailed economic sanctions. Here, what is needed is to find an ethical paradigm that can help 
us to go beyond the use of sanctions as punishment against a sovereign state. From whatever ethical 
angle one looks at economic sanctions, they remain an unethical system for influencing foreign 
policy against the target state. International morality has to go beyond the theory of political and 
ethical realism. In this regard, real ethics or a genuine ethical outlook has to be as inclusive as 
possible. In this regard we need to see our humanity as inseparable from the humanity of others. 
In a letter to Sigmund Freud, Albert Einstein, an outstanding, world-renowned physicist, 
questioned the violence that was related to nationalism or political realism and its contribution to 
global conflicts. What he partly saw as a contributory factor to violence in the generality of human 
existence was that: 
 [t]he craving for power which characterizes the governing class in every nation is hostile to any 
limitation of the national sovereignty … I have especially in mind that small but determined group, 
active in every nation, composed of individuals who, indifferent to social considerations and 
restraints, regard warfare, the manufacture and sale of arms, simply as an occasion to advance their 
personal interests and enlarge their personal authority.  
In this regard, Einstein had undoubtedly expressed the reason for war and economic sanctions in 
human existence. 
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter was mainly about an ethical critique of economic sanctions in which the main 
argument in this critique is that sanctions violate the principle of discrimination which is central 
to just war theory. From the Kantian ethical perspective, people should be treated as ends in 
themselves. Sanctions reduce individuals to nothing more than means to an end by using the 
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suffering of innocents as a means of coercion against the target state, thereby violating the Kantian 
principle that human beings are ‘ends in themselves’. Kant postulated that our human actions are 
ethical when they can be universalised. What this implies is that what we do to other people can 
be ethically condoned only when we accept the same action to be done to our own humanity. 
Economic sanctions fail to meet this Kantian ethical dictum, especially when one takes into 
account the fact that the sender(s) of economic sanctions do so in pursuit of their national interests 
to the detriment of the target state.  
As can be seen, another ethical theory which is at odds with economic sanctions is John Stuart 
Mill’s theory of utilitarianism. This ethical theory says that an act can be ethical only when it 
promotes the greatest good for the greatest number of people. Economic sanctions are 
incommensurable with the ethical theory of utilitarianism because the imposition on a target state 
has an indiscriminate impact that has always resulted in loss of life to the majority of citizens of 
the target state. From a utilitarian perspective, an action is deemed to have promoted the greatest 
good for the greatest number of people by analysing the resultant consequences of the action. Since 
the consequences of economic sanctions are indiscriminately devastating to the majority of the 
citizens of the target state, the consequences of economic sanctions outweigh the good because 
there is no empirical evidence that proves that economic sanctions lead to the promotion of the 
greatest good within the target state.  
From an African ethical tradition, it was argued that economic sanctions dehumanise the majority 
of the innocent citizens of the target state. There were two perspectives from African ethics which 
render economic sanctions unethical. First, since African ethics puts emphasis on the promotion 
of life of the community, economic sanctions are unethical because they are destructive to the 
general communal wellbeing of the communities of the target state. The second presumption of 
African ethics which makes economic sanctions unethical is the fact that human beings are beings 
by virtue of relationality, whereby to be a real person is to promote life of the community. In other 
words, a humane existence should be that which promotes the perpetuation of life to such an extent 
that no life is endangered for whatever reason. For this reason, the idea that economic sanctions 
decimate lives and livelihoods indiscriminately makes them ethically indefensible. Economic 
sanctions are not aimed at promoting life; rather, the telos of their sender(s) is to make life 
unbearable to the majority of the citizens of the target state. 
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The last section of this chapter argued that economic sanctions are related to the problem of evil 
in human existence. My first argument on the connection between economic sanctions and evil 
came in the form of the rationale behind sceptical realism which asserts that the relations among 
states are not guided by moral or ethical considerations. Rather, they are based on the pursuit of 
national interests of the sender states. After investigating the works of most of the scholars who 
have been critical towards economic sanctions, their criticisms on sanctions converged on the idea 
that such a promotion of a foreign policy remains inhumane and evil because of the resultant 
devastating effects on the majority of the innocent citizens of the target state. It is for this reason 
that it was argued that economic sanctions belong to the narrative of the reality of evil in human 
existence, and economic sanctions were part of that narrative. The following chapter will thus 
serve as a general conclusion to the study and will also provide some constructive 
recommendations.  
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CHAPTER EIGHT: GENERAL CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
This study was mainly an investigation into the ethical dilemma in respect of the imposition of 
economic sanctions as a tool for foreign policy in international relations. While the topic of 
economic sanctions is a wide and controversial area which many scholars have investigated from 
various perspectives, in this study my focus was mainly on whether economic sanctions can be 
defended ethically as a tool of behaviour modification against the target state. My main aim in this 
study was to investigate whether economic sanctions are ethically justifiable as a foreign policy 
tool that can be used by the international community or a group of States with the aim of promoting 
behaviour modification in the target state. For this reason, the thrust of the study was to find out 
whether economic sanctions have achieved what they have been designed to achieve within the 
UN Charter, Chapter VII, Article 41. Put succinctly, the above aim was the main focus of all the 
chapters in this study. If economic sanctions have failed to effect behaviour modification in the 
target state, the rationale which is appealed to by senders obviously remains unintelligible.  
While it has been argued throughout the thesis that economic sanctions are ethically indefensible, 
this claim has been authenticated by the central argument of the thesis that the main difficulty that 
makes economic sanctions ethically indefensible emanates from the fact that senders of economic 
sanctions are mainly motivated by national interest at the expense of the vulnerable and innocent 
citizens of the target state. The reasons that are given by sender State(s) are usually aimed at 
influencing foreign and domestic policy of the target state in a way that advances the national 
interests of the sender State(s). The examples of the countries (Cuba, Iraq and Zimbabwe) provided 
empirical evidence that economic sanctions are imposed by sender State(s) with the aim of 
promoting the national interests of the sender State(s) at the expense of the target State(s). 
Economic sanctions provide an opportunity whereby those countries that are economically 
powerful seek to modify the foreign policy of a target state to comply with the wishes of the 
powerful State(s). Apart from this introduction, this chapter comprises six sections which will 
serve as summaries of each chapter. After providing the scope of the study, which served as an 
introduction to the whole thesis, in the second chapter I went on to discuss succinctly the rationale 
or the common conceptual framework that is used by scholars in their analysis of economic 
sanctions. 
 
 
174 
 
SECTION A: CONCLUSION 
8.2 The Rationale behind Economic Sanctions 
Chapter 2 was mainly concerned with the dominant rationale behind the conceptualisation of 
economic sanctions and scholars who have systematically studied the rationale used in the 
understanding of economic sanctions. The first rationale behind economic sanctions that was 
discussed was that of the game theoretical approach. Scholars who are the proponents of this 
conceptualisation of economic sanctions maintain that economic sanctions and their efficacy on 
the target state can be understood better when economic sanctions are subjected to the logical 
presumptions of game theory in which the outcome of two parties to economic sanctions 
presupposes that in the final analysis there will be a winner and a loser. Proponents of the game 
theoretical approach to economic sanctions argue that such an approach is “a realistic theory of 
economic sanctions” which they regard as “a game issue linkage involving two or more issues” 
where “players many not know each other’s preferences for the outcome of the game” (Lacy & 
Niou 2004:25). The argument which was made against this game theoretical approach to economic 
sanctions was that it was mechanistic in the sense that its main aim was to come up with predictable 
outcomes. The fact that economic sanctions have not always succeeded in bringing about the pre-
anticipated outcomes renders the game theoretical approach to economic sanctions futile and 
redundant as an authentic tool for the rationale behind the practice of imposing economic sanctions 
as a tool for foreign policy. 
The traditional understanding of sanctions has been predominantly based on the idea that the 
intention of economic sanctions is to bring about policy change in the target state by imposing 
harmful economic sanctions on the target state. William Kaempfer and Anton Lowenberg 
described this view as “the instrumental theory” of economic sanctions (Kaempfer & Lowenberg 
2017:786). The modern understanding of economic sanctions as it evolved from the League of 
Nations up to the formation of the UN and the promulgation of its Charter presumed economic 
sanctions be an “alternative to war, a ‘peaceful’ instrument of international diplomacy that could 
effectively prevent military aggression” (Gordon 1999:123). In other words, economic sanctions 
were presumed by its advocates as a foreign policy to be the most effective way of ensuring that 
there is no threat to peace and security as a result of war. The instrumental theory of economic 
sanctions was also based on the presumption that when citizens of the target state are subjected to 
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excruciating economic hardships as some form of international quest for policy or behaviour 
modification of the target state, the citizens of the target state will end up revolting against their 
own government or ultimately overthrowing it by violent means. The other presumption behind 
the instrumental theory of economic sanctions is based on the theory of political realism, which 
asserts that sanctions can be a vital foreign policy that can be used by the sender state to pursue its 
national interests in the target state. 
Another rationale that was identified behind the imposition of economic sanctions comes from the 
belief that they help errant States to adhere to international law within their sovereign territories. 
The predominant reasoning given for the deployment of economic sanctions against the target state 
is usually presented as a mechanism for the protection of human rights in the target state. Both 
comprehensive and smart sanctions are rationalised on the basis that it is the only way of protecting 
human rights against the abuses of the citizens within the target state. The idea of human rights is 
presumed to be pivotal to international law. Regardless of cultural and historical differences, all 
countries of the world are presumed to support the idea of human rights. 
Lastly, it was observes that the rationale behind the imposition of economic sanctions which is 
pivotal to this study is that economic sanctions are imposed in a way that demonstrates some prior 
commitment to double standards in pursuit of national interests of the powerful countries. Some 
countries have violated human rights with impunity, without having economic sanctions imposed 
on them. Here, what comes to mind is Saudi Arabia and Israel, to mention only two. When 
sanctions are imposed on the target country on the basis of national interest, they serve the selfish 
purposes of the sender. For example, the reason USA sanctions against Cuba were studied is that 
in most cases they were imposed on the target state for self-interested motives. The pursuit of 
national interest through sanctions is not done in a way that is consistent. Consider, for example, 
punitive measures against Fidel Castro, who was pro-socialist economic policies, as opposed to 
those against the Batista regime, which was pro-capitalist. I have also shown that some countries 
such as China have provided economic support to some of the countries that are on economic 
sanctions. 
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8.3 An Historical Overview of Economic Sanctions and the United Nations 
Regardless, in all the issues discussed in this chapter, the main aim was to explore an overview on 
the evolution of the idea of sanctions. As previously discussed in the chapter, the UN imposed 
sanctions under Chapter VII of UN Charter when applying punitive measures against Rhodesia 
and South Africa. The sanctions imposed were targeted at changing the behaviour of the targets, 
and these sanctions caused significant damage to the targeted States. In the case of Cuba the 
sanctions were imposed with the intention of weakening Cuba and in the process safeguarding the 
national interests of the United States and its Western allies. It is scarcely surprising that the US 
and its allies took these punitive measures against Cuba considering that the latter was a bastion 
of communist expansionism in the Western hemisphere. On the other hand, the collective 
economic sanctions are causing harm, whether directly or indirectly, to innocent civilians in Cuba. 
As can be seen, the rationale behind the imposition of sanctions includes coercive, punitive 
purposes, and this will also affect human beings as a whole, since economic sanctions have a 
negative impact on all civilians. The UN sanctions in the context of non-proliferation, counter-
terrorism, protection of civilians, democratisation, and the conflict resolution mechanism was 
ethical and based on law; but in terms of application it became unethical, since there were five 
super powers which also have direct input into the passing of UN Security Council Resolutions. 
Economic sanctions have over the last three decades been used more than ever before, even though 
the evidence regarding ineffectiveness is quite overwhelming in many cases, with the possible 
exception being when they were used against apartheid South Africa, as some authors intimate. 
This begs the question why politicians still persist with them. The consensus of analysts is that, in 
tune with the remark made by former US Secretary of Defence, James R. Schlesinger, sanctions 
appeal to America because they seem to be a substitute for stiffer measures that may be required. 
In short, they are a way of making ourselves feel that we are doing something substantial about a 
serious problem without really doing anything at all (Bartlett 1985). The weapon of economic 
sanctions would appear to be generally undesirable for those holding to the Biblical worldview, 
except possibly in the case of a war between two nations. Sanctions tend to alienate parties and 
make conflict resolution more difficult to achieve.  
Furthermore, research has shown that sanctions leave the real targets, the political manipulators 
and despots, largely unscathed. Also, no self-respecting government has been prepared to lose 
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standing by succumbing to such measures. If anything, as has also been noticed, alternative trading 
partners would be sought and found, in most cases making the subjected nation stronger over time. 
It should be no surprise that sanctions, however well intended, lead to unexpected and unwanted 
results. In order to progress relationally in this world, be it at a personal or at any public level, 
there must be relationship building through dialogue, and through willingness to stand beside the 
other person or nation. The effectiveness of sanctions is questionable. It is clear that the more harm 
sanctions inflict on their target, the more likely they are to influence the target’s behaviour. The 
human costs of such sanctions, however, are often unacceptable and make international support 
unlikely. Moreover, sanctions are likely to have greater effect on their target if the target 
government is faced with domestic opposition; otherwise, sanctions may simply encourage greater 
political cohesion around the targeted leadership. Conflict often arises as a result of one party’s 
feeling that they lack political, economic, or security resources. Sanctions, by definition, intend to 
further weaken the target, increasing their anxiety, and escalating a conflict. The next section will 
discuss the following issues: an exploration of UN application of economic sanctions during the 
Cold War; an analogue of the Cold War ideologies; the dynamics surrounding the application of 
economic sanctions during the Cold War; an evaluation of the effectiveness of application of UN 
economic sanctions in the Cold War environment; and post-Cold War trends and the use of 
sanctions. 
8.4 The United Nations’ Application of Economic Sanctions during the Cold War 
Economic sanctions are a tool of a state’s foreign policy that have been used frequently for the last 
20 years since the fall of communism and championed as the humane alternative to war. Despite 
their prevalent use, they have conclusively failed in their stated purpose. Sanctions almost never 
succeed in stopping or changing the unethical behaviour of target States, particularly when enacted 
over long periods of time or through multilateral actions. Sanctions are not cost-free from an ethical 
perspective. Comprehensive sanctions especially cause great pain and suffering to the innocent 
and weak within the sanctioned state’s population, as seen with the humanitarian disaster that was 
Iraq. Smart sanctions have mitigated the worst impacts on civilians but still carry costs that may 
be difficult to justify when weighed against their comparatively miserable efficacy. The only way 
economic sanctions make sense is if we view the power of sanctions as symbols in a constructivist 
 
 
178 
 
light rather than their bare political form. Then, arguably, there may be a place for sanctions as a 
means to shape international ethical norms for the better. 
The chapter basically presented an exploration of the United Nations’ application of economic 
sanctions during the Cold War where it highlighted issues such as the UN maintaining uneasy 
peace, the analogue of the Cold War ideologies, and dynamics surrounding the application of 
economic sanctions. In these scenarios, it was noted that there was reluctance in the use of 
sanctions during the Cold War era as the countries would circumvent or bypass the sanctions and 
continue with their trade. This was an upshot of the diverse and distinct ideologies (communism 
and liberalism) that characterised the power relations during this particular time. In highlighting 
the dynamics surrounding the imposition and usage of sanctions, the chapter categorically 
presented that economic sanctions were increasingly applied during the beginning of the 20th 
century as some of these economic sanctions were enshrined in the United Nations Charter system 
in Chapter IV. The chapter presented an evaluation of the effectiveness of the application of the 
United Nations sanctions in the Cold War environment where it noted that sanctions have failed 
as an instrument to change behaviour and are not free of ethical costs as they have an impact on 
innocent civilians. Lastly, the chapter outlined the post-Cold War trends and the use of economic 
sanctions, where it traced the nature and severity of sanctions that were imposed by the UN. It 
noted that sanctions that were imposed during the 1990s were pre-eminently comprehensive 
embargoes which had little effect in changing the state policies and caused immense suffering on 
the populations of the respective countries that would have received these sanctions.  
8.5 The United Nations’ Application of Economic Sanctions during the Post-Cold War Era 
The chapter gave a run-down of the issues underlying the dimensions and the rationale of economic 
sanctions in the post-Cold War era. It also looked at the concepts of smart and comprehensive 
sanctions and analysed their attributes and facets. Then it moved on to analyse the usage of the 
smart sanctions by the United Nations across the world, where it unpacked the modalities 
associated with the UN sanctions imposition system, and successes and failures by the UN in 
realising their intended objectives. The supporting clauses of the UN Charter that paved the way 
for sanctions to be imposed were analysed thoroughly. The problems militating against the 
implementation of smart sanctions were also delved into. In addition, the reasons behind the 
adoption and imposition of smart sanctions were looked at in detail, in which case, factors such as 
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deterrence, compulsion, and coercion as well as the symbolic facet of economic sanctions were 
highlighted. Lastly, the chapter captured the scenarios of the usage of economic sanctions in the 
new dispensation where sanctions are used as a measure for facilitating the adoption of 
international humanitarian law. Economic sanctions can also serve as a measure for combating 
terrorism as well as serving as an ethical measure for conflict prevention. 
It was noted in this chapter that the end of the Cold War resulted in the increased propensity of 
the UNSC to impose sanctions. The rationale for the imposition of these sanctions varied. The 
traditional reasons behind the imposition of sanctions such as coercion, deterrence, and 
compulsion, among others, were highlighted. The end of the war ushered in a new era whereby 
sanctions were used in threefold: sanctions as a mechanism of enforcing international 
humanitarian law and as an ethical tool of conflict prevention, as well as being a measure of 
combating terrorism. It was noted that after the Cold War period, members of the international 
community realised the need to keep sanctions in check as well as come up with mechanisms for 
enforcement against those regimes and nation States which did not observe and practise the 
ethically acceptable principles of governance, which include protection of human rights. It was 
argued that the Security Council’s main objective in maintaining and restoring international peace 
and security is in line with Article 42 of the UN Charter.  
The imposition of sanctions is aimed at achieving political ends while lessening and to some 
extent avoiding the unbearable repercussions of armed conflict. Thus, the aim of imposing 
sanctions after the Cold War period has been generally to modify the behaviour of the individual 
state rather than to punish the same. It was highlighted, however, that such sanctions come into 
conflict with other fundamental principles of international law such as the principles of non-
intervention and state sovereignty. The imposition of economic sanctions becomes immoral in 
the sense that they are targeted at the people as a whole rather than at the given regime. It was 
noted in the first section of the chapter that economic sanctions are imposed as a mechanism of 
enforcing international humanitarian law. The end of the Cold War has witnessed the emergence 
of a modern version of humanitarian intervention in cases of gross human rights violations, 
particularly through economic sanctions. The General Assembly has often invited States to 
impose economic sanctions in situations where human rights have been violated.  
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Such developments have been a result of the growing assertion of power by the Security Council 
in the post-Cold War era and the expanding willingness of the international community to 
confront violations of human rights with economic sanctions or military force whenever it is 
deemed necessary. In the second section, the imposition of economic sanctions was discussed as 
an ethical tool of conflict prevention. It was noted that about 14 sanction regimes were applied to 
address intra-state conflicts in the post-Cold War era. Case studies were drawn from the UN 
Resolutions on Somalia and Haiti. The third and last section analysed the rationale for the 
imposition of sanctions after the Cold War period with reference to economic sanctions as a 
measure of combating terrorism. Considering that terrorism is one of the emerging global threats 
to peace and security, it was noted that the Security Council has made efforts at coming up with 
Resolutions on combating terrorism. The next section will discuss the application of economic 
sanctions with specific reference to Cuba, Iraq and Zimbabwe.  
8.6 A Case Study of Economic Sanctions with Reference to Cuba, Iraq and Zimbabwe 
The chapter focused on the deployment of economic sanctions on Iraq, Cuba and Zimbabwe. In 
the process it traced the origins or factors that contributed or led to the imposition or adoption of 
economic sanctions in these three countries respectively. The Iraqi scenario saw the economic 
sanctions being imposed as a result of Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait. The United Nations Security 
Council really wanted to curtail the Iraqi army’s readiness for war as well as to compel Saddam 
Hussein to withdraw forces from Kuwait. This saw the UNSC coming up with resolutions to this 
end. The Cuban case witnessed the US government imposing an embargo on Cuba in 1959 as a 
strategy to oust the Castro-led Communist revolutionary government. The economic sanctions 
evolved into a comprehensive blockade in the early 1960s. The Zimbabwean case is punctuated 
by the imposition of sanctions that came as a result of Zimbabwe’s policy to grab its land back 
from its erstwhile colonial masters. This attracted hostility and hatred from the losers of the land,  
who in this case were mainly the colonial farmers of British and American origin. This led to the 
imposition of sanctions against Zimbabwe. The chapter highlighted the rationale behind the 
imposition of these economic sanctions on these three countries as well as the nature of the 
sanctions in these countries. Lastly, the far-reaching effects of these sanctions on Cuba, Iraq and 
Zimbabwe were also captured. It was noted that these sanctions had economic and social impacts. 
The countries suffered from economic strangulation where trade and general businesses were 
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affected. The general economic performances of these nations were weakened. In addition, the 
social rights of the populace were also hampered by, for instance, the lack of general access to 
many basic rights including medical care, food, security, potable water, housing and education, all 
of which were immensely hindered by these economic sanctions. 
 Almost the entire spectrum of political opinion in Iraq during the reign Saddam Hussein was 
against the Western inspired UN sanctions. While the sanctions regime might have been effective 
in reducing Iraq’s military potential and in securing its compliance with international law for the 
time being, by imposing a heavy cost on Iraqi civilians, it added further fuel to the sense of 
historical injustice felt by ordinary Iraqis. Given that it was widely perceived inside Iraq as a 
vengeful measure, the sanctions regime gave rise to further cynicism by Iraqis towards 
international institutions. While on the one hand the sanctions and other punitive measures against 
Iraq may have enforced an uneasy peace in the medium-term, their long-term effects were counter-
productive and unpredictable. The sanctions may have succeeded in forcing the Iraqi government 
to submit a substantial proportion of the stock of long-range rockets and nuclear and chemical 
materials and facilities for their manufacture. However, the continuation of sanctions may have 
helped to unleash negative forces characterised by unstable political and security environment. In 
the long run, the sanctions impact has prolonged the suffering of the Iraqi population as well 
degrading the country’s economic capacity. As is evident, economic sanctions are double edged 
swords and are more likely to hinder rather than help the cause of meeting the ongoing challenge 
of building long-term peace and stability in target states. 
With regard to Zimbabwe, it was the SADC’s engagement efforts that saw the birth of the inclusive 
government after the 2008 plebiscite failed to produce a winner, and political violence erupted in 
the countdown to the presidential run-off (Raftopolous & Mlambo 2009:229). Prominent British 
scholar, Stephen Chan (2011 online), observes that the targeted sanctions against Zimbabwe have 
not worked and has enjoined the main advocate for the targeted sanctions, Britain, to consider 
engagement as an option now. His prediction that the US and the whole of EU, currently faced 
with a serious recession, will need Zimbabwe for trade in 2011 resonates with Rennie Atterbury 
III’s (1997:338) observation that sanctions also do harm to business in the sender States. 
In conclusion, it is conceded that comprehensive economic sanctions need to be revised in order 
to spare the innocent people who more often than not get caught up in the crossfire. However, as 
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has been argued in this paper, targeted or smart sanctions are not the solution because of the harm 
they bring to bear on the same innocent victims. The selected case study of Zimbabwe presented 
poignant accounts of how targeted sanctions have caused untold suffering to the ordinary people 
who ironically are the intended beneficiaries. The paper also illustrated how the targeted sanctions 
are evaded by the targeted individuals who remain entrenched in the corridors of power. Therefore, 
the sooner diplomatic engagement becomes the alternative policy instrument of the day, the more 
innocent lives are likely to be saved, and the better the prospects for international peace and 
stability. The observation by Hufbauer et al. (2007:139) that practically, it is impossible to 
choreograph measures “with the accuracy of a cruise missile”, therefore holds true with regard to 
targeted sanctions. In the case of Cuba, Zimbabwe and Iraq, the sanctions failed their intended 
goals of removing the regime or changing the behaviour of the leadership in these countries, but 
led to innocent civilians’ suffering through high cost of living and high death tolls, especially in 
Iraq. 
8.7 An Ethical Critique of Economic Sanctions 
This chapter was mainly about an ethical critique of economic sanctions in which the main 
argument in this critique is that sanctions violate the principle of discrimination which is central 
to just war theory. From the Kantian ethical perspective people should be treated as ends in 
themselves. Sanctions reduce individuals to nothing more than means to an end by using the 
suffering of innocents as a means of coercion against the target state, thereby violating the Kantian 
principle that human beings are ‘ends in themselves’. Kant postulated that our human actions are 
ethical when they can be universalised. What this implies is that what we do to other people can 
be ethically condoned only when we accept the same action to be done to our own humanity. 
Economic sanctions do fail to meet this Kantian ethical dictum, especially when one takes into 
account the fact that the sender(s) of economic sanctions do so in pursuit of their national interests 
to the detriment of the target state. 
Another ethical theory which is at odds with economic sanctions is John Stuart Mill’s theory of 
utilitarianism. This ethical theory says that an act can be ethical only when it promotes the greatest 
good for the greatest number of people. Economic sanctions are incommensurate with the ethical 
theory of utilitarianism because the imposition on a target state has an indiscriminate impact that 
has always resulted in the loss of life to the majority of citizens of the target state. From a utilitarian 
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perspective, an action is deemed to have promoted the greatest good for the greatest number of 
people by analysing the resultant consequences after the action has been made. Since the 
consequences of economic sanctions are devastating indiscriminately to the majority of the citizens 
of the target state, they outweigh the good, because there is no empirical evidence that proves that 
economic sanctions lead to the promotion of the greatest good within the target state.  
From an African ethical tradition, it was argued that economic sanctions dehumanise the majority 
of the innocent citizens of the target state. There are two perspectives from African ethics which 
render economic sanctions unethical. First, since African ethics puts emphasis on the promotion 
of life of the community, economic sanctions are unethical because they are destructive to the 
general communal wellbeing of the communities of the target states. The second presumption of 
African ethics which makes economic sanctions unethical is the fact that human beings are beings 
by virtue of relationality, whereby to be a real person is to promote life of the community. In other 
words, a humane existence should be that which promotes the perpetuation of life to such an extent 
no life is endangered for whatever reason. For this reason, the idea that economic sanctions 
decimate lives and livelihoods indiscriminately makes them ethically indefensible. Economic 
sanctions are not aimed at promoting life. Rather, the telos of their sender(s) is to make life 
unbearable to the majority of the citizens of the target state. 
The last section of this chapter argued that economic sanctions are related to the problem of evil 
in human existence. My first argument on the connection between economic sanctions and evil 
came in the form of the rationale behind sceptical realism which asserts that the relations among 
States are not guided by moral or ethical considerations; they are based instead on the pursuit of 
national interests of the sender States. After investigating the works of most of the scholars who 
have been critical towards economic sanctions, their criticisms on sanctions converged on the idea 
that such a promotion of a foreign policy remains inhumane and evil because of the resultant 
devastating effects of economic sanctions on the majority of the innocent citizens of the target 
state. It is for this reason that it was argued that economic sanctions belong to the narrative of the 
reality of evil in human existence, they form part of that narrative. The following section will thus 
serve as a general conclusion to the study and will also provide some recommendations in a way 
that is constructive. 
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SECTION B: STUDY RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.8 Recommendations 
While the previous section provided a general conclusion to the whole study on the basis of the 
conclusions that were made in various chapters, this section will end this dissertation with 
recommendations. This study adopted a critical stance against economic sanctions as a tool for 
foreign policy aimed at enforcing behaviour modification on the target state. It is only logical that 
one does not end simply with a critical stance against economic sanctions, but rather, one should 
provide an alternative point of view on the place of economic sanctions in the realm of international 
relations. It is from the recommendations that will be briefly discussed in this chapter that future 
scholars and students who will study sanctions will also benefit academically. As we have seen in 
the various chapters of this study apart from Chapter 7, scholars who provided some rational 
justification for the imposition of sanctions as a foreign policy tool for behaviour modification on 
the target state were mainly motivated by the assumption that economic sanctions were preferable 
to war, an argument which was found ethically implausible. The later argument became the 
position of this thesis. Since there is no empirical evidence on the efficacy of economic sanctions 
as a tool for foreign policy aimed at influencing behaviour modification on the target state, there 
is a need to come up with recommendations that can be used as pointers for further scholarly 
reflection on future international approaches to influencing behaviour modification of the target 
state other than the imposition of economic sanctions.  
In the light of the above observation, this section is divided into three sub-sections that comprise 
the recommendations deemed necessary for foreign policy towards the target state. In the first 
section, my recommendation is that economic sanctions imposed on the target country should be 
evaluated by a multilateral body such as the UN and some of its strategic organs such as the UNSC, 
WHO, the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process (formerly known 
as UNSCO), and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNCHR), to mention just a 
few. The second section will comprise the recommendation that before the imposition of economic 
sanctions on the target state it is imperative that a serious study should be undertaken by a body of 
experts from a multidisciplinary perspective as to whether the imposition of economic sanctions 
on the chosen target state is justifiable as the only alternative available to effect policy change or 
behaviour modification on the target state. Finally, the third recommendation is that instead of 
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imposing economic sanctions as a foreign policy tool on the target state, the UN and its member 
States should thrive in adopting a strategy based on constructive engagement with the target state 
with the aim of bringing about behaviour modification on the target state. 
8.8.1 Subjecting Economic Sanctions to Continuous Evaluation by the UN and its Organs 
An argument which is central to this study and which was previously raised against the ethical 
justifiability of economic sanctions was that economic sanctions are usually imposed on the target 
state on the basis of the national interest of the sender countries and the interests of lobbying groups 
or organisations. It is partly for this reason that economic sanctions are imposed against the target 
state on the basis of competing motivations that are on closer scrutiny based on the pursuit of 
national interests and self-interests, which remain ethically unjustifiable. Once economic sanctions 
are imposed on the target state, there is no effort since there are no mechanisms in place that subject 
them to exerting their effects on the target country. As we have seen previously in the examples 
given in this study, the effects of economic sanctions on the target countries were reflected on only 
later, after the lives of the majority of the citizens of the target state had already been destroyed 
indiscriminately. It is for this reason that economic sanctions should be subjected to continuous 
evaluation by the UN and its organs. Here, the presumption is that economic sanctions against the 
target state should be authorised by the UN General Assembly instead of being imposed by 
countries on the basis of geostrategic political, economic and military alliances’ national interests. 
For economic sanctions to be legal and legitimate, they need to be approved by the UN with the 
specific aim of enforcing specific policy objectives that will be desirable to the majority of the 
citizens of the target state. This recommendation entails making some changes to the current UN 
Charter which has given too much power to the UNSC on the imposition of economic sanctions 
to the exclusion of the UN General Assembly so as to include the participation of all the UN organs 
in the imposition of economic sanctions. 
8.8.2 Sanctions should be Reviewed by a Body of Experts from a Multidisciplinary 
Perspective 
In the preceding chapters, it is evident that the rational justification of economic sanctions as a 
policy for foreign policy has come from economists and political scholars of foreign relations. 
These scholars have a strong influence on the general presumptions about economic sanctions as 
a tool for the enforcement of foreign policy. Economic thinking as enshrined in game theoretical 
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approach to human economic behaviour and political theories of international relations has 
adopted a mechanistic approach in the analysis of economic sanctions. These disciplines do not 
take into account the indiscriminate punishment that is inflicted on the citizens of the target state. 
They also fail to deal with two problems that dovetail economic sanctions, namely that economic 
sanctions have never succeeded as a tool for the modification of foreign policy on the target state 
and that economic sanctions do not have ethical justifiability. Our current conceptualisation of 
economic sanctions needs to be enriched by adopting a multidisciplinary perspective. My 
recommendation in this regard is that when subjected economic sanctions are seen from an ethical 
paradigm, they remain ethically indefensible. From a health perspective they are a foreign policy 
tool that creates a deterioration of the healthcare system of the target state. When seen from a 
sociological perspective, economic sanctions give rise to social instability because of the migration 
of the population of the target state in search for greener pastures in neighbouring countries. Since 
economic sanctions have a devastating impact on the livelihoods of those who are economically 
vulnerable, the would-be impact of economic sanctions should be taken into consideration before 
they are imposed on the target state. 
8.8.3 Constructive Engagement Over Comprehensive Economic Sanctions 
Since it was the main argument of this thesis that there is no ethical justifiability for the imposition 
of economic sanctions over the target state, I should like to recommend that economic sanctions 
should be replaced by a political culture of constructive engagement between the sender State(s) 
or organisations and the target state on how to resolve the political situation in the target state in a 
way that results in harmonious international relations. Constructive engagement presupposes all 
parties to the conflict should aim at coming up with a solution which is agreeable to both sides. 
Since economic sanctions are similar to warfare in the sense that they inflict indiscriminate 
suffering on the poor and the innocent, they cannot be defended with impunity as a humane policy 
in influencing foreign policy in the target state. The very idea that economic sanctions are an 
inhumane or immoral foreign policy implies that their implementation against the target state 
remains inhumane and amoral. But since economic sanctions are sometimes imposed by the 
senders under a wide range of motives, their justifiability remains problematic.  
In our currently democratised world where the value of political pluralism is highly valued, the 
idea of co-existence implies that a global or an international effort should be put into nursing the 
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value of pluralism through constructive engagement, which is possible only through a dialogic 
approach in solving issues of domestic and international conflicts. Through constructive 
engagement, policy deliberations should not be aimed at converting each other. They should rather 
be aimed at learning from each other. In this regard, constructive engagement aims at persuading 
the other party and offering reasons that will enable them to see the beauty of one’s point of view. 
As we have seen in the preceding chapters, economic sanctions are usually used as a coercive tool 
for the change of foreign policy in the target state. Usually the point of view of the target state is 
not taken into account prior to the imposition of economic sanctions. The point of view of or 
reasoning with the target state with regard to its foreign policy is entirely ignored. Through the art 
of constructive engagement, one party to the conflict employs persuasion, where the other party 
does not feel cornered into assenting to an idea or policy which they feel to be a blatant violation 
of their socio-political and cultural convictions. Constructive engagement aims at persuading the 
other party to the conflict by offering reasons that will enable them to see the beauty of the point 
of view of the foreign policy alternative which is being offered. Constructive engagement 
presupposes the existence of mature minds whereby socio-political and economic policy 
commitments are seen as a demonstration of the versatility of the plurality of human existence. 
Prior dogmatic commitment to long-held socio-economic and political commitments is usually a 
recipe for the erosion of the grounds for constructive engagement. In constructive engagement, 
tolerance becomes a civic virtue that is highly sought after.  
8.9 Suggestions for Future Research 
In order to maintain the focus of the study the present research could address all pertinent issue 
areas linked to economic sanctions. One of the critical areas that needs further interrogation is the 
relationship between economic sanctions and democratisation. As indicated in this study, extant 
literature has established that the question of democratic sanction efficacy has been left largely 
unanswered or unexplored. Future research on sanctions and democratization should be 
undertaken to demonstrate the democratic effect of those sanctions that explicitly aim to increase 
the level of democracy in the targeted country. 
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